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PREFACE 
PREFACE 
Nationalism emerged as the major force animating Afro-
Asian and Latin American countries in the. world that developed 
following the end of the world War II. The diverse manifestation 
of this emergent nationalism exerciscd fcur reaching effects on 
the development of international relations - both political and 
economic. On the political level, the objectives of Third World 
'nationalism' were to end colonial domination, to take change of 
their own destinies, and to play more effective role in global 
affairs - particularly in those matters that directly affected 
their vital interests. 
On the economic plan, their goals were to generate and 
encourage international cooperation in the field of development 
assistance, anc' to establish their sovereign rights over their 
natural resources. For several reasons, the oil producing 
countries eventually came to play a major role in advancing 
these objectives, shifting their focus from political liberation 
and struggle for independence to economic independence. 
In addition to general international factors, developments 
in the countries of the West Asia after the World War II, 
regarding Arab unity and the role assigned to oil in its 
achievement along with other countries speeded this process 
that finally led to the creation of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1960. 
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As is often the case with the major historical events the 
creation of OPEC was prompted by two sets of factors: 
The immediate factors were the two subsequent unilateral 
and arbitrary reductions of oil prices by the international oil 
companies in February 1959 and August i960. These price 
reductions had a determining effect on the creation of OPEC by 
galvanishing the oil producers to take action to counter the 
erosion of their economic position. Yet at the same time, the 
establishment of an association of oil producers would not have 
been possible, if certain developments had not taken place within 
the oil producing states in the light of the emerging new ideas 
and concepts regarding international economic relations, the 
relationship between developing and industrialised countries, and 
the factors stimulating cooperation among developing countries -
all contributed to OPEC's establishmento 
Although the creation of OPEC did much to intensify the 
need felt among Third World countries for closer cooperation in 
order to achieve their political and economic objectives. However, 
the fundamental differences among OPEC members - as they differ 
widely in size, population, petroleum reserves, development needs 
and political and ideological orientation, affected to a great 
deal the outlook and approach of the member countries towards oil 
matters, which in turn have restricted OPEC's operation and 
policy evolution. Of course, one major source of difference 
within OPEC is the division of its members between Arab and 
GULF OPEC MEI4BFRS 
Map No. 1 
+ OPEC West Asia - Isl.amic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE 
Source: Based on OPEC at a Glance 
published by OPEC Secretariat, OPEC, VIENNA, Austria,1983. 
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non-Arab countries, and this has led the West Asian Arab 
countries to fullfil their particular needs, to establish 
purely Intra-Arab and Arab Gulf countries' Organization in the 
form of OAPEC and GCC, which contribute the largest share of 
OPEC's oil reserves and financial surplus. Yet the Arab members 
of OAPEC and GCC within OPEC do not form a homogenous group, but 
rather have remain divided along ideological lines between the 
so-called progressive and conservative regimes. 
This is aiso true in the case of three major non-Arab 
OPEC countries i.e. Iran, Venezuela and Nigeria which like 
their Arab counterparts are more confined to their own specific 
objectives than for a cohesive unity of OPEC. In the past, 
their needs and objectives have sharply conflicted with one-another 
with the OPEC - the best example of which is the Iran-Iraq dispute 
over border problems - and later their war - in addition to a whole 
range of other issues. And hence this study of the'OPEC and 
the Politics of Indian Ocean* is purposely try to confine 
itself to the Gulf OPEC members in the context of their being 
located as littoral states and dominated by the rivalry between 
tbe ,'juper powers, in the Indian Ocean. As the rise of OPEC is 
not an event that the Super Powers have viewed with equanimity 
and conposure. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have 
been affected by the growth of the economic power of the OPEC 
countries. Looking at the map, the Persian Gulf region of the 
Indian Ocean is obviously important for the Super Powers to 
control the production and transportation of oil, while the 
control of the Red Sea region, means to ensure a smooth passage 
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of cargo vessels and warships. In the wider circle, control of 
the area includes not only the control of political units 
directly located on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Red 
Sea* but also other unites that depend economically* militarily 
and strategically on the Red Sea, the horn of Africa arid the 
Persian Gulf, The United States and the West depend for their 
oil needs on this region while the Soviet Union considers the 
Red Sea important as the nearest route connecting its black sea 
ports to the Indian Ocean. These reasons give to this area 
general strategic dimensions in the international arena where 
the situation may likely to fall into three broad categories* 
Interstate conflicts, domestic crises, and acts of non-state 
entities. Interstate conflicts may further fall into three 
sub-categories: conflict between the Super Powers^between the 
gulf states and the major oil consttming nations, and arreang 
regional states. Thus we cannot talk about the policies -
economic, political and strategic - of the OPEC GUlf coxintries 
without taking into consideration the security of the Red Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This 
Power politics of Indian Ocean has badly affected the desire of 
conservative OPEC Gulf countries to fullfil their commitment to 
support the under-developed countries and hence to support the 
issues for the New International Economic Order. To them the 
monetary help has become a way of obtaining diplomatic support 
for their own cause rather than an eaimest compaign to be waged 
for their goals. Thus the aid policies of the Arab members of 
OPEC have been motivated first and foremost by their security -
political and economic both at the level of individual Arab 
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countries and at the Pan-Arab level. However despite their 
divergences, the Arab countries, atleast in theory, are 
committed to the ideal of Arab unity and to use their new oil 
wealth to fullfil some of their common Arab political and 
economic objectives. Yet they disagree on the exact nature, 
order of priority and the best means to achieve these goals and 
through its financial leverage, every major Arab donor separately 
has tried to influence the evolution both of Intra-Arab relations 
and relations between Arab and Third World countries in 
directions more akin to its own interests and ideological 
preferences. This is not to say that Arab countries have been 
totally insensitive to the aspirations of the developing 
countries. It is simply to stress that their individual and 
common objectives and interests have had priority over other 
considerations. 
It needs to be stressed that adverse political developments 
in the oil rich countries of the Gulf are likely to effect OPEC's 
position in world markets. It is also quite clear that the oil 
producing developing countries outside OPEC have contributed to 
further weakening of oil market by incieased production and price 
reduction. In most cases these non-OPEC countries have been 
forced to take these decisions, which are obviously not in their 
interest. 
The question, then why the Gulf States should make a 
stand over an issue that appears to effect their position less 
severely than other factors that have been controversial within 
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OPEC. The Gulf states have seen their oil revenues diminishing 
rapidly as a result of weak demand, and by having played the 
role of residual prodxjiccr by adjusting their production to 
maintain a grip on total supply and hence price. The OPEC's 
share of the capitalist world market has slunped from 67.4 
percent in 1976 to 44,6 percent in 1982. Despite a productive 
capacity of more than 30 million barrels per day (b/d), the OPEC 
total plunged to 14 million b/d in early 1983, and has now 
established at a level of 17-18 million b/d. OPEC oil as a 
share of total primary energy consumption of the capitalist 
world amounted to only 13.6 percent in 1982, compared to 22,6% 
* 
in 1979. 
OPEC has been pushed into the role of a marginal supplier 
responsible for bearing the brunt of demand reductions. A 
number of structural factors have combined to reduce demand for 
OPEC oil and to undermine world market pricess 
1, Increased production of cut-priced non-OPEC Oil. 
2. Alternative energy use had increased slightly. 
3. The global economic crises resulted in unprecedentedly 
large cuts in energy consultation. 
4, More energy-efficient industrial production 
technologies are being developed in "old" industries. 
New "high technology" industrial sectors are only 
marginally dependent on energy input. 
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However/ the deo^and for oil and other energy resources 
are mainly "derived demands" in the sense that they are used 
as inputs in the production of a flow of services or output. 
Both the price of these resources and the level of aggregate 
demand/output will therefore be important factors in determining 
the overall demand for oil anri other energy resources. This 
relationship, however/ is complex to understand in part because 
these two determining factors interact and also because it is 
likely to change through time. Furthermore/ the recent economic 
environment is very different to that of the previous two decades 
and hence, past trends which reflected falling real energy prices 
and a growing volume of world trade and output are likely to 
prove a helpful guide for future demand projections. 
It has been argued that a fall in the price of oil/energy 
could help to stimulate world demand, since lower prices would 
imply lower costs of production of oil/energy users. This could 
stimulate demand either through increased profit margins, which 
could increase investment, employment and output and/or through 
lower output prices leading to higher output demand, then 
increased investment and so on. This could prove ultimately to 
be beneficial to the resource owners since they can then hope 
to restore their original bargaining power to fullfil their 
commitments, although at present it is complicated as the Super 
Pov/ers' economic intervention in the International energy markets 
contributes towards an erosion of their collective economic power. 
Given these facts, OPEC cannot be a narrowly functionalist 
organization, intentionally oblivious of the political demension 
of developments within the energy industry. OPEC must address 
itself to the political initiatives of the Super Powers and seek 
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to offset the repercussions. OPEC policy in the field of trade, 
investment and aid must be explicitly based upon a firm 
commitment to safeguard the political interests of its member 
states. 
What it required, is a recognition of a reorientation of 
OPEC's role as an instrument for enhancing the economic power of 
member countries. It can play this role by accelerating the 
process of industrialization and reduce their dependence on the 
West, In Asia and Africa* OPEC can become a vehicle for regional 
development through aid. Such a policy can be pursued if, 
despite their preoccupation with affairs close to home, the 
member countries not ignore the wide problems of the West Asian 
region, A settlement of the Israeli-Arab or perhaps more 
precisely of the Israeli-Palestinean conflict matters to the 
Gulf OPEC countries for a number of reasons as their rulers 
genuinely care about the lo~t of the Palestineans and they 
strongly object to Israel rule in the region. 
It is in this scenario, to ensure security-political, 
economic and military, the area has to work together , It is 
probably the case, however, that without calculated economic 
steps at this juncture, political and military security would 
have an inadequate base. Economic ties will be an immence 
tool to bring these countries together in a meaningful way. 
However, one is bound to believe that the Gulf countries must 
continue to have a strong association with the rest of the Arab 
world, not only politically but economically because this is very 
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critical. Second important, is a question, which involves the 
transfer of technology - not in the sense of the non-oil 
producing countries transferring technology to the oil 
producing nations - but the way in which oil countries can 
transfer energy technology to the non-oil states in the Gulf 
region. Here there is a mutuality of interest that could be 
enhanced. 
For all these reasons, such an approach provides 
incentive for cooperation among the Gulf OPEC members. It also 
provides a step or a stage in a wider cooperation, involving the 
oil rich states of the Gulf and the rest of the Third World 
developing countries. And hence, if one looks at OPEC as a 
regional development, as a stage in a greater effort, then it 
is worth while for all parties in the area to meet jointly the 
more immediate economic, political and security needs as well as 
an expended long term potential for a larger Third World 
grouping. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAME WORK 
In order to substantiate the thesis outline above, this 
study will focus a comprehensive overview of where OPEC has been 
and where it finds itself today. It will also fore-shadow what 
the future might hold for oil producers in a world rapidly 
sloughing off its reliance on oil. This study will also try to 
provide atleast a partial answer to the broder question of why 
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the OPEC countries have failed to achieve certain political 
goals, when their economic policies may be used as a means to 
achieve the wider aims of controlling the policies of other 
countries to their benefit. And why the OPEC countries have 
failed to advance Third World objectives. What it suggests -
is a recognition of a reorientation of OPEC's role as an 
instrtament for enhancing (its members) economic power by 
accelerating their industrialisation and reducing dependence on 
the West. 
In so doing, this study will concentrate on describing 
and analysing five distinct areas, leading to significant 
conclusions about the overall phenomenon of OPEC's politics in 
the regional and international context. The areas chosen have 
been put in a logical order so as to lead to the central thesis 
of study. 
The chapter I proposes to set the scence by discussing 
OPEC's own history and the history of the Gulf developing 
countries' efforts to reform the international economic system 
in Order to make it more responsive to their own needs. Since 
the voracious appetite for energy in industrialized societies 
and the growing nationalism of the producing countries in energy 
matters have caused oil to become a prominent political issue. 
This chapter also aims to assess the true place of oil in the 
world, for around oil as a raw material there arise relations of 
cooperation and of conflict between men, organizations and states. 
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Chapter 2 w i l l provide a background f o r d i s cuss ion of 
con^jarative International Energy Policy of three countries and 
of one of the regional groupings i.e. U.S.A. # USSR, Japan and 
E.E.C., including a summary of current energy problems and their 
likely future options in relation to the frame work of OPEC*s 
action. The objective of this corrparative study is two foldj 
First there is a heuristic purpose of learning how other 
societies resolve energy problems within their different 
political economic and geogx^iphical contexts, and secondly, to 
what extent did the internal political structure of these 
countries, their resource base beyond oil, and the geo-strategic 
contexts within which they have to operate, effect their domestic 
and foreign policies. 
Chapter 3 is ir^ortant in assessing particular means of 
dispersing aid which have an impact on basic questions of its 
orientation and effectiveness in the light of th^ conflicting 
scenario West Asia faces today. It will explore the following 
key questions, among others* what were the factors that affected 
OPEC's choice of channels for aid?, did all OPEC countries 
prefer the same channels or were their differences among them 
and - if so - what were the reasons for the differences? What 
were the implications of OPEC's choices for achieving developing 
country goals, including that of reforming the international 
economic order? What were the implications of OPEC's choices 
for achieving developing country goals, including that of 
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reforming the international economic order? As until now, the 
North-South Dialogue has shown a lack of vision and thus has 
remained ineffective. It would also suggest the means to achieve 
serious cooperation between North and South in order to move ahead 
in a process that reflect the community of interests of all 
nations. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the frame work of OPEC actions: 
the why of aid programmes, set within a broad context of foreign, 
security, and economic policies. It will include discussion of 
the following questions among others: How consistent were OPEC 
country motives with the Organizations declared objectives in 
granting aid? To what extent were these motives influence by the 
needs-security, political and economic -- of the OPEC Gulf 
countries? In addition did the OPEC countries use aid as an 
instnament of security and foreign policy and - if so - how 
effective was it? What was the impact of aid on recipent 
countries in terms of their - political and economic dependence 
on OPEC and their capacity for independent economic action? In 
sum, what were the politics of OPEC's aid? 
Chapter 5 and 6 provide a backdrop to the problems of the 
Indian Ocean region. As it is essential to bear in mind the 
general question of the third world equation (or equations) with 
the Super Powers in order to put Super Powers involvement in the 
region in its proper perspective, as this has a direct bearing on 
the problems of peace and security to the West Asian littoral and 
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hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. Since this rivalry has 
broadly proceeded on three considerations: competition in 
developing and maintaining tht capability for developmc nt of 
strategic nuclear weapons; competition to exercise influence and 
control in the littoroal and hinterland states in the Indian 
Ocean area, and competition to maintain the security of the sea 
lanes. The se two chapter simply do not pretend to discuss the 
history of inter-state relations, but try to examine the whole 
security environment of the region. These chapters will also 
assess the strategic interests of th^ major global powers in the 
area in relation to their commitments elsewhere, for it is their 
commitments that are going to decide the degree of their 
interference in the region and it is the extent of their 
interference that will influence the shape of economic, political 
and security isnues of the areap 
The chapter 7, also concluding chapter will synthesize 
different factors that have shaped OPEC politics what it is. This 
chapter will also demonstrate how the interaction of these factors 
tended to strengthen the device elements both within OPEC and 
between OPEC and the rest of the developing world in general and 
with the developed world in particular, preventing OPEC from using 
aid, principally to advance its Third World objectives. Further 
this chapter will maXe some general remarks regarding an 
understanding of alternative and most likely future of oil vis-a-
vis the further operative development of OPECo Since the question 
of its supply and price are central to the prospects for the overall 
development of the world's economic system and thus for the 
v?elfare of most of the world's inhabitants. Second, because the 
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future of oil is increasingly influential in detenmining major 
political issues at the international level, including the 
question of peace and war, and a failure to resolve this issue 
will in fact provide a ground for future upheavals. 
Thus, in modem world which is increasingly interdependent 
and yet fragmented the OPEC cannot be isolated from major world 
issues as a subject of study of the international systfm. However 
this study cannot and does not claim to be con^jrehcnsive or 
conclusive. It looks at the kaleidoscopic situation and 
portrays a snap of the picture at one point of time. The 
dissertation does hot atteirpt to give the answers, it endeavours 
only to raise right questions. It is an opening statment in 
generating further discussion through OPEC on the over growing 
problems of the region. This is an outsiders view of the 
crisis and development and hence all the comments here are 
personalo 
Since a realistic examination of the oil problems cannot 
be adequately studied with the conventional economic tools, 
therefore my ability to develop a broad gauge system approach to 
economic problems is devoted in exploring applications of Economic, 
Political, Sociological and Psychological theories to the 
analysis of historical problems. 
With regard to the actual carrying out of this study, I am 
deeply indebted to my teacher and supervisor Prof, S.AoH, Bilgrami, 
Department of Political Science, A,M,U. Indeed his consistent 
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encouragement coupled with his constructive criticism has 
greatly helped me to give a final shape to this study, I would 
also like to place my thanks to Prof, Mahmudul Haque, Prof„ M.Ao 
Saleem Khan, Centre of West Asian' Studies, AMU. and Prof. A,H.H, 
Abidi, Centre of West Asian and North African Studies, J,N,U., 
New Delhi, for encouragement and timely suggestions, that have 
greatly eased the task of finally presenting this thesis. I am 
also grateful to Prof. Tom Travis, Bucknell University, USA 
(visiting Pulbright Scholar to India), and Prof. A.P. 
Venkataratnam, Mysore University, for their help and many 
valuable suggestions at the early stage of the study, I am 
equally indebted to Prof, A,Pc Usmani, Chairman, and to the 
staff members of the Department of Political Science for their 
rendered help and much needed support for the preparation of 
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CHAPTER I 
CHAPTER - I 
OIL PRODUCTION POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICTS AND WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In the recent years, the international oil industry 
has undergone fundamental changes that have altered both the 
subject of conflict and the principle players of the oil game. 
The early conflict was seen between oil producing countz'iE's 
acting mostly individually and the multinational oil 
corporations monopolizing oil industry whereby appropriating 
major part of the profit to themselves. By contrast, the 
present conflict is over pricing and production policies, and 
the players are now a collective front of oil exporters - the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), versus 
a disarranged collection of oil importers. Thus the conflict 
over oil pricing and production policies will continue unabated 
1 
with its concomitant effects on the International Politics. 
For these reasons, the present issue addresses throe 
major questions. The first concerns the early conflict betvreen 
1. Oil and Gas Journal 1974, p. 11„ 
oil producers and Multinational Corporations (r-lNCs) relating to 
factors that strenqthened the bargaining position of oil 
producers« The second question focuses on the present conflict 
between OPEC and oil importerSo And finally the third question 
emphasises over production decisions in the oil producing 
countries in general and in the Arab countrie s in particular 
against the background of shifting conflicts in the international 
oil game. 
In initial explorations for oil and in the early 
concessions arranged between heads of oil producing states 
foreign oil companies, the heads of producing states were not 
profit maximizers, because they were in no position to apply 
the marginal costs - marginal revenue criterian. The concept 
of profit maximization did not enter into early noryotiations 
to any significant degree, because West Asian states had 
neither the technical expertise nor the financial resources 
necessary to develop independently their oil fields. The 
primary objectives of west Asian leaders xvere the development 
of their resources and the attraction of sorely needed foreign 
capital and technology. There is no doubt that these leaders 
were skilled bargainers* but their immediate needs placed them 
in a weak bargaining position with foreign oil companies. Thus, 
the result of negotiations were inequitable agreements 
characterized by long leases, a high degree of foreign control, 
2 
and relatively moderate royalities. 
It is no wonder, then that, in the West Asian countries 
the term 'concession' acquired an unfavourable connotation, so 
much so that at times its use has been condemned as derogatory 
to national honour. Nevertheless, the developir^nt of the modem 
oil industry in the area began with this concept. Although 
their concession agreements differred from country to country. 
2, Naiem A. Sherbiny and Mark A Testier (eds.); Arab Oil 
Impact on the Arab countries and Global Implications. 
(Praeger Publishers, USA), P. 35. 
however, a number of characteristics were common to practically 
all concessions granted by the producing countries. The common 
elements can be summarised as follows: 
1, The area of concession was ger^rally very large. 
In some cases it embraced the whole country (as in the case of 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar); in others it covered a major region 
which, either because of its geological formation or because of 
its political character, constituted a well defined territorial 
entity (as in the case of Iranian concession, which excluded five 
northern provinces then under the Russian sphere of influence), 
2. The privileges granted to companies included as a 
rule, the exclusive rights to explore, prospect, extract, refine 
and export crude oil and related materials (such as natural gas) 
within the area of the concession, 
3. The duration of the concession was specified usually 
from 60 to 75 years, 
4, Companies were generally required to supply the oil 
requirements of the host governments and oil products for local 
consunption. This clause was usually accompanied by a proviso 
that Quantities thus supplied should not be subject to royalty 
calculation and should be calculated at prices below those 
prevailing in world markets. 
5. Installations rights and the right of eminent domain 
were granted. Within these limitations, companies had the right 
to establish their own system of trasportation and communication 
for the efficient conduct of their operations. Among these 
facilities, radio, telegraph and telephone as well as rail roads, 
vessels and air planes, were usually specified in the concession 
agreements. 
6. Certain extra territorial rights, such as freedom 
from all direct and indirect taxation and freedom from government 
controls over the conditions of production and marketing, were 
granted. 
7. Con^janies were required to present to the host 
government an annual report of their operations, including data 
on the discovery of new oil deposits and geological plans and 
records. Such information was to be treated as confidential by 
the host countryo 
8. The concession agreements made no mention of the 
surrender by the oil coixpanies of unexploited areas after a 
certain period of time. Thus the companies were able to retain 
all the areas covered by the original concession agreement, 
although no actual operations were undertaken, on the other hand, 
the corrpanies could refuse to allow other companies or the host 
government to exploit these areas. 
Conunenting on the injustices of the oil concessions, 
George W. Stocking, the well knovfn oil economist said; 'Never 
in modern times have governments granted so much to so few for 
so long. • Thus it should come as no surprise that, after 
attaining political independence the oil producing countries 
began to ask for major revisions of the terms of the old 
concessions. Between the early 1940s and the formation of OPEC, 
the host government took actions ranging from direct negotiations 
between the governments and thcj oil con^ajnies for revision of 
4 concession agreements, to nationalization. 
Quarrels between producing governments and their 
concessionaires over the amount of payments to governments did 
not spring forth full blown after World War II. In Iran, for 
example the 60 year D* Arcy concession of 1901 was suspended 
when the government having become aware of the Inportance of the 
oil to the British Navy during the first World War, expressed 
dissatisfaction with Its revenues, and insisted on renegotiation. 
Iran concluded a new agreement with the conpany (now named 
Anglo-Persian, and later Anglo-^Iranian oil company) in 1920, but 
the government soon was perturbed that during several years in 
the 1920's production had increased but Iran's revenue had gon« 
down. 
3. George W. Stocking, the Middle East oil. A study in 
Political and Economic Controversy (Vanderbilt University 
Press, Nashville, Tenn, 1970), P. 13. 
4. Andulazlz al-Sowayegh, see chap. 'Major Actors in the Oil 
Game* from Arab Petto Politics, (Croom Helm, Australia 1984), pp. 28-29. 
In 1931 the government unilaterally cancelled the 
concession, citing the failure of the coirpany to open its 
financial records to inspection. So a new agreement was 
concluded in 1933, guaranteeing the government a minimum 
royalty per ton, however until World war II, the two parties 
disputed whether the royalty should be calculated according to 
the English ••long" ton (2.240 pounds) or the 2,000 pound ••short" 
5 
ton. 
Since by that time it was the conpanies that decided 
where and when to prospect for oil; it was the companies again 
that determined how much oil to produce once it was fourtd; and 
it was again the companies that, in the light of their assessment 
of the market set the price at which it would be sold. Although 
the companies operating in each country were legally distinct, 
their was a pattern of interlocking ownership. British Petroleum 
(BP), Shell, Mobil, and Exxon were part-owners of the three 
conpanies operating in Iraqj Exxon, Texaco, California standard, 
and Mobil jointly owned Aramco, which operated in Saudi Arabia; 
Exxon, Shell and Gulf through affiliates, operated separately in 
Venezuela; Gulf and BP jointly held the concession in Kuwait. 
5. According to the company the one major difference between 
itself and the Govememtn during the period, until the 
outbreak of war, was the definition of the word "ton" in the concession. The company maintained that the English long ton of 2,240 pounds was meant, while the Government maintained 
that the ton of 2,000 Pounds was meant. On July 30, 1936 the 
company agreed to pay royalty on the basis of the ordinary 
ton, though it continued to maintain that it was the English 
ton that had been understood, Benjamin Shwadran, the Middle 
East Oil and the Great Powers 3rd. ed.(Wiley New York, 1973) 
pp, 13-47 annual production and revenues are listed on 
pp. I3f Cf.Raymond F. Wikeseel and Hollis Chenery# Arabian 
8 
Later, all seven of them held shaires in the Iranian 
consortium that replaced BP after the crisis of 1951-54. in the 
world at large in 1949/50 these seven cottpanies controlled 65% 
of proved reserves of Petroleum outside the Soviet bloc, 55% 
of its production, 57% of all refinairy capacity and major 
pipelines, and through ownership or long-term leases, atleast 
6 67% of all privately owned tanker space. 
There had also been earlier attempts to coordinate 
policies among the governments of oil producing countries, 
Venezuela had putout feelers to West Asian governments as early as 
1947. Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1953 had concluded an agreement 
calling for exchange of information and periodic consultation 
regarding the problem. And an Arab Petroleum Conference in 
Cairo in 1959 adopted a resolution in^sting that any changes 
in posted price should be discussed with the government of the 
7 
producing country. However, despite the strong position taken 
by the oil producing countries and their warning to the 
companies against a unilateral price reduction, the companies 
went ahead and, for the second time cut oil prices in August 
1960. This action reduced West Asian posted prices to a level 
below that of 1953. The two price cuts of 1959 and I960, of 
approximately 27 cents a barrel, resulted in a drastic loss of 
>, Charles Issawi and Mohaimad Yaganeh, 'The Economics 
Middle Eastern Oil' (Praegar, New York, 1962), P,6l. of 
7, Zyhayr Mikdashi, The Community Of Oil Exporting Countries 
(Lthacaj Corneel University Press, 1972)^ PP.22-23. 
revenue to the major West Asian oil-producing countries amounting 
to an estimated loss of ^ 4 billion to the decade 1960-70, 
8 
Late in the fall of 1959 the Oil Exports Committee 
meeting in Jeddah, Arabia^ with Iraq present, approved the 
boycott of companies operating in Algeria, counselled that no 
new concessions be granted in which Arab states did not 
participate in ownership and management, urged a standardized 
petroleum code for all members and the repossession of those 
parts of concession areas not being developed. 
During 1960 Iraq continued discussions with IPC over 
cession of unexploited oil territory, discounts, and other 
grievances. Proposal met counter proposal, with ceaseless trips 
to London. Suddenly, on September 6, after the cartel had 
announced further price cuts^Kassim summoned the producing states 
to a conference in Baghdad to which Iran and Venezuela responded. 
On September 14 a new Baghdad Pact was proclaimed among the main 
exporters, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
was formally ^et up. Three resolutions were passed. The two 
principal- ones provided* 
1, The exporing countries, unable to remain indifferent 
to the attitude of the companies in effecting price changes, 
will require them to maintain stable prices, restore the cuts. 
8, Oil Expoirt Committee: was constituted in 1951 - xinder the guidance of Arab League (1945) to welding a common Arab oil Policy, to support for the transit states to get a fair share of Pipe line revenues; barring foreign govemment-^ participation in concessions; enployment of Arabs in labour and technical Posts, housing for Arabs to be equal to that of foreigners; encouragement of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, British Protectorates, to join League oil meeting; and an Invitation to Iran, a non-Arab country to consult on oil matters. 
10 
and in future change prices only with the consultation of the 
producing countries. A system will be devised to stabilize 
prices through control of production and the members will stand 
together in rejecting offers of advantageous treatment to one 
member through unilateral action by the companies, 
2, The OPEC is formed by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, 
Kuwait and Venezuela^and they can accept new members by tinanimous 
vote (Qatar being the first, 1961). The principle objective is 
the Unification of Petroleum Prices. Meetings are to be held 
9 
atleast twice a year, and a Secretariat is to be established. 
The creation of OPEC was widely regarded as the most 
momentous event of the decade in the Near East. For the 1st time 
a cartel of countries faced the cartel of companies. Despite of 
price cuts, the countries were remained adament in insisting that 
their income not be reduced and if any one was going to suffer 
from the price cuts, it would be companies not the OPEC partners. 
The united front, transcending Arab countries and even 
the Near East through the inclusion of Venezuela was a triumph 
for the patient work of Abdullah al-Tariki^ the imaginative 
resourceful and dynamic petroleum director of the Saudi government 
and equally for Dr. Periz Alfonzo, architect of Venezuelan oil 
policy. In the 'London Economist* i960 Dr. Paul Prankel summed up 
the situation presented by OPECi "The fact that international 
9, For details of the OPEC resolution see the original text of the Organizations aifeatute approved by the conference in January 1961 in Caracas in Appendix N0.I9 
11 
oil was for a long stretch of its history almost an American and 
British Preserve was an historical accident. The Americans were 
the first to have a persistent oil surpluso The British had no 
oil, but were the first to obtain command of oil abroad. A 
change was bound to come. The two countries could not hope that 
they should forever be Purveyors to the world of oil which they 
find and develop in countries which are not their own it is 
probably true that the oil companies can hope to play their role 
of regulating the international market only in cooperation with 
10 governments, not against them." 
The second Arab oil Congress opened in Beirut October 16, 
I960, A new vote of confidence extended from the delegates. 
The representatives from Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the Soviet 
Union, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia and Italy*s ENI 
attended it as observers. In contrast with the first Congress in 
Cairo, the Beirut meeting saw lively debate between the countries 
and the conpanies, Arabia's Hendryx reiterated his challenge to 
the sanctity of contracts. He was backed by Samir Shamma of 
Arabia; "I too am a Moslem and an Arab, Sharia (religious) law 
does not approve of a violation of a contract, but it implies 
violation is permissible where the needs are of the nation. Even 
the second Caliph of Islam had to do it." 
10, Dr. Paul Frankel, London Econcanist, i960. 
12 
Arabia*s Tariki denounced the cartels' price forrnula as 
"fishy" and declared the 50 - 50 pattern of profit division an 
illusion. This the conpanies hotly denied. "You don't let us 
into the industry to see for ourselves," Tariki retorted, "when 
we asked to see, you refused." To the delegates he said, "they 
treat us like children." 
George T. Ballou of standard of California had a soothing 
answer to all this talk about prices and production; "the 
solution will be forthcoming through the action of the natural 
forces in the market place," to this Emile Soubly of Standard 
of New Jersey added, "we'd rather fight in an open jungle than 
in a cage." 
The Iranian delegate was explicit, "Obviously we cannot 
allow the disposal of and payment for our petroleum to depend 
solely on the will and unilateral action of the other party. 
Within the past 18 months, the price paid for our petroleum has 
been cut down twice without so much as previous notice to the 
countries concerned." In this he was backed by the Shah who on 
another occasion had said; "The Oil companies must act not only 
as business men, who think only in teirms of where they can make 
a cent per barrel more profit. They must also take into 
consideration political aspects and consider the Question of how 
long they will continue in the area."^^ 
11. Quoted from Haevcy O'CONNOR, see Chap. In World Crisis in 
Oil". The Arabs Look to the future, (Elek Books Ltd. London 1963) PP. 374-84. 
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Unable to increase oil revenues through improving their 
relative shares, host governments were left with only one viable 
alternative, namely, raising oil production rates which itself 
became an issue of conflict, while the oil conpanies aimed at 
stabilizing production, especially from the "old" sources, host 
governments, because of development pressures, pushed for higher 
production rates. 
This picture was to change in relatively short order; 
a number of independent factors were talcing shape in the oil 
industry and in the oil producing countries, (over the past 
decade or so)^ that were eventually to shift the bargaining 
balance, and with it the division of revenue in favour of host 
countries. Chief among such factors were tte following: "(a) the 
size of pEvan oil reserves, (b) the rise of nationalism in the 
oil countries, (c) the weakening of vertical integration in the 
oil industry, and (d) the successful emergence of OPEC. 
Since 1962 most of the governments have organised national 
oil companies which developed the local oil industries - from 
production to marketing - and the producing countries have gained 
full control of local refining and distribution. They contracted 
new concessions which made them the masters of the oil potential 
of their countries. Moreover during that period Israel became 
a very small and declining producer and entered the ranks of the 
major transporters, a number of the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms 
became producers, and some of considerable magnitude, Persian 
Gulf offshore magnitudes added great Quantities of oil to the 
14 
total production and reserves of the region; with loading 
facilities, storage capacity and pipelines were constantly added. 
The region became a great natural gas producer, ^ d a centre of 
Petrochemical industry, Egypt became a substantial producer, 
and although the Suez Canal was closed since 1967, it was 
reentering the transporter's group through the planned sumed 
pipeline, Syria became a producer, and its role as transporter 
was enhanced by its nationalization of the IPC pipeline running 
through its territory. Iraq nationalized the IPC and MPC and was 
struggling to operate the enterprize and find markets for the 
crude produced. The consequences of these developments, 
economically and politically affect the oil production which was 
steadily increasing. It almost quadrupled between 1959 and 1971 
and the percentage of the region's share in world production went 
12 
up from 23,696 to 32,4%, 
Even more impressive was the dazzling rise in the 
estimated reserves from 181,365 billion barrels in 1959, to 
366,8 billion barrels in 1971, double what it was at the end of 
1959 inspite of the constant heavy accelerated production. 
Curiously enough the share of the West Asia in total reserves 
did not increase since 1963; in fact it might have dropped 
somewhat. It should be noted that the United States share of 
world reserves dropped from 9,l96 in 1963 to 6,896 in 1971, and 
12o BP, Statistical Review 1963, 7 1971, 6, reproduced from 
Beniamine Shwadran; op,clt, .No,5, PP, 524-525, 
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of the whole western Hemisphere from 20.4% to 13,4%. The slight 
drop in the West Asian share was primarily the result of the 13 
increment of reserves of the communist countries and of Africa. 
Regardless of the drop of a few percentage^ the outstanding 
fact remained that the West Asia had been for a long time the 
single huge oil reservoir of the world, and it was constantly 
expanding in absolute nunOsers of barrels as well as percentages 
of the other world reserve centres. It long surpassed the United 
States in reserves, it passed it also as a producer and it was 
destined to become the greatest producer in the world. 
At the same time the west Asian oil rich countries had 
been obtaining steadily and increasingly enormous amounts of 
revenue from its oil. As the oil revenue statistics shows, it 
increased five fold in revenue from | 1,274 billion in 1959 to 
7,088 billion in 1971, Great portions of this enormous revenue 
were invested in economic projects which intensified the economic 
development of the region. 
Even though until 1971 despite OPEC's efforts oil exporting 
countries were in a weak position, as MNC's unilaterally 
established production and pricing policies, for thfe most part 
was on the basis of the interests of the developed oil importing 
13, Africa's share accounted for 4o7% in 1963 and that of the communist countries was 8,8% in 1971 Africa's share increased 
to 8,9", and that of the Communist countries to 15,4% 
Western Europe's share of reserves rose from 8% in 1963 to 
2,3% in 1971, Ibid. Po526, BP, Statistical Review 1963, 5? 
1971, 4c 
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countries. However, to judge its success or failure, one has 
to understand the main purpose's which OPEC proclaimed for itself. 
OPEC concentrated on establishing a uniform policy, 'Ironing out' 
the differences that existed between the oil-producing countries 
and the oil companies with respect to prices, royalties and 
production. 
Thus^the first task which OPEC set for itself was to 
stabilize oil prices and keep them 'steady and free from all 
unnecessary fluctuations. Accordingly, the first paragraph of 
the first resolution asserted that/members can no longer remain 
indifferent to the attitude therefore adopted by the oil 
conpanies in effecting price modifications'. OPEC's initial 
declaration on price restoration v/as not followed up with a 
concrete policy to achieve that objective until two years later 
at the fourth OPEC conference, however it was finally realized 
that they had insufficient power to force oil prices up and from 
1962 on, they sought to obtain by means of increasing royalties 
what they had been unable to obtain by demanding price increases. 
At the time OPEC was created royalty payments to host 
governments were in the form of royalty per barrel, usually 12.5% 
of the posted price. The only OPEC member country that benefited 
14 
from a rate higher than 12.5% was Venezuela. In addition, the 
cort^ janies treated royalty payments as a necessary production cost 
in calculating profits. When the companies agreed on the 50/50 
profit sharing formula in the early 1950's they calculated 
14. The applicable rate of Venezuela was l6.2/3?6. 
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royalties as part of the governments' 50 percent, thereby 
15 
making the governments actual share much less* The iroyalty, 
in effect, became a payment to the companies rather than the 
countries. In the words of Fuad Rouhani, OPEC's chief negotiator 
with the oil companies: 
Either the companies are paying income tax at the full 
rate prescribed by law, but no royalties, or they are effectively 
paying royalty but their income tax payment amounted to about 
16 
41% of income, not 5096. 
Against the forcing background, 'Resolution 33, adopted 
17 
at OPEC's Fourth conference in Geneva in 1962, demandedi 
That each member country affected should approach the 
company or companies concerned with a view to working out a 
formula whereunder royalty payments shall be fixed at a uniform 
rate that members consider equitable, and shall not be treated as 
credit against income tax liability. 
15. Quoted in Aodulaziz al-Sowayeqh, op.cit. No.4 PP.39-40. 
16. Quoted in Muhamma^**^. Mughrabey, permanent Sovereignty over oil Re sources I A st^y o^ f Middle East Oil Concessions and Legal changes (Middle East Research and publishing Centre, Beirut 1968), PP. 141-2. 
17. The 4th OPEC Conference (two sessions April 5-8 and June 4-8 
Geneva) approved the admission of Indonesia and Libya to 
OPEC and recommended that Member Countries should enter into 
negotiations with oil companies to ensure the restoration of crude oil prices to the level which prevailed prior to August 9, 1960. For the formulation of a rational price structure, the conference deemed it necessary to link oil 
prices to an index of prices of goods imported by member 
countries. An expensing of royalties formula and the 
elimination of any contribution to ;narketlng expenses of 
the cil companies were also recommended. Source - OPEC -
General information,and Chronology, (Pub. oy rne Secretariat, 
OPEC, V i e n n a , June 19©5r. P. 25, 
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However, approaching the con^anies to discuss the issue 
of royalties was not an easy task. The negotiations on this 
issue, which lasted from 1962 - 1965, have been characterized by 
OPEC as the 'longest, toughest and most revealing in the history 
of the international oil industry'. Throughout the negotiations, 
the oil conpanies persistently rejected the 'principles of 
collective bargaining^' which the OPEC countries adopted to deal 
with the companies. 
Eventually, the con^anies reluctantly agreed to bargain 
with OPEC. The protected negotiations ended in the conroanies 
'agreeing* to improve the royalties of the oil producing 
countries; in other words, royalties were to be deducted before 
profits were calculated and divided, thus increasing the actual 
18 
government take per barrel of crude. The settlement provided, 
moreover, for consultation in 1966 between the governments and 
the companies on possible future reductions in the discount rate. 
In April 1966, at OPEC's Eleventh Conference in Vienna, the member 
states adopted Resolution XI71, advising member countries to 'take 
steps towards the complete elimination of the discount allowance 
granted to the oil companies 
In accordance with this recommendation^ negotiations soon 
reopened between the producing countries and the companies. 
However, as usual, negotiations proved difficult, and there was 
no solution yet in sight when the Arab Israeli war broke in 1967. 
Following the outbreak of war, the Arab countries decided to 
boycott oil shipments to certain countries; the boycott, together 
18. Fuod Rouhani, A History of OPEC (Praeger, New York, 1971), 
PPo 228-9. 
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with the closure of the Suez Canal caused crude oil prices to 
recover. The interruption of oil supplies and the finning of 
oil market irtproved OPEC's bargaining position. At the OPEC 
Conference in Rome in September 1967, the members decided that 
•ttie five countries most concerned with expanding royalties (Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya and Qatar) should meet for consulta-
tion on the issue in early October, On 9 January 1968, after a 
two day conference in Beirut, the five OPEC members announced that 
•they have accepted an offer submitted by the conpanies on 6 
January to Iran and Saudi Arabia, binding all companies operating 
in OPEC member countries'. Under the agreement reached, the 
discounts were to be phased out over a four year period, declining 
from 5,4 percent in 1968, to 4.b percent in 1969, 3,5 percent in 19 1970, 2 percent in 1971, and ceasing entirely in 1972. Thus by 
1970 the change was conplete, in view of the West's political and 
military withdrawal from the West Asia whereby making coitpany's 
resistance against government demands futile. And since the 
companies had irun out of additional tax credits to claim and out 
of new markets to conquer, they could not meet any new financial 
demands by OPEC without cutting into their own profits or raising 
prices to their customers. Naturally they chose the second 
option. 
In short, the conpanies in any new confrontation with OPEC, 
or its member countries, could be expected to yield, and to pass 
along any financial pressure to their customers. They were not 
exactly relegated, as the chairman of BP put it to being a vast 
"Tax collecting agency" for OPEC, since they continued incharge of 
18. Abdulaziz Al-Sowayegh, Op, cit., No,4, P,41» 
20 
the world wide transport, refining and marketing of oil and made 
20 
profits somewhat beyond a tax collectors' normal salary. But they 
had lost their controlling position at the upstream end from which 
their other powers once had flowed. And in view of Japan's and 
Europe's mounting (and America's prospective) dependence on oil 
imports, any concerted drive by OPEC for higher revenue would be 
sure to have repercussions throughout the entire industrial 
non-communist world. 
Whether the strategies of OPEC and its member countries 
fully appreciated all the factors Just listed is hard to tell. 
But several things were certain: that objective circumstances had 
fundamentally changed in their favour; that OPEC countries were 
ready to exploit fortuitous circumstances (such as the temporary 
closing in 1970 of the pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the 
Mediterranean and the resulting temporary tanker shortage) so as 
to probe defences on the other side; that they were ready to push 
21 
ahead singly or in groups. However all earlier price increases 
were dwarfed by there of mid October 1973, which raised the 
posted price of the market crude from ^ 3.01 to ^ 5.12, which 
further raised it to as much as ^ much as 11.65 - inplying a 
"Tax take" of $ 7«01 in 1974, The first round of increases 
20. Sir Eric Drake, Quoted by M.Ao Adelman in "IS the oil 
shortage Real? World Petroleum Market (Baltimore, John 
Hopkins Press, 1972), PP. 70-78r 
21. Dankward A. Rustow & John F. Mugno, see'OPEC Revolution' 
in OPEC Success and Prospects (Martin Robertson & Co. Ltd, 
London, 1976) PP. 17-19. 
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accottipanied the Arab's use of their long - heralded "oil Weapon" 
22 in the Yora Kippur war. o i l shipments were embargoed United 
States, the Netherlands, and certain other countries; production 
was cut by as much as 25% at once and further cuts of b% a month 
were threatened; and posted prices were raised by 7054, The 
enOaargo and production cuts were fully applied only by the Arab 
producers of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi)# 
and somewhat more unevenly by Libya and Algeria. Iraq, while 
participating in the embargo, soon restore^l full production, 
(among the major non-Arab countries, Venezuelan production 
remained steady, whereas that in Iran, Nigeria and Indonesia 
increased slightly), still the overall effect was a decrease of 
world oil supplies in international trade from 33 b. barrels per 23 day(mb/d) in September 1973 to 298 n\/b/d in November 1973. Since 
22. The misconception has long been prevailed that"oil weapon for the first time used during the Oct. 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In fact the Arabs have always sought the shelter of oil for the implementation of their short term strategies, however it was for the 1st time that oil strategy was put into operation strictly against the United States and the developed countries to prevent them from supporting Israel and look at the Arab-Israeli conflict from a different point of view obviously as a long term strategic consideration. The principal lesson for the Arabs was that war in itself cannot within the foreseeable future - put an end to Israel's existence. War can at best supplement a political process that has reached a stalemate, 1967-77; 
A Ten year perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict by Alouph Hareven Article Pub. in the Middle East Review, 
Vol. IX No.4 P. 15 Summer 1977, Washington. 
23. New Yorlc Times, November 24, 1973. For an excellent analysis of the handling of the embargo by producer coiantries and con^anies aee Robert B. Stobaugh 'The o i l Companies in the Crisis' see also Federal Energy Aidministration U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab oil embargo. The International Allocation of constricted supplies, U.S. Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee on multinational 
corporations^ committee Print (Washington! GPO, 1975). 
22 
the allocation of the shortage had to be handled by the oil 
companies/ which to this day control the world's network of 
tankers and irefineries, tte effects were fairly evenly 
distributed. But an even reduction of oil imports meant a much 
more severe energy shortage in Europe and Japan (which depended 
on Oil imports for three fifths or three fourths, respectively, 
of their total energy) than in the United States (v/here oil 24 
imports constituted only one sixth of total energy consunption) 
as the table shows. 
Table - I 
Energy Consumption by Industrial l^ .ed Povrer - 1374-75 
USA European Commxinity Japan 
1, Energy consumed per capita 
8o2 3.6 3.1 
2, Percent of energy 
from oil 
47.2 59.5 76.4 
3, Percent of oil inported (2x3) 
36.9 98.7 99,7 
4, Percent of energy from imported oil 17.4 58.7 76.2 
5, Percent of oil imported 
from Arab sources 
29.4 66.0 42.0 
6. Percent of energy from 
Arab sources (4x5) 
5,1 38.8 32.0 
7. Energy per capita from sources other than oil Impojrts, 
6.8 1.5 0.7 
24, This statement is based on the above calculations, 
reproduced here from Rustow "who won the^Yom Kippur,and Oil wars? Foreign Policy No,17 (Winter 1974-757 P,l68: 
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The new order that OPEC created restored control to the 
legitimate owners of the oil reserves and empowered them to make 
independent decisions within the framework of burgeoning national 
sovereignty, cooperative action with OPEC and world out side. 
Thus* the turning point in 1973 has allowed these countries the 
opportunity to use oil as an instrument of economic and social 
development. However, today all OPEC members face the same 
challenge; to stretch the exploitation period of their oil 
reserves long enough to enable them to establish a productive 
economic system capable of replacing oil as a source of income 
and export proceeds, in order to sustain comparable standards of 
living to those they are new at long last beginning to enjoy, 
AS long as oil is the only engine for growth, and it is 
likely to remain so within the foreseeable future , OPEC members 
will have to cooperate and harmonize their policies to sustain 
their collective benefits. However the steep increases in OPEC's 
revenue represent a financial transfer not from the companies 
but indirectly firom the consumers. OPEC's future prospects 
therefoire depend largely on the response of the consumer 
countries in the near future. 
CHAPTER II 
CHAPTER - II 
SCENARIO PLANNING IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 
The first and most striking feature about the global energy-
picture is the extraordinary rapid postwar growth in its overall 
consumption, a growth pattern which looks likely to be maintained 
for the indefinite future. The dramatic increase in world 
consumption can be.broadly accounted for by both the spread of 
industrialism and an increased rate of per capita consumption as part 
of the growth of a technologically sophisticated form of 
industrialization. 
The second, no less striking, feature of world energy 
consumption was that by 1970 the industrialised world obtained 14% 
of its total energy requirements from fossil fuels. 
The evolution of fossil fuel trade on a global basis did not 
result overnight. Coal production, for example, has never been 
oriented toward the export market, with the exception of Great 
Britain and a few other nations. In 1925 when coal constituted 
approximately four fifths of the primary commercial energy consumed 
1 
globally, only 12 percent of this amount was imported. Liquid 
fuels, (crude oil and refined petroleum products ) , represented 
in 1925 only 13 percent of the primary energy resource market, 
of which a little more than a third crossed national borders. 
Taken together we find that only 14.4 percent of tht jjriratiry 
comercial energy producted in 1925 crossed national borders. 
This meant that those nations industrializing in the early 
twentieth century did so essentially on the basis of their own 
resource endowments. It should also be noted that what trade 
existed in the 1920's was primarily intraregional rather than inter-
regional, Over 70 percent of the 192 9 energy imports into Western 
European countries originated within Western Europe itself. The major 
global transition from coal to oil brought with it the far flung 
global system of energy trade which we know today. The process 
1. Joel Darmistgdter et al. Energy in the World Economy, 
T^ltimores John Hospkins Press, 1971), PP, 25-26. 
2. Ibid. P. 28o 
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by which major industrial nations became dependent on foreign 
oil was gradual. Western Eureope's consumption of oil in 1950 
was only 14 percent of its total primary eneirgy consumption. 
Japan was even less dependent on oil, as only 5 percent of its 
3 
primary energy demand In 1950 was for oil. The united States in 
1950 was essentially energy self sufficient, 
Hafele and Sassin claim that it was not until the 1960s 
4 
that a truly global system of every trade was forged. 
Developments in the 1960s took analysts by surpri:^e. Danrfetadter 
and Landsberg point to an Organization For Economic cooperation 
and Development (OECD) study, published in 1966 that had projected 
the average annual growth rate of Western European demand for oil 
at 4.1 percent through 1980. In fact through the year 1962-72 
Western European oil consunption increased at an average annual 
rate of 10,5 percent. Over the same decade Japan increased its 
oil consumption at an astounding average annual rate of 17.5 
percent. Lacking significant indigenous reserves of oil, nearly 
all the oil that Western Europe and Japan burned had to be 
inported - the bulk of which came from the West Asian and North 
African regions. The United States, more abundantly endowed with 
oil deposits than many other industrial nations^ placed import 
Quotas on foreign oil throughout the I960's but felt compelled 
5 to remove this barrier to imports in the 1970's. 
3, Joel Darmistadter and Hans H. Landsberg, "The Economic 
Background" Daedalus 104 (Pall 1975) 20, 
4, W, Fafele and W. Assin, "The Global Energy System", Annual 
Review of Energy 2 (1977): 4-6 reproduced from Robert 
M. Lawrence and Martin 0. Heisler, 'International Energy 
Policy' (Lexington Books, Maaachusetts 1980), P.5 
5, Ibid., p. 24. 
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Prior to the l960s# it was primarily large, non-governraental 
Institutions that orchestrated the national, regional and global 
movement of fossil fuels. This is not to say that governments 
were passive by^standers. Governments have always taken certain 
measures to affect the flow of resources, such as setting import 
levies or export quotas; but generally it was national and 
multinational corporations that determined and forged demand -
6 
supply lines and carried out operational activities. 
With the increasing dependence of industrial societies on 
imported primary energy, however, governments have become 
increasingly conspicuous in taking actional to effect the movement 
and sale of energy; and this now constitutes the major 
characteristic differentiating the fossil fuel era from the x^ ood 
era. The water-shed in this development was, of course, tte 
embargo of oil shipments by Arab oil-producing nations in 1973, 
and the subsequent Organization of petroleum exporting countries' 
(OPEC) price hike in 1974. The success of OPEC's actions 
heralded a shift in pov/er from oil companies to oil prof'ucing 
nations. 
Even before OPEC's 1973 - 1974 actions, the magnitude of 
oil imports caused major importing governments to view oil not 
only as a commercial commodity but also as a strategic commodity. 
And finally by the 1970's, it became apparent that the very 
security and well-being of entire indxistrial societies were 
6. This generalization must be qualified by important 
exceptions such as the nationalization of the coal 
industries in several European countries. 
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dependent on regular and reliable infusions of oil, OPEC 
compounded this concern by raising oil prices four~fold, 
creating havoc with both industrial and developing nation 
economies. It is not surprising that governments, responsible 
for the health and welfare of their citizens at this Juncture 
have taken a more prominent role while dealing with oil in shaping 
energy supply and determining national energy policy in general. 
In 1974, the major industrial nations banded together 
to form the International Energy Agency (lEA), first to pose a 
counter force to OPEC; second, to develop a formula for equitable 
oil sharing in the event of another embargo; and third, to 
7 
coordinate energy policies. It is observed therefore, that both 
producing and consviming governments have concluded that energy 
supplies are too consequential to be left to the discretion of 
corporate decision makers. As a result, international politics 
constitute the major determining factor today in whether energy 
8 reaches the consumer. 
For what is now at present generally beyond dispute 
is that the technology and economics of energy exploitation are 
going through a period of very rapid change. These changes, 
whatever the benefits or disbenefits they may ultimately confer. 
7, Mason Will rich and Mclrin A Conant "The International Energy 
Agency, An Interpretation and Assessment 'The American 
Journal of International Law 71 (1977)» 199-223. 
8. Robert M. Lawrence & Martin Oo Heisler ed.; op.cit. No.4, P.6, 
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create immediate uncertainties and opportunities to the 
energy planner of vast proportions which are still being 
fathomed. The need for new and more flexible methods of 
energy planning incorporating regular and repeated critical 
reappraisals of both the policies and the principles that 
undergird them is already clear, clearest of all is the fact 
that energy requirements will continue to grow and that the 
means of their development will require ever greater 
sophistication both in terms of the technology of conversion 
and conservation and in the economic and political structures 
they are likely to spawn, since through out this period, oil 
importing nations will remain vulnerable to possible additional 
price pressures anc^  supply cut backs th^ it could occur for any 
number of reasons. The only antidote to this phenomenon is 
to standback and survey the world energy economy in relationsto 
regional - economic groupings^ the energy policies of the major 
powers, who constitute by far the greater part of world energy 
production and consumption despite the crucial part played by 
the OPEC states in the world oil market. 
Thus it sounds reasonable here to begin with outlining 
the recent energy policy of the United States. 
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The United States 
The United States energy policy has been and remains to 
be essentially her foreign policy because the US energy policy 
has derived primarily (not exclusively) from the requirement to 
maintain America's external influence in the Worldo Domestically 
also, due to the accelerating rates of consumption, it has 
become clear from the early seventies that the U.S. would 
exhaust its supplies of petroleum by the mid - 1980's unless 
fundamental changes were made in national energy policy. With 
the sobering thought that the U.S. energy requirements would by 
1990 be double what they were in 1970, the then U.So President 
Richard Nixon revealed a five-point action programme in April 
1973, which provided the basis for fundamental U.S. energy 
policy since that date. The five points include the follcwing 
obj ectives:-
I. to increase domestic production of all forms of 
energy; 
II. to act to conserve energy more effectively; 
III. to strive to meet energy needs at the lowest 
cost consistent with national security and the 
national environment; 
IVo to act in concent with other nations to conduct 
research in the energy fields and to find meams 
of preventing serious shortages; 
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V. to apply vast scientific and technical capacity - both 
public and private - so that the U«S. might use its 
current energy sources more wisely and develop, both 
new sources and new forms of energy. 
The central umbrella under which U.S. energy policy has 
been discussed since 1973» bringing together a number of 
policies which had been evolving for some times, was labelled 
by the Nixon Administration as 'Project Independence*. The alms 
of the project was to make the United States free from dependence 
on foreign energy sources by 1980, By setting a target of 
eliminating U.S.. dependence on foreign energy within ten to 
fifteen year's time span. Project Independence irnf>licitly 
accepted increased costs of about one third for consumers. This 
ineffect was never accepted by the Congress, whose outright 
rejection or compromise measure-s in response to the Nixon and Ford 
Administration's proposals have left Project Independe'nce virtually 
high and dry. 
The U.S. for the first time, after October 1973, perceived 
9 
the energy crisis as a direct diplomatic foreign policy threat. 
This threat was symbolized by the oil embargo and was directed 
in the first instance at U.S. diplomatic flexibility and 
initiative in the West Asian dispute and in the second instance 
at U.S. European solidarity in broader East-West relations. To 
9. For an earlier and more detailed discussion of this initial 
period of U.S. foreign energy policy see Henry R. Nau, U.S. 
Foreign policy in the Energy Crises, The Atlantic Community 
Quaterly 12 (Winter 1974-1975): PP. 426-440. 
31 
deal with this threat, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
undertook an active West Asian diplomatic role on behalf of the 
United States and rallied the NATO allies to attend the Washington 
10 
Energy Conference in February 1974, The Washington Energy 
Conference, on the other hand, provided a new denwnstration of 
alliaoice solidarity in the waXe of the breakdown of alliance 
cooperation in the October war and focused, in particular, on the 
negotiation of an emergency oil-sharing plan among the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-
oil-consuming countries to defend against another Arab oil 
embargo in the future, 
A major triunph for U,S, diplomacy, the Washington Energy 
Conference firmly demonstrated Western unity in the face of Arab 
oil eiTt)argo (where, for example, western unity had collapsed in 
the October war and European Economic Community (EEC) unity had 
failed dismally at the Copenhagen summit in December 1973) and 
successfully neutralized separate European approaches to the 
Arab States, At the same time, it did nothing to deal with the 
economic consequences of higher oil prices except to call for a 
moratorium on trade restrictions, which was implemented at the 
OECD ministerial meeting in June 1974, 
Diplomatic successes had brought about a lifting of the 
embargo but not a rollback of oil prices. Panic was especially 
evident in early U,S, reactions to these events. In September, 
10, Department of State Bulletin, 21 January 1974, P.51. 
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Secretary Kissinger and President Ford both resorted to veiled 
threats at the United Nations, urging Arab States to behave as 
responsibly in the supply and pricing of oil as the United States 
11 
was seeking to do in the case of food. Rhetoric escalated during 
this period concerning the possibility of U.S. military 
intervention in the West Asia, culminating with Secretary 
Kissinger's new year pronouncement that this might be necessary 
if it came to the economic strangulation of U.S. allies in 
12 
Europe and the Far East, more importantly U.S. Officials 
hurriedly formulated in October and November of 1974 a set of 
prograrranes which were introduced at the newly established lEA, 
These programmes were designed to cope directly with the economic 
consequences of OPEC oil prices. They include a ^ 25 billion 
safety net programme to finance balance of-payments deficits 
among consuming countries, a minimum floor price concept and 
other incentives to encourage production of alternative 
conventional energy sources, a cooperative conservation programme 
to cut down on energy consumption in advanced countries, and a 
long tei-m research and development programme to develop 
non-conventional energy sources.,. 
To influence OPEC policies in the near term (the lEA 
approach was long term), a more direct approach to the oil 
producers was required. The Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation (CIEC) was convened in December 1975. This 
conference was the out growth of a compromise between the United 
11. For these speeches, see (DSB) Department of State Bulletin^ 
7 October 1974 PP. 465-468 and 14 October 1974, PP. 498-504. 
12. See interview with Kissinger in Business week, 13 January 
1975, PP. 66-76o 
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States and developing countries, involving a willingness by the 
former to discuss all development issues, and an agreement by 
the latter to do this in a more manageable institutional forum 
than either the U.N. General Assembly or the U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The CIEC discussion made only 
modest progress through the course of 1976. 
The Carter programme announced in 1977 offered a 
new focus on the energy issue. The chief threat now was an 
invisible but inexorable global resource shortage threatening 
domestic and world energy markets within the next five to eight 
years. The National Energy Plan states it well: 
The diagonosis of the U.S. energy crisis in quite 
simple: demand for energy is increasing, while supplies 
of oil and natural gas are diminishing unless the U.S. 
m a k e s a timely adjustment before the world oil becomes 
very scarce and very expensive in the 1980's^the nation's 
economic security and the American way of life will be 
gravely endangered. The steps the U.S. must take now are small compared to the drastic measures that will be 
needed if the U.S. does nothing until it is too late. ^^ 
These steps included a gradual transition from oil and 
natural gas, currently supplying about three quartcis of U.S. 
•energy needs, to coal, nuclear power, and eventually non-
conventional envergy sources, such as solar and fusion power. 
The new approach acknowledged the diminished urgency of 
the energy crisis at the same time it predicted dire consequences 
in the future if the nation failed to act now. However till the 
13, For copy of the National energy plan, see Energy Users 
Report U^ashington D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., 5 May 1977) Quote is from P. 21s0716. Reproduced 
from Robert M. Lawrence and Martin Oo Heisler Ed. 
op.cit. No.4, P. 54. 
34 
fall of 1978, there was no ongoing global institution for the 
discussion of energy issues. CIEC had ended in May 1977 
without the establishment of the global energy forum, which 
the United States had earnestly sought. The programmes in lEA 
were in place but had not been significantly broadened to 
include developing countries. The implementation of energy 
policies was increasingly a function of bilateral relationships 
and negotiations, not \mlike world energy diplomacy as it 
prevailed before the 1973 crisis. The inability to coordinate 
multilateral apporaches to the energy crisis was no doubt in 
part ^ consequence of the failure of domestic policies and 
revealed a Jiew the importance of sound domestic policies as a 
basis, if not prerequisite, for international discussions. 
Thus the core of U.S. energy policy continues to be based 
on foreign policy considerations. Accomodation to higher OPEC 
prices for world energy is necessary both to avoid short-term 
conflicts with oil producing states, especially Gulf OPEC 
members that might use oil prices to leverage U.S. diplomacy in 
the West Asia, and to ensure long-run conservation and energy 
development programmes that will eventually rcdu.ce dependence 14 
on foreign oil and indeed on oil and other fossil fuels altogether. 
14, Administration officials are at some pain to explain that adjustment to OPEC prices does not imply an endorsement of OPEC prices. (For example, see statement of Cyrus R, Vance before the Ad Hoc Committee on Energy of the House of Representatives of the U.S. 4 May 1977,release by Press office. Dept. of State). Specific OPEC price levels are said to be justified by supply and demand conditions. 
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Domestic politics, it continues to be assumed, must accept the 
costs and sacrifices of these world-wide imperatives. 
Soviet Union 
The energy policy of the Soviet Union, like those 
of its overall economic policies and unlike those of the 
western industrial powers, has always been aimed at ideally 
national or at the very least regional self-sufficiency. With 
the increasing technological sophistication of the Soviet 
Economy, accompanied as everywhere else by accelerated rates 
of energy consumption, this foreign policy goal has 
progressively become more difficult to accomplish. 
The beginning of the Soviet Siberian Policy can be 
traced as early as the late 1950's to embark upon a programme of 
industrialization. The concentration on heavy industry involved 
a significant increase in energy consxarrption, which in tuim 
produced a heavy reliance on imported energy and raw materials 
therefore to transformed its significance from one of strategic 
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regional importance to a central plank in Sovift economic and 
15 defence policy. 
With tlois hydrocarbon cornucopia, it appeared that the 
expanding Soviet domestic needs and those of East European CMEA 
countries could easily be meto Likewise, petroleum and petroleum 
products would become a major source of hard currency earnings 
for increasing trade with Western industrial countries. 
CMEA countries were encouraged by low Soviet Oil prices 
and a similarly optimistic view of oil and gas reserves in the 
USSR^ rapidly to expand hydrocarbon use, Pri.;cing of energy on 
stable five year plan prices, related to the then low OPEC prices, 
encouraged this process of shift from coal. From I960 to 1975 
there was a significant increase in CMEA reliance on Soviet oil 
Imports, although it was uneven from country to country. By the 
time of OPEC price rise in 1973 one might suggest that there had 
been over a decade for strengthening of CMEA reliance on the 
assumption that inexhaustible Soviet oil supplies could be found 
to meet expanding CMEA and foreign trade needs. 
However by, 1973-74, the Soviet oil reserve assumptions 
began to come under more serious doubt. Oil output in Ural-Volga 
field had peaked earlier than anticipated and the enphasis had 
to be placed earlier than planned on the expansion of output from 
15. See David Gushee and John P. Hasdt, policies Prices and 
Technologies From Christe Pher T. Saunders Ed. East and West 
in the Energy SqueeTI (The Macmillan Pres's Ltd, 1980, London) 
PP. 181-182. 
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the West Siber^ian fields. That would have been alright if other 
giant fields could had been proven out and put in line for 
exploitation to take over from the West Siberian fields when 
they, in turn, peaked. However, no new giant fields have been 
located, so the silver cloud of the OPEC price rises had a dark 
lining for the Soviet Union, since anticipated oil and gas 
supplies were less, requirements for increased earnings from 
hydroca rbon exports were greater. Likewise, the adverse iir5)act 
of the restricted hydrocarbon supplies and Western stagflation 
was also felt in the smaller East European CMEA countries, that 
further reflected back on Soviet Union. 
The East European countries were then asked by the Soviet 
Union to pay more for their energy inported from the USSR, 
This action led to severe new burden on East European economies 
and an inputed subsidy or sacrifice of hard currency income 
for the Soviet Union, With a new sense of limited future 
supplies, the projected Soviet deliveris of oil and gas 
to Eastern Europe f*r the future were doubtless scaled 
down. Oil imports from the hard currency demanding OPEC 
countries, therefore, had to be sought by the East European 
countries. Prom the Soviet side, the East European countries 
appeared more cooperative on joint projects, such as the 
Orenburg Gas Pipeline, but less able to balance their trade with 
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the USSR, specially with hard goods exports. Economic crisis 
and potential instability in East Europe apparently contributed 
to a Soviet willingness to accept balance of payments deficits 
with many of the East European countries and even extend hard 
currency loanso The latter*, of course, aggravated the Soviets' 
overall hard currency problems. Encouraqement, indeed enforcement, 
of energy conservation and balance of-payments discipline on East 
Europe may have had mixed success. Austerity in energy use and 
restriction of western indebtedness may have some short-term 
financial advantages, but it tends to slow growth in completion 
of new projections that, in the long run, are vital to serving 
16 the same ends of improved growth and trade. 
In view of the uncertainties and alternative policy 
approaches there are various projections of Soviet production of 
17 
primary energy for the 1980's. The most controversial are the 
projections of oil output. The most optimistic estimates would 
have Soviet oil output increasing, but at a slower rate upto 
1980, The optimistic ECE projections, referred to above, would 
provide for expansion of energy consumption in the Soviet domestic 
economy, albeit with significant relative shift to natural gas and 
coal and a modest relative increase in nuclear power; a 
continuation of the 1980's level through the decade of oil 
16. Ibid; P, 184, 
17, Ibid; P. 187, 
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deliveries to the smaller countries of CMEA with some increase 
in natural gas availability; a continued, albeit reduced, not 
export of oil by Soviet Union to hard-currency countries with an 
increase in natural gas and coal sales. Smaller CMEA countries 
would be expected to inport an increasing supply of oil and 
natural gas from the West Asia for hard currency, either directly 
(e.g. through the Adria oil pipeline from the Adriatic to 
Czeckoslovakia and Hungary), or indirectly through transfer of 
Soviet imported Iranian gas to Last European countries on 
bilateral agreements arranged by those East European nations with 
the West Asian producers, A somewhat less optimistic projection 
of policy variants and uncertainties implied in the ECE report 
might satisfy these allocation requirementSo In any event, they 
18 
appear to be close to the CMEA countries expectations. 
However the political and economic coasts of failure to 
meet minimum plan needs appear to be very serious for the Soviet 
Union and for the CMEA. Shortage of oil or alternative energy 
supplies might lead to slower economic growth in the U,S.S.R. 
even more serious slowdown in smaller countries of CMEA, and 
dn inability to finance the imports for which petroleum sales 
have provided har d currency in the past leading to the need to 
find an export substitute. Military sales, or an extension of 
political control over West Asian oil-producing nations, are 
theoretical possibilities, but most unattractive options for 
the Soviet Union, 
18, Ibid; PP.77-83. 
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At present the really important question that remains 
unanswered is not the extent of Soviet reserves of oil, gas and 
coal, which are almost certainly gigantic by world standards, but 
the capacity of the Soviet Union first to meet her national energy 
requirements from domestic sources for the short term future, and 
second, to obtain or develop her own technology to extract the 
highly inaccessible Siberian energy resources« The Soviet 
governments' policy remains one of total energy self-sufficiency, 
but it may yet have to settle for diversity of supply, atleast for 
the medium-term future. There is nonetheless a distinct 
possibility that the Soviet Union may need to import oil on a 
growing scale in the early 199 0s, However by comparison with 
the continued dependency of the major western industrial countries 
on OPEC it is a minimal degree of dependence. 
The European Economic Community 
The slow evolution of an EEC Common Energy Policy should 
surprise nobody. The reasons are manifold and might be described 
as part historical and part structural (i.e. they are tampering 
with one of the tap roots of not only national sovereignty but 
the independence of some of the moist powerful elements in the 
structure of industrial society). Historically the slow 
development of a coinmon energy policy was due to three principal 
factors. 
First, responsibility for energy was divided between the 
various organs of the communities: the Paris Treaty conferred 
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responsibility for coal on the European Coal and Steet Community; 
the Rome Treaty assigned oil, natural gas, electricity and 
hydro-power to the EEC Commission and left nuclear power 
development and control to Euratom, 
Second, at the out set of the community there was no 
mention of a common energy policy for the fairly simple reason 
that there was no apparent need to coordinate differing energy 
sources since coal was still the king. In 1950, for instance, 
coal provided 75 percent of community energy requirements, oil 
a mere 10 percent. By 1966 coal had dropped to around 40 percent 
with oil climbing to about 50 per cent, these changes were almost 
entirely wrought by the overall growth in energy consumption with 
the addtional demand for cheap and immediate energy between 1960 
19 
and 1970 being met almost exclusively by oil. Overnight the 
community had become the richest oil inporter in the world for 
which the multinationals provided a cheap and plentiful source of 
energy throughout the 1960s. 
The third historical but also very contemporary reason 
why the common energy policy has made such slow progress is that, 
in order to come into full operation, it would need to cut across 
national policies, nationalized industries and fiscal policy; 
in short, to challenge the national energy interests across the 
19, Douglas Evans, International and Comparative Energy Policies 
from 'Western Eneirgy Policy' (The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1978) 
PP. 39-40. 
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board. This has been the most fundamental reason for moving 
slowly toward a common policy^ the more so because different 
sources of energy are not of equal importance in tach country. 
Thus, Italy* the Netherlands and Luxembourg with only small or 
non-existent coal outputs, for long favoured a cheap fuel policy, 
effectively supporting the prevailing trend towards imported oil. 
By contrast, each of West Germany, France and Belgium operated 
major coal-fields, with West Germany in particular providing 75 
20 
percent of the six's coal requirements. Their arguments for 
self-sufficiency, effectively an argument for increased reliance 
on coal, were overruled by the availability of cheap imported oil, 
It is interesting to speculate that If Prance rather than the 
newly emergent West Germany, still seeking to establish its 
political acceptability, had produced the majority of the 
communityscoal, whether coal might have been aided to hold its 
own against the challenge of oil in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
The dramatic consequences of the OPEC cartel enforced on 
the western industrial nations in late 1973 was bound to act as 21 
goad on the formulations of the EEC Common Energy Policy, p^ ^ 
early as 1971 the energy companies warned the EEC Commission of 
an impending oil crisis. It was nevertheless not until December 
1974 that the EEC Council of Ministers was able to agree on a 
20, Ibid; P. 76 
21, See appendix I, EEC Statement on Energy, 
The text of the Statement on Energy by tt^ Summit meeting 
of the EEC in Copenhagen 15th December reproduced from M E E D . 
21 December, 1973 P, 14-69, 
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package of conservation and diversification mea;mre3 to reduce 
energy consumption growth by 15 percent, and dependence on 
imported energy from 63 percent in 1973 to between 40 and 50 
percent in 1985, Previous to this the cormiission had reasseited 
that any strategy for Community energy policy would need to 
observer three basic criteria: first, to maintain price levels 
to the consumer as low as possible; second, to ensure reasonable 
profitability to guarantee sustained investment; and third, to 
create the framewark for greater conservation by consumers. 
Although, like the Nixon Administration's Project 
Independence, the overriding long term goal of the commission 
was to make the community self sufficient in energy, this v / a s 
not either a short or even a medium term option. Instead, thp 
commission aicAed at two major objectives; first, the guaranteeing 
of security of supply by means of diversification of domestic 
and foreign energy sources; anc"! second, the creation of a unified 
market for energy. Thus the strategies propose as their major 
objective the reduction in the community's dependfnr-e on imported 
oil and the development of nuclear pov.'er, co md q.is. By seokincj 
to describe the at empts of the community to create a cormion policyi 
and also the actual trends in energy supply and demand v;ithin the 
community's members, one is required to provide the necessary 
background to understand requirements of a British energy policy 
which harmonizes Britains national self-interest with the 
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coramxmity*s self sufficiency. Thus the prospect of British 
entry into the community has always held promise of a substantial 
movement toward oil and gas self sufficiency. However the other 
alternative energy source such as gas, coal and nuclear power 
markedly showed a more gradual growth trend. Foreign oil 
specially from West Asia still represents community's most 
energy requirements. 
Japan - Not unlike the European Economic Community, only more 
so, Japan has become increasingly dependent on imported sources 
of energy. This import dependence was an integral aspect of the 
astonishing economic growth of Japan during the 1960s in 
particular, when imported oil was cheap and plentiful. More 
than for any other major economic power, the figures make 
startling reading. More surprisingly still, the general 
expectation is that, while concerted attempts at domestic 
diversification of energy sources will be conplemented by 
diversification of foreign supplies of both oil and gas, due 
to the escalator of increased overall energy consumption, Japan 
will remain predominantly dependent on imported energy for the 
indefinite future. 
The logical starting point for a summary review of 
Japanese energy policy, is the striking sparsity not only of 
22. Carroll L. Wilson, Energy Global Prospects, 1985-2000 
Report of the Workshop of Alternative Enerrgy strategies 
(WAES) (McGraw-Hill 1977). PP. 70-73. 
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domestic energy resources but of raw materials generally. 
Japan l^ck^^orthwhile quantities of both oil or coal and among 
her indigenous sources of energy only those of hydro-electricity 
and thermal power count for anything at all. Yet Japan maintained 
an annual rate of growth right up until 1972 of around 12 percent 
which she had sustained from about 1960. Unsurprisingly, during 
the same 12 years her rate of energy consumption, largely 
imported rocketed. Thus between 1962 and 1972, total energy 
consunption grew threefold, with oil and gas increasing five-fold 
each and coal and electricity by a factor of 1,4, 
During the same period the Japanese economy was steadily 
switching from coal to oil, becoming more vulnerable year by year 
as it became simultaneously more important dependent. 
In 1962 coal accounted for 36 percent of energy 
consunption, oil 46 percent; by 1972 coal had fallen to 17 per 
cent while oil had soared to an astronomical 75 per cent. The 
overall comparison of imported energy was 52 percent in 1962 
compared with 86 percent in 1972, The fact that the great bulk 
of this imported energy derived from a single region, that is the 
West Asia, was to make Japan the most vulnerable by far of all 
the major economic powers when the OPEC countries finally fully 
exercised their hitherto restrained bargaining Power, 
The severity of the OPEC challenge to the Japanese 
government and people was greater than any thrown up in the post 
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war era, a challenge heightened by its comprehensiveness and its 
suddeness. Shaken but not intimidated by this challenge, the 
Japanese government based its counter-attacking strategy on four 
main priorities; firstly, to economise on oil consumption 
immediately; secondly, to build new enlarged reserves of oil; 
thirdly, to seek out fresh sources of crude oil; arri fourthly, 
to reduce and eventually eliminate Japan's current account 
deficit through a major export programme. With admirable dispatch 
the government had by November 1973 imposed a 10 percent cut in 
consumption of both oil and electric power, passed two major 
pieces of legislation (one for balancing oil supplies equitably 
among consumers and the other for stabilizing people's livelihoods) 
and declared a state of national emergency. This was only the 
beginning and it was not until August of 1974 that the effects of 
the cumulative governmental measures began to have a generally 
23 
beneficial impact. 
The next step was the inauguration of an energy recovery 
programme spearheaded by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) MITI's programme strategy can be summarised under 
six main headings: 
(1) the active development of oil in Japan's offshore 
continental shelf; 
(2) the direct acquisition of crude oil from oil producing 
states on a government to government basis; 
23. Hugh Corbet Trade Strategy and the Asian Pacific, Region 
(Allen and Unwin Toronto University Press, Toronto 1976) 
P. 129. 
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(3) the increased stock piling of oil until, by 1979, the nation should possess a 90 day supply in reserve; 
(4) the readjustment, mainly slimming down, of Japan's 
energy industries; 
(5) the development of new energy technologies; and 
(6) the promotion for the long tepi of both the nuclear 
and solar energy industries, * 
The means employed necessarily increased the degree of 
government intervention. Meanwhile, throughout 1975, the newly 
created Japanese Advisory Committee on Energy was heavily engaged 
in securing govemment-to-govemment deals in oil and atten^ting 
to diversify away from the West Asia, which nevertheless 
remained Japan's principal regional suppliers 
As it is evident from the earlier observations that oil 
hag, since the early 1960s, come to dominate the world's energy 
economy much as coal had done for several decades before. And 
since around 45 percent of the world's energy requirements are 
25 
met by oil. The search for alternative oil sources and the 
further development of technology will doubtless proceed on all 
fronts. Yet such moves offer little hope of short term relief. 
In short and medium term, petroleum is irreplaceable. Looking 
towards the west many defunct coal mines cannot be reopened, nor 
is labour easy to find for them, even if wages are high, Natxiral 
24, Kiyoshi Kijima, Japanese Foreign Economic Policy, (Trade 
policy Research Centre, London) as Quoted Douglas Evans; 
op,cito No,19, pp, 42-43, 
25, Ibid; P, 52-53, 
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gas derives mainly from the oil producing countries, is 
difficult to transport and its heat value is 5 percent of that 
of oil. Nuclear energy cannot be supplied in a large Quantity 
during the present decade, and perhaps not until 1985-95, 'We 
are disappointed in nuclear energy'^ declares Co King Mallory III, 
Deputy assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals at the U,S, 
Department of the Interior, 'it has been the repository of 
billions of research and development dollars during the past 
twenty five years, but has been able to supply only 1 percent 
of our energy needs to date. In addition, the supply of high 
grade uranium ore has turned ouc to be not all that abundant,' 
he addeif Exploitation of the shale oil of Colorodo, of the tar 
sands of Athabaska and heavy Venezueulan oil are more expensive 
than Arab petroleum. And the construction of barrages in tidal 
estuaries geothermal heat system and solar energy are all sources 
which cannot be readily developed. 
Moreover, pollution and environmental damage raise new 
and largely unexplored problems in connection with the massive 
use of unclear energy and the realisation of other scientific 
possibilities. In effect, the development of alternative energy 
26. For details see Chapo The Objectives of U.S, Foreign 
Economic Policy from Managing International Economic 
Interdependence: selected papers of C» Fred Bergston, 
(Lexington Books, Massachusetts. 1976). 
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sources such as those planned by 'Project independence' - only 27 
gives way to unprecedented environmental hazards. 
Energy is a pjroblem and will remain a problem that v/111 
take considerable efforts to solve. All countries should 
therefore try to work together to overcome the difficulties of 
28 
these for atleast next twenty years. Producer and consumer 
nations could thus avoid a confrontation which neither would win. 
A western attack on West Asian oil fields would invoke a world 
Catast3X>phe, Petroleum at source is far easier to destroy than 
to seize by force. And attempts to pull oil prices down 
excessively/ to enforce rigorous restrictions to the free 
movement of capital or to refuse to supply certain goods (e.g. 
food stuffs) to the Arab nations would led to consequences far 
more drastic for those taking such actions than those against 
whom the action is directed. 
In fact, the bargaining power of West Asiahoil Exporting 
countries is shared with other states. Thus contracts for the 
export of natural gas from Holland have already been tied to oil 
parity, (i.e. Price increase of 10 guilders per ton of crude 
27. Significant here is the fact that the Alaka Pipeline has 
been approved, that oil refinaries are being built along 
the coast of New England, that as many as 5000 oil wells 
are contemplated in the offshore area near the most popular 
beaches around Los Angeles, that air-pollution rules are 
less and less respected, and that the safety rules in 
nuclear installations are now less stringent, 
28. D.Cook, 'Supply of Enriched Uranium is Committed for the 
Decade', International Herald Tribune 4 October 1974; OECD, 
Energy Prospects to 1985, Paris, 1974o 
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automatically implies a 0.6 percent increase per m^ of natural 
gas). The Norwegi ans (the Arabs of the North) as well as failing 
to take part in the oil-sharing mechanism of the international 
Energy Agency, have - for political reasons and national 
secuirty - virtually barred foreign oil compdnies from gas and 
oil exploration along the vast continental shelf of Northern 
Norway. i=ind in the contract for the sale of North sea gas to 
Britain by Petronord (The Franco - Norwegian consortium working 
the Norwegian part of the Prigg gas field), not only have veiry 
stringent conditions been laid down, but escalation clauses have 
been included, linking the agreed price to prices of other fuels 
and to other indices. Tough conditions have also been imposed 
by Canada (which has started phasing out crude exports to the U.S.), 
Australia (which, in addition to export controls, has embargoed 
exports of uranium and natural gas) and the USSR (which, as well 
raised the price to Eastern Europe by 120 percent from 1975 to 
January 1976, is pressing for further increases in order to 
develop its abundant but remote Siberian and Uranain energy 
resources). 
Under such conditions it should come, as no surprise 
if the Arab OPEC nations cut production rather than lower prices 
for they know their oil to be depletable. Attempts to drive 
a wedge between states with revenue, exceeding internal 
absorption capacity such as Saudi Arabia, and those who need the 
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bulk of their incomes to sustain the living standards of their 
expanding population have so far failed. 
At the same time it is now clear that the West Asian 
nations are more interested in taking their places among the 
rich nations then in opposing them. In particular* they are 
trying to encourage a growing interdependence between themselves 
and the west, investing in Europe and America in such a way as 
to ensure that the industrialized countries will remain oriented 
to West Asiar.development needs for a long time to come. Said 
H.H, Sheik Jaber Al Ahmad Al-Sabah, heir apparent and P,M, of 
Kuwait, we full realise that any international monetary disorder 
or world economic recession will be detrimental to the interests 
29 
of all countries including the oil producers. 
Thus the only realistic and mutually advantageous -
solution to the oil problem is to start a. new form of economic 
partnership between producer and consumer countries. Such a 
partnership must have a global character, in the sense that it 
must not be limited to oil only, but that oil should be inserted 
into a complete context of economic relationships which comply 
with the developmental requirements of producing countries. If it 
is imparative for industrial countries to have sure supplies of 
oil at reasonable prices, it is equally urgent for producing 
countries to attain a true economic take off and acquire a place in 
29, Speech delivered on opening 'Seminar on the investment 
Policies of the Arab oil producing countries'^ see official 
Press Rebease, Kuwait 18 February 1984t 
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great flaws of international trade. Too often the oil industry, 
instead of becoming the engine of an economic take off, has been 
maintained in a separate position from the economic context of 
producing countries. At present, the new economic partnership 
between producer and consumer countries is l i m i t t o the 
context of national solutions (conclusion of bil-iteral agreements) , 
while a multilateral effort would be appropriate between the OPEC 
bloc and the OECD countries. 
Bilateral deals are attractive to the Arabs because they 
guarantee that customers pay for oil by boosting Arab development, 
and to the customer countries because they avoid large deficits in 
that balance of payments (Exporting goods instead of foreign 
currencies). Moreover, bilateral agreements may be so 
constructed as to avoid price uncertainties for both parties. In 
particular, instead of bitterness associated with a unilateral 
increase in oil price there is a spirit of mutual cooperation and 
advantage - thixiugh the problem of 'indexing* also remains in 
uuch dealSo Additionally, bilateral agreements - which are also 
current in East - West relations - may open up investment 
opportunities in real assets which would otherwise not be possible, 
and provide some guarantee against restrictive regulation vis-a-vis 
Arab invest ments and provide for needed commodities and 
technology. Thus, even the United States - which condemned their 
deals as 'selfish' - has signed ^ US 10 billion and $ US 15 
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billion agreements respectively with Saudi Arabia and Iran for 
the supply o£ goods. Machinery arms and technology (the largest 
international transaction ever arranged, even the Marshall Plan 
30 
involving for smaller commitments„) 
Thus, although in the short term bilateral agreements 
can be expected to mushroom (especially if a multilateral 
solution is not agreed on quickly), in the long run they are 
less likely to find favour. In fact, Arab governments have lost 
political leverage e.g. by setting aside European restrictions 
on arms s^les in the West Asia, since Britain and Prance have 
rescinded their arms embargoes and no transfer clause on weapons 
seems likely to be enfor^edo Another difficulty of bilateral 
agreements stems from capital flows tending to concentrate in a 
few countries with adverse effects on others (particularly many 
less developed countries. It would have seen best therefore, 
to phase the bilateral approach gradually into a multilateral 
solution through a conserted effort under which: (a) the 
governments of the oil-exporting countri(.'S would commit themselves 
to provide industrial countries with a major share of their oil 
consumption (for instance 60 percent) at an assured price (but 
at a lower level than the current one) for some definite period 
(e.g. five years) subject to renewal. This would operate on the 
basis of a multilateral export Quota System (modelled on the 
30, Qian Paola Casadio, The Diplomacy of Resources, from the 
Economic Challenge of the Arabs t?ub. Saxon House Ltd. 
1976) PP. 13-14. 
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arrangements for sugar, as agreed in the Lbme convention between 
31 
the EEC, African, Caribbean and Pacific States), and be managed 
by the national oil conpanies of the two blocs of countries to 
exclude any manipulation by international oil companies. 
In return, tht governments of the industrial countries 
would commit themselves to pay for the agreed oil supplies with 
a planned volume of goods and services (food stuffs, industrial 
equipment, technology transfer i:echnical assistance etc.) meeting 
the developmental requirements of oil exporting countries, and to 
open their own markets gradually (e.g. by 10 percent of the whole 
consumption every five years) to the inrports of oil (derived 
products). In addition^ the negotiated price levels of the scheme 
would be kept in an appropriate relationship every year; the 
schemes net proceeds from oil would be exculsively used for the 
purchase of the goods and services agreed on; the eventual loss 
of earnings under the plan (for both blocs) would not be 
compensated automatically but would first be reviewed by a mixed 
commission; eventual disputes would be entrusted to the world 
Bank international centre for the settlement of investment 
disputes; heavy fines as well as reimposition of import 
restrictions on oil-derived products would be applied to those 
oil exporting States which do not comply with the engagements 
undertaken. Thus a kind of international oil-clearing agreement 
31. Under the Lome convention, the Antilles and Guyana, 
Mauritius, Fiji, Swzuland, Congo/Brazzaville, Indian and 
British Honduras, Medagas Car, British Africa and Surinam 
will send the EE^ upto 1.3 million tons of sugar a ^ a r 
until 1980 and may be beyond. The special price of f 260 
per ton held until the end of 1975; the countries involved 
now get a price indexed to the EEC's own support price. 
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would be defied, so that the advantages of bilateral deals could 
be maintained in a multilateral and co-ordinated contcxt, 
(b) A corporate joint venture would be instituted, whereby 
oil capital would be combined with engineering and organizational 
know-how of firms from industrial countries. Thus the institutions 
and the enterprises of the countries participating in 
international oil-clearing agreement would be granted guarantees 
against political risks; additional import facilities in the 
markets of the industrial countries for the goods (notably oil 
jpefined products) exclusively produced by the ventures; attractive 
fiscal facilities (especially for 'cross partnership'); and 
liberal interpretation of antitrust laws. Thus multilateral 
scheme should, then, be integrated with other international 
arrangements to finance oil payments deficits as well as permit 
the exploitation of 'synthetic fuel' and 'miracle' energy resources 
(e.g, fusion solar power). 
It is therefore necessary to qo much further than the 
defensive cooperation of the OECD countries, and think in terms 
of more constructive initiatives which would make it possible - in 
32 
a manner profitable to both oil producer and consumer countries. 
Naturally, these choices will have to be made within the context 
of a much broader economic framev/ork embracing both commercial and 
strategic criteria. Today the world needs some degree of 
continuity in its energy supplies and some stability in its energy 
32, Gian Paolo Casadio; op.cit. No.30 PP, 10-18. 
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costs. The producing countries, for their part, require some 
stability in oil revenue, so as to enable them to achieve 
reasonable rates of growth development and social change. This is 
clear from the current state of market forces. The other aspects 
of the problem, concern the stability of energy costs and the oil 
revenues on the OPEC countries, as are both related to the 
stability of the oil market. Since OPEC oil is the indispensable 
residue in the world oil balanceo Without OPEC oil there would be 
no world energy balance and no woorld oil balance. Since 1980 the 
oil market has been subject to a series of pressures which have 
threatened the price structure. Many people thought that there 
would be a collapse in prices as a result of developments in the 
1970s under which the energy component of growth changed 
structurally. Moreover the increased price of OPEC oil led to the 
greater supplies of oil becoming available out side of OPEC, The 
oil price decided by OPEC has thus been subject to pressures both 
on the supply side and the demand side. These development led to 
a dramatic fall in OPEC's share in world energy supplies and more 
seriously, to some very serious financial imbalances. The oil 
revenues of OPEC countries, which reached a Peak of about ^ US 280 
billion in 1981, fell to about | US 150 billion in 1983. One can 
imagine the distructive effects of this fall. 
However, since the price reduction of March 1983, OPEC has 
been successful in stabilising the market. Prices have been 
holding fairly well, with the supply/demand balances being kept 
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in a situation of equilibrium. But this precariousness of 
mobility is dangerous and may have a serious impact on future 
energy balances. While market stability has been achieved it is 
the OPEC countries which are paying the price, OPEC has been 
successful in holding the price simply by reducing its production. 
Other producers* such as the North Sea, Mexico and Egypt, have 
been in a different position. While they benefited a great deal 
from the OPEC price rise, in sustaining investments which otherwise 
would not have been made, they are also now benefiting from the 
OPEC retreat as a major supplier. They are continuing to offer 
for sale as much oil as they want to sell, at a lower price. So, 
in practice these producers (including the North Sea) are gaining 
a higher and higher share of a shrinking market. Yet the price 
structure from which they benefit is being held or defended only 
through OPEC's action in reducing its production. 
In the long run the current structure of world oil 
production could be a real source of instability. Against the 
falling trend of revenues as a result of fall in OPEC production 
and the reduction in OPEC's share of world energy supply, there 
is an increasing cost for development. It is clear that OPEC 
countries cannot go on reducing their share in the market, while 
other producers feel free to offer as much oil for sale as they 
wish, OPEC has strictly adhered to its price structure and its 
production programme so as to stabilise the market/ without such 
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action the market would be inherently unstable. Outside OPi^ C there 
should be some sharing of responsibility for market stability: 
this is an essential requirement for a healthy world energy 
economy and energy balance. 
CHAPTER III 
CHAPTER - III 
AN OPEC STRATEGY FOR COOPERATION AND 
THE NORTH SOUTH DIALOGUE 
In assessing the impacts of oil price fluctuations on 
industrialized and less developed countries, it is necessary 
to distinguish two separate effects: firstly the lessons of 
the past, particularly those of the 1970s, vdll be enhanced in 
the future; secondly the lesson of interdependence will be even 
greater, not only for the oil consumer but possibly even more 
so for the producer/exporter nations as industrialization and 
economic diversification efforts, domestically are ever more 
closely tied to co-ordinated policies i.e. international trade, 
monetary policy, the transfer of technology and the rational 
management of non-renewable resources. Responsibility for the 
problem of the developing bloc, thus created^cannot be assigned 
solely to either the advanced group of nations or to the OPEC, 
However, a better understanding of the recjuirements and .«u 
priorities of the OPEC nations facilitates the structuring of 
mechanisms to balance the need of both producers and consumers 
of petroleum as well as of the third wojld developing countries. 
This perception in a broader framework is invariably drawn from 
the content and context of the North - South divide, where aid 
is perceived more as a phenomenon involving the transfer of 
resources (for a variety of motives), from the rich north to 
the poor Souths 
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Thus, the 'North-South' Dialogue', means the conference 
on International Economic cooperation (CIEC) held in Paris in 
1975-77 which brought together eight indxistrialized countries 
and nineteen developing nations. The issues that have divided 
developed countries of the West and the developing countries of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America cover a wide rage of issues. They 
are adequately spelled out in the resolution on Development and 
International Cooperation adopted by the UN General Assembly's 
Seventh special session in September 1975, This resolution 
invited all countries to Join in the search for solutions to 
world problems, pointing in particular tox international trade; 
transfer of real resources to developing countries; international 
monetary reforms; Science and technology; industrialization, 
food and agriculture; cooperation among developing nations; and 
restructuring the economic and social sectors of the UN system,^ 
A few comments on the earlier efforts, before the Paris 
Conference could take place may help to understand the role of 
OPEC members in placing the North-South parleys in their proper 
perspective,. 
1, The urgent need to create a "New International Economic,oj(NIEO) 
was expressed by the UN at an earlier date. On 1 May 1974, 
a day to which it can be traced back the formalization, on 
a global basis, of the North-South Dialogue, the UN General 
Assembly, at its sixth special session adopted resoultions 
on the "Declaration of the Establishment of a "NIEO", and 
the "programme of action" for its establishment in order to 
"correct the inequalities and redress existing injustices, 
and make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between 
the developed and the developing countries". 
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After the failure of the UN General Assembly's Sixth 
Special session (1974) on the issue, there was a general sense 
that negotiations between the industrialized and developing 
coxintries should at first be conducted within smaller grouping, 
and suggestions were aired to this end. In order to study the 
new developments and adopt a common position, at the suggestion 
of Algeria, an extra ordinary Conference of OPEC was convened 
on 26th Jan, 1975, The Conference welcomed in principle the 
idea of establising a dialogue between smaller groups of 
developing and industtrialized countries. The conference then 
decided that a summit meeting of OPEC heads of state should be 
convened to discuss international economic questions and OPEC's 
positions on them. The summit was held in Algiers in March 1975 
and produced a Solemn Declaration, which is the most inportant 
2 
OPEC document so far on the subject. 
The first part of the Solemn Declaration reiterated the 
right of OPEC members 'to develop their natural resources, to 
exploit them and to fix their prices'. It also rejected 'any 
3 
idea or attempt to infringe on these basic rights'. 
The second part of the declaration dealt with the causes 
of international economic crisis. It observed that: the current 
international economic crisis is due basically to great 
differences in the economic and social progress of the various 
For details see Appendix No.I 
3. See ^pendix I and Middle East Economic Survey, Vol,19, 
No,11, 14 March 1975, PP,8-10. 
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people; these differences, of which the backwardness of the 
developing countries is one feature, 'are basically the result 
of foreign exploitation, which perpetuates these differences'. 
The Declaration then rejected, 'all allegations which attribute 
the responsibility for the present instablility of world's 4 
econouiy to the price of oili 
In the third part of the declaration, the heads of OPEC 
states 'condemn (ed) the threats that have been made, the 
propaganda compaign and other measures taken, culminating in the 
accusation levelled at the OPEC member countries that they wish 
to undermine the economy of the developed countries.' They also 
denounce(d) any attempt by the consuming nations to form cartels 
with a view to a confrontation; condemn (ed) any plan or 
strategy aimed at economic or military acts of aggresssion by 
these or other cartels against any member countries of OPEC. 
Then, once more they emphasise(d) the solidarity which unites 
their ranks in defence of their peoples' legilimate rights, and 
declare(d) their readiness within the framework of that 
solidarity? to take immediate and effective measures to oppose 
these threats by adopting a united policy whenever it is called 
for particularly in the event of aggression^ 
4, Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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The fourth part of this Declaration dealt with OPEC aid. 
The part dealing with aid to developing countries read as 
followss 
•Once again the kings and presidents stress the mutual 
solidarity which unites their countries with other developing 
countries in their struggle to overcome their backwardness,.,.' 
They realize that the developing countries suffer worst 
from the world economic crisis. Consequently, they stress anew 
their determination to implement measures to strengthen their 
cooperation with these coiintries. They were also prepared to 
participate with'in the limits of their resources in inplementing 
the special international programme drawn up by the UN and to 
give additional special allocations, loans and grants to the 
developing countries. In this connection they agreed on their 
special programme for financial cooperation to aid the worst hit 
developing countries in the best possible manner, especially to 
help them overcome their balance of payments difficulties. They 
were further agreed to coordinate these financial measures with 
long term loans for the development of the economies of these 
countries. 
To help improve the use of the agricultural potential of 
the developing countries, the kings and presidents decided to 
encourage the production of fertilizers and to provide the latter 
at favourable terms to the countries which had been badly 
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affected by the economic crisis. They stress their readiness 
to cooperate with other raw material exporting developing 
countries.at their efforts to obtain a fair price for their 
6 exports 
This Solemn Declaration had an Inportant impact, in that 
it preeiipted the industrialized countries* efforts to establish 
an exclusive dialogue with OPEC and to keep it confined to 
energy. 
Although the Paris Conference on International Economic 
cooperation (CIEC) did not signi tihe beginning or the end of the 
dialogue, nonetheless it helped focus world attention, in 
particular, on the problems of development aid, primary 
commodity exports, external debt and, in general, on the 
increasing gap between North and South, 
With respect to the issue of financial and development 
assistance to the South, the industrial nations agreed to 
contribute $ 1 billion in a "Special Action Programme" in order 
to meet, on highly concessionary terms, the urgent needs of the 
low income countries "facing general problems of transfer and 
resources." Of this amount, ^ 385 million was later entirusted 
by the EEC to IDA for use in future project and programme 
assistance to be disbursed over a number of years. Sweden and 
Switzerland have since cancelled some debts of the least developed 
6. Ibid, 
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countries totalling $ 55 million. The developed North also 
concurred, without specific commitments, in the necessity of 
increasing official development assistance in real terms. Part 
of this assistance was to be assigned for the expansion of food 
production in developing countries. Specificially it was agreed 
only to set up a minimum target of ten million tons of grain per 
7 annum for jfood aid, a target which remains unfulfilled to date. 
However in the area of trade, the agreed arrangements were 
expressed in general, including such points asi 
(a) further cooperation in primary commodity marketing 
and distribution; 
(b) assisting developing countries in their attempts 
to diversify domestic production and exports; 
(c) working out measures to cope with the problem of 
synthetic goods so as to ease their inpact on 
natural products; 
'(d) establishing a generalized system of preferences 
more favourable to the developing countries; 
(e) giving special and advantageous treatment to the 
developing nations in Multilateral Trade 
8 
Negotiations (MTN's). 
7, This account relies chiefly upon Louis Turner's 'Oil and the North South Pialoque', The Woria TOaaV,—February 1977 
52-61, and by the same author's The North-South Dialogue, 
The World Today, Feb. 1976, 81-83. 
8. See the Tokyo Round Trade Package signed in Geneva on 12 April 
1979 has so far been accepted by only one of the developing 
country participants in the MINs, the rest finding it. short 
in meeting their minimum demandso Reproduced from Ibrahim 
F.I, Shihata, 'Other Pace of OPEC - Financial (Assistanceto 
the Tfcird World'(Longman,London, 1982) PP.83-84, 
66 
One important commitment in this area of trade, which 
later on lose much of tts original comprehensive content was 
agreed upon in principle by the industrial countries, namely 
the agreement to establish a Common Fund, to finance buffer 
stocks for certain primary commodities of export interest to 
the South, 
Finally in the field of energy, no more than a resentment 
of the obvious was made, spelling out the importance of energy 
availability and supply, to the significance of conservation and 
increased efficiency of energy use and, to develop all forms of 
energy. 
At the conclusion of Paris Conference it was not surprising^ 
therefore, to see the developing countries express their 
disapprobation on having most of the proposals for structural 
changes, and some other suggestions dealing with crucial questions, 
discarded by the North, As to the latter, its expression of 
regret mainly centred on the lack of agreement on issues related 
to "Co-operation" on eneirgy. Following the Conference, the 
negotiations between the industrial and the developing countries 
were scattered among several bodies. The issues of commodities 
were left to UNCTad, Compensatory financing to the IMF - IBRD 
Development Committee; the matter of external debt to both UNCTAD 
and the Development Committee; development and balance of payments 
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to IMP and IBRD; and the question of access by developing 
nations to industrial markets to GATT, 
In all these assemblies, and on most important issues, 
the developed countries generally reacted in a negative way to 
9 
the demands of the developing countries, whenever their 
response was positive, it came late, offering at tintes too 
little. At the iX)Ot of this failure lay the seemingly 
incompatible North-South differences, as each saw the world 
through different lensest The developing nations calling for 
fundamental and structural changes in the existing production 
and exchange systems, and the developed countries favouring only 
marginal adjustments. A broad consensus among both sides on 
9. The specific demands put forward by the developing countries were related in particular to the following* adopting of UNCTAD's integrated programme for commodities; energy conservation, development and finance protection of the purchasing power of export earnings and assets; debt relief and debt reorganization; adoption by the developed countries of the 0.7 percent ODA target; access to capital markets of the developed world; infrastructural development; full iirolementation of the "Lima Declaration and Plan of Action" calling for an increase in the percentage share of developing countries to at least 25 percent of the total world industrial production by the year 2000; increased food production in developing countries, food security and food aid; transfer of technology through private foreign investment, and international financial and monetary reforms, that is, in IMP and IBRD resources, new allocation o£ SDR,g and greater access by developing countries to these resources. • 
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principles and objectives, therefore, remains a remote 
target. 
However, successful producer action to raise oil prices 
has had a strong impact on the commodity woffld, in economic 
as well as in political terms. In fact, with the UN General 
Assembly proclamation on April 1974 for the right of the 
developing nations to control their natural wealth and to 
industrialize on the basis of the local processing of their raw 
materials - first and foremost for their own economic and social 
development. This order was given added point after the Paris 
Conference of 1975. Thus, Venezuela nationalized the country's 
Iron - ore industry', previously controlled by two American 
companies and second only to petroleum in export ventures; Peru 
nationalized the Cerro de Pasco Co., one of the most inportant 
mining coirpanies in Latin America; Mauritania nationalized 
Mifarma, the Corporation which works the copper mines of AK 
Joint; Tofo nationalized the mining company of Benin; and 
Jamaica took a majority stake in the local subsidiary of Kaiser 
11 Aluminium, 
Moreover, since then several developing nations have 
tried to emulate the OPEC example. In particular,seven bauxite 
10, Ibrahim P.I, Shihatea; op.cit.. No.8, P,9l. 
11, See Gian Paolo Casadio, The Intact of Higher Oil Prices -
The Diplomacy of Resources in 'The Economic Challenge of 
the Arabs' (Saxon House, Haii?>shire, England) P,18 and 
Karl K, Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpluq eds,, A new 
international Economic Order* Confrontation or Cooperation 
between North and South (Boulder, Col, West view, 1977), 
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piroducing covintries (Guinea, Australia, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierra 
Leone Surinam and Yugoslavia), having between them some 63 
percent of world production, agreed to set up the' International 
Association of Bauxite Producers' to manufacture aluminium and 
assure that the multinationals do not work to the detriment of 
any member state; Algeria, Italy and Spain agreed a price-setting 
arrangement for mercury, Zambia, Chile, Peru and Zaire, accounting 
for 70 percent of Copper exports and constituting the 
intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), 
have cutback production to boost declining world copper prices; 
twenty Latin American nations (including Cuba) established a 
cartel to protect the world price of sugar; Cameroun, Ghana and 
Ivory coast, Nigeria, Togo and Brazil established the Cocoa 
producers' alliance (COPAL); Coffee producers decided to withhold 
part of their production and set up a multinational organization 
(Cafe* Suaves Centrales) to regulate price and supply, with 
support from Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela to finance a 'buffer* 
Stoc^^plle? Morocco, the biggest world exporter of Phosphates, 
joined hands with smaller producers (Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia 
and Togo) to maintain high prices thrx5ughout the world and 
promote the use of Phosphatic fertilizers. And eleven iron-ore 
exporting countries had agreed to set up an organization of 
12 
exporting countries. 
12. Stephen A. Zorm^ 'Producer's Association and Commodity 
- ^ ^ Jk^ ama arid Sonia 
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Further to keep the Third World in the OPEC Canp, the 
OPEC states have rapidly expanded their aid commitments. Thus, in 
1974, OECD estimated that the total amount of OPEC aid reached 
almost ^ US 7^2 billion (as defined by the criteria applying to 
western aid, i.e. exclusively from high interest loans and 
military assistance). The amount of OPEC aid is remained even 
higher if we include items not included in the OECD computations 
- substantial puirchases of world Bank bounds, contributions to 
the new aid mechanisms such as the IMP oil facility and the UN 
• special Emergency Fund, and the concessionary sale of oil, 
notably to India and Bangladesh. While in 1979/76 OPEC aid (2 
percent of its combined GNP) proved to be more generous then that 
provided by the west (0.3 percent of combined GNP), even more 
important, 40 percent of OPEC aid disbursements (conpared with 
only 8 percent of western aid) went to this thirty-three poorest 
countries; the sacalled fourth world (mainly some of East African 
and central American nations, and the Indian subcontinent). 
Moreover, it was the Arab states and Iran which were doing most 
to try to offset the impact of higher oil prices on the poorer 
nations, (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates had emerged on 
the world's top donors in proportion to GNP). During this period 
it was achieved through: 
(a) existing international monetary and development 
institutions such as IMP and World Bank; 
(b) new regional bodies such as the Arab Bank for African 
Economic Development; the US 200 million special 
Arab Fund for Africa; the $ US 900 million Islamic 
Development Bank; the ^ 340 million Arab Fund for 
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Economic and Social Development; and the Saudi and 
Iraqi Development Funds modelled on the Kuwait and Abu 
Dhabi Funds which have also extender! their activities 
to non-Arab developing nations, by increasing their 
capital to | US 3o4 billion and ^ US 500 million 
respectively; 
(c) the expansion of trade ties, notably Brazil barting 
Soya» Sugar and cotton in exchange for oil. South East 
Asia which is complementary to West Asia in many ways -
Singapore for instance depends greatly on West Asiauoil 
refining; India which can provide the man power and the 
market for example fertilizer plants installed in the 
West Asia, etc, 
(d) bilateral or tripartite investment deals, e.g. the 
establishment of iran-o-hind, a new shipping line run 
jointly by Iran and India; the setting up of a joint 
Tanker Shippoing Company between Iran and Pakistan; 
the creation of a Kuwaiti-Brazilian investment-Company 
for agricultural and industrial projects; Libyan 
investment in a Zaire Copper Mine development; Iraqi 
investment in Malaysia for the manufacture of rubber 
based goods; a fertilizer plant jointly owned by Abu 
Dhabi and Pakistan with Pakistan's share being 
contributed by Saudi Arabia and a company jointly by 
Guinea^ Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Egypt to mine 
13 the Aykoye bauxite deposits in Guinea® 
13, Gian Pf^olo Casadio; op.cito No.11, PP. 19-20, 
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Looking back over the past decade, OPEC members provided 
from 1974 to 1977 slightly more than $ 38 bn In aid to less 
developed countries; In 1974, the figure was $ 7^6 bn. and In 
1977 about $ 10 bn. However owing to the vagaries of the oil 
market, the figure for 1978 was slightly down from 1977*s. 
It must be stressed at this juncture that the mid 1970s 
marked a turning point in the OPEC aid programme. This was 
mainly due to the introduction of a formal institutional 
structures for the distribution of OPEC aid. This institution, 
initially known as the OPEC's special Fund, as pioneered in 
early 1976 as an International special account, collectively 
owned by all OPEC members. Three years later the Funds Agreement 
was amended in order to permit it to use loan repayments to 
finance future operations, thus providing for the agencys' 
indefinite continuity. The very next year, the Fund's permanence 
was ensured when OPEC Finance Ministersco^erted the Fund into an 
'International Agency for Financial Assistance to other Developing 
Countries', thus endowing it with a distinct legal personality. 
The Funds' formal title was changed to the OPEC Fund for 
International Development, to be administered by a ministerial 
council and a governing board on which all member states of 
14 
OPEC are represented. 
With the current dismal glut on the oil market, one might 
expect a situation in which OPEC aid programmes had almost 
Ian Seymour, OPECi An Instrument of change (Macmillion, 
London, 1980) PP. 86-87. 
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fizzled out, but this is far from the case. Despite its current 
difficulties, OPEC in this decade is still to be found financing 
15 numerous projects in the Third World« 
This ingression was vividly conveyed in a interview with 
Dr. Seyyid Abdulai, the Director General of the OPEC Fund, Among 
other things, he revealed that in 1984 alone, the OPEC fund 
assisted 20 countries in Africa, five in Asia and three in Latin 
America. He also pointed out that in the same year the institution 
had helped to finance 21 operations in Africa, five schemes in 
Asia, and three projects in Latin America. 
In several respects however OPEC aid cannot be compared 
with the aid programme of the Western World and the centrally 
planned economi-es (CPEs). Members of the industrial world have 
not yet complied in any meaningful way with UN Policy which states 
that a minimum net amoimt of 0.7 percent of GNP should be set 
aside for Official Development Assistance (ODA), Most donors from 
the western world have failed to provide more than one-half of this 
amount, AS regards the CPE's the situation is even worse, since 
aid disbursements, which accounted for less than 0.1 percent of 
their GNP in the early 1970s, have slipped to 0.04 percent of 
16 their collective GNP. 
15, Aid from OPEC countries, Paris, OECD publications, 1983. 
16. Ian Seymour op.cit.No.l4 and Paul Hallwood and - . Stuart 
Sinclair, Oil Dejst^  and Development in'OPEC in the Third 
World^Allen & Unwin London 1981) PP. 94-128. 
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By contrast, OPEC donors have sustained uniquely high 
levels of aid in relation to national income. Prom 1970 onwards, 
the OPEC ODA/GNP ratios have remained unmatched.by those of the 
other aid-given groups. Indeed in every year since 1973, the 
world's four leading aid donors relative to GNP, have all been 
17 members of OPEC, 
> The unique sacrifices inherent in OPEC aid can also be 
discerned in the fact that these aid programmes are made possible 
by the depletion of a finite natural resources that is more in 
the nature of a capital endowment than a source of indefinitely-
recurring income. By contrast DAC and CPE aid programmes are 
overwhelmingly derived from renewable sources of wealth. Again, 
almost one-half of non-OPEC aid is tied, or partially tied to 
procurement and its value to the recipient, or true grant element, 
is correspondingly reduced. On the other hand, OPEC aid is united 
to its source, and one consequence is that the western world 
ultimately benefits from united OPEC aid since it is a major 
source of procurment for members of the Third World, 
However, there exists an economic case, as well as a 
political one, for oil surplus countries to invest their funds 
in the developing countries rather than to place them in the 
developed countries. It is trxE-that, on the face of it, 
developed countries seem to offer Gulf surplus countries a wide 
Hossein G, Askari, OPEC and International aid, Sais Review 
winter 1981-82, No.3 reproduced from OPEC bulletin Vienna April 86, P.14 
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spectrum of advantages that developing countries ace unable to 
match. Credit worthiness, well organized financial markets, 
available technology, and good management are some of the 
attractions for oil surplus funds in developed Economics, However, 
behind this misleading facade remain the hard facts that OPEC 
savings can hardly increase real investment in developed 
countries. Inflation would unobtrusively but persistently -erode 
the same oil funds entrusted to highly organized markets in 
developed countries. Motivated by self inteirest, the Gulf oil 
states' investment in developed countries turns out to be self 
defeating. Developing countries, with all their short comings, 
can on the contrary offer Gulf oil states a chance to transform 
their savings into real investment and hence protect them against 
erosion by inflation. Even then over an oil the main aid 
recipients from OPEC during the 1970s were not, in fact, those 
countries most affected by OPEC price increases. 
In 1979, the eight industrializing countries with a 70 
percent share of the developing countries' manufacturing exports 
took 70 percent of Third world oil imports. The annual oil 
imports of the 31 poorest countries is only about 4 percent of the 
total. Yet during 1973-79 the group of least developed countries 
received some$ 4 bn. in aid from OPEC countries, as against the 
$ 3.3 bn they spent on oil Imports. During 1974-80 these countries 
attcounted for 13 percent of OPEC aid. Thus there is no direct 
18 link between aid and oil imports. 
See Bahman Roshan, 'Wanted; a new helping hand in' OPEC 
at the Cross Roads, Arabia. A Journal of Islamic World 
Review, London 1983, P.28. — - - — 
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Concessional aid - that is# aid given at less than market 
interest rates - in this OPEC aid has been quite substantial during 
the 1970s. But the sheer magnitude of OPEC aid, though still 
small in comparision with aid from OECD countries, is nonetheless 
very significant. During 1974-76, concessional flows from OECD 
countries to developing countries were about 0,34 percent of their 
collective GNP, a figure well below the 0.7 percent target set by 
the 'Brandt Commission.' The equivalent for OPEC was in the range 
of 2 to 2,7 percent. If non-concessional flows are also taken 
into account, it would be 3,4 percent. 
Nontheless, without an overall assessment of OPEC aid since 
1973, one cannot be sure that it has effectively achieved the aims 
of OPEC lending. Furthermore, the fact that OPEc countries are 
themselves developing countries means that aid funds do not come 
back to them as orders for manufactured goods or repayments for 
bank loans, unlike aid from industrialized countries. 
To this extent, OPEC aid can be seen as contributing to 
increased demand for goods and services from the industrialized 
countries as well as facilitating the developing countries' 
payment of debts to the western banks - hence the keen interest 
among the bankers, industrialists and governments of the developed 
countries calling for increased OPEC aid to non-oil. developing 
countries. One wonders whether the issue concerns help to 
developing countries or releasing of funds for the West, OPEC 
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aid could be used more effectively for the promotion of a 
greater degree of trade and commercial links among developing 
countries than has been the case so far. However investment 
in the Third World seems to be in the nature of a collective 
good. Even if the Gulf states are interested investing their 
savings in the developing countries the developing countries 
themselves remain far from being the promised land for 
investment. The odds against secure and successful investment 
in these countries are enormous. Not only inadequacy of 
infrastructure and qualified manpower, but also insufficient 
management and political instability impede any sustainable 
20 effort for development in the Third world. 
A vast literature on development has eirphasised the need 
for a substantial investment effort to break the vicious circle 
in developing countries and thus to make the effort worthwhile, 
19. Ibid? P. 28. 
H. Beblawi, 'The Predicament of the Arab Gulf Oil States; 
Individual Gains and Collective Losses' in Malcolm Kerr 
and El Sayed Yassin (eds.) Rich and Poor States in the 
Middle East (West view Press, Boaldr, Colorado, 1982), 
P. 202. 
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Whether it is called the 'big push' 'balanced growth' or 'take 21 
off, the message is always the same# Investment in the Xhird 
World cannot be made profitable unless undertaken on a massive 
scale. While this scale could be within the reach of the Gulf 
states as a group for certain regions, it is not necessarily 
attainable by any one country along* Here^ enters the nature of 
21, See respectively, P,N. Rosenstein, 'Notes on the Theoiry 
of the Big Push in H« Ellis and T!« Wallish (eds.) Economic 
Development for Latin America (St, Martins Press, London 
1966), R. Nurkse Problems of Capital Formation in Under 
Jieveloped Countries (Blackwell, Oxford, 1954): The following 
is the essence of Nurkse's argument. Low income "is a 
reflection of low productivity, which in turn is due largely 
to lack of capital. The lack of capital is a result of the 
small capacity to save, and so the circle is conplete." The 
inducement to investment is limited by the size of the market, 
The size of the market is chiefly determined by productivity 
and prodtictivity "depends largely, though by no means 
entirely, on the degree to which capital is used in 
production .... But for any individual entrepreneur, the 
use of the capital is inhabited, to start with, by the 
small size of the market." This is another vicious circle. 
Individual investment decision cannot help. The only way 
out of the dilemma is the application of balanced growth' 
There is an overall enlargement of the market. Most mass 
consun^tion industries support each other, for they are 
conplementary In that they provide market, W>W, Rostow, 
The stages of Economic growth; 2nd Edn. (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1971), 
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investment in developing countries as a collective good. There 
is no doubt that it is in the interests of the Gulf oil states 
to transform their savings into investment in developing countries 
Yet one country alone - even an oil rich one - cannot assume all 
the hazards of investment in developing countries. What is 
needed is a collective action to bring about a collective benefit. 
The prerequisite for maningful development it has been said, is 
to undertake a massive investment programme. However, all the 
Gulf States' savings are too small to finance massive investment 
in all developing countries, and hence there is a need for 
concentration on a regional basis. Gulf States' accumulated 
savings inportant as they are, would become largely ineffective 
22, A public or collective good is defined as one in which 
the consunption by one member of a group does not jreduce its utility to other members of the group. The distinguishing feature of a collective good is that, once provided to one member of the group, it can be made available to other members at 'no extra cost- The Joint supply principles' (P. Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure*~T5evlew of Economics and Statistics, (November 1954, Novemoer ly^b, NovemDef"I9SB) and/or the rest^of the group cannot be^ excluded from benefiting from it -'"the exclusion principe (R. Muagrave, The Theory of Public Finance, (McGraw Hill, New 1959), Though collective goods are not free goods, since their piroduction entails less care of scarce resources and implies risks, it remains true that once provided they appear to other members of the group as costless and they can enjoy them as free riders. In most cases the indivisibility of costs appears to reside at the heart of the collective goods problem. Whereas costs are indivisible and must be incurred all at once, benefits have to be divided among members of the group, A member of a group may not be able to incur alone the cost of the collective good because the initial cost exceeds its benefit to him. It is no consolation to know that the total benefits to all members of the group out match total cost. What matters to each member is the fraction of benefit that he gains from the collective goods regardless of the benefits accruing to other members of the gxroup. Without coercion and/or co-ordination collective goods cannot be provided, no matter how important thing may be. 
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if thinly spread out ell over the Third World. In the absence 
of a supranational authority able to define an investment policy 
by coercion, the only way to reach such a policy is through 
co-ordination/ without such co-ordination no investment in the 
Thir^iWorld could bring about the desired results. It is no 
worder, then, that in the absence of such coordination the Gulf 
States acting independently prefer to place their savings in 
developed countries rather than to assume alone all the hazards 
of investment in the Third World. Unfortunately, what appears as 
a second best investment policy for the Gulf States, savings 
triggers an inflation process that would ultimately erode the^ se 
very savings. On the other hand, if investing the Gulf States' 
savings in developing countries seems to be necessary to bring 
about the 'investment case* referred to earlier, this cannot be 
23 
realized' without coordination among them. 
If this is not the case then most institutional solutions 
proposed to deal with the problems of commercial independence 
and economic development in the developing world are supposed 
to function through the World Bank or the IMF. Yet none of them 
are structurally suitable for the redirection of OPEC aid and 
surplus funds to achieve greater economic development. 
23. Hazem Beblawi Gulf Foreign Investment co-ordinationj Needs 
and Modalities, in M.S. Elazbary Ed, 'The Impact of Oil Revenues on Arab Guir beveiopment' (Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1984), P.77. 
81 
The IMP is primarily an institution leinding money on a 
short term basis. Solutions to development problems require 
availability of large sums of loans with low interest and long 
maturity, which is beyond the present structure of the IMF. Nor 
can the world Bank offer the developing countries finance on a 
scale needed for their development programmes. The World Bank's 
non-concessional finance essentially extends assistance to 
specific projects after a long and slow process of evaluationg 
them on a commercial basis. 
Another alternative suggested by the 'Brandt Report" is 
a "World Development J'xind" which combines the functions of both 
the IMF and the World Bank of short terra lending and project 
assistance. But the main resources for such a bank are 
supposed to come from the governments of the industrial 
countries. And considering that the aid record of these 
governments has fallen well below the targets set by the Brandt 
commission, this porposal clearly does not have much chance of 
being inplemented. 
In contrast to the above proposals, all of which work 
through the IMF or the World Bank, a proposal was suggested by 
Algeria and Venezuela in 1979 in Caracas for the creation of 
a "Third World Development Agency" based on an extension of 
OPEC Fund. The basic idea as a whole of OPEC states and 
developing countries to have a joint pool of credit for short-
term support and long-term project lending. It would also 
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provide countries with an alternative source of finance when the 
IMF conditions could force them to abandon their economic 
priorities, (in the long-term this agency could finance 
development projects that would promote trade among developing 
countries, and create a Third World capital market> The agency 
could use the surplus credit of OPEC as security against loans 
from the industrial countries for the benefit, particularly of 
those poor developing countries with no access to private capital 
markets • 
The Algerian suggestion based on the dual function of the 
OPEC Fund aims to redirect the benefits of OPEC's aid to the 
promotion of economic links among all developing countries and 
offers a more effective alternative to aid financiing. It 
envisages significant extensions to the functions and the 
structure of the present OPEC fund to enable it to face the 
whole problem of recycling and gain a greater degree of 
financial independence for the developing countries. 
The proposal for the Third World Develojpraent Agency was 
not adopted in 1979, but every thing that has happen^ since 
indicates OPEC's need for an institution of this kind. 
CHAPTER IV 
CHAPTER - IV 
OPEC AID; A NEW FACTOJ^ IN 
THIRD WORLD POLITICS 
The creation of OPEC, which does qualify for the title 
of an instrument of collective self-help, was a major event 
in the history of developing country efforts to rectify 
systematic inequalities detrimental to their interests. The 
history of financial cooperation between member countries of 
OPEC and other developing nations began soon after the foundation 
of that organization in 1960, This process started with the 
cireation in 1961 of the 'Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development', 
The chronological coincidence of these events may be considered 
accidental; as there was no neceesary link between the actions of 
1 
the five oil-exporting countries which decided in 1960 to Join 
together in order to defend their vital economic interests 
threatened by the erosion of petroleum prices, and the separate 
c 
decision of Kuwait in 1961 to est.ablish a Fund for external 
development aid. Yet, in a subtle sense, one may now recognise 
in their diverse actions the features of a new and inportant 
phenomenon; the emergence of effective solidarity in the Third 
World - both within a group of countries with similar economic 
interest and between members of this group and other developing 
1. The five oil exporting countries cited above are» Islamic 
Repxiblic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela 
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nations. The point of interest in the context is the birth as 
early as 1961, of a new concept in foreign aid in which both 
donor and recipient are developing countries. The Kuwait Fund 
during the 1960s was, by present standards* a fairly modest aid 
institution. Yet, Kuwait was in this period transferring in 
foreign aid every year a percentage of its Gross National 
Product higher than that of any other donor country. Cumulative 
disbursements from the Kuwait Fund between 1962/1963, in the 
first year of its operation, and 1970/1971 were of the order of 
KP 60 million or approximately $ 200 million (US). Other aid 
institution sprang up in OPEC member countries early in 1970s, 
prior to the oil events of 1973, The Abu Dhabi Fund for 'Arab 
Economic Development* was launched in 1971, and tte 'Arab Fund 
for Social and Economic Development' established in 1968/became 
operational in 1972, The Abu Dhabi Fund, like the Kuwait Fund, 
is a national institution owned by one OPEC member country.While 
the Arab Fund is a regional institution founded by a group of 
2. The term Third world countries is relative in general to 
those countries which have recently gained independence and have a real per capita income less than a Quarter of the per capita income of the United States of America, 
Canada, Switzerland etc. Or are falling within the Income range of less than $ 500 per capita, per annum. Most of 
the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and some countries of Europe are included among them, 
3. Specially Kuwait could be given some credit for having tried to cireate conditions, atleast in the Arab world, which could make investments safer and thus more possible. For instance, Kuwait initiated the Inter-Arab Investmait Guarantee Corporation (lAIGC) with the Kuwait Fund for Arb Economic Development (KFEAD), taking the lead as early as 1966 when it proposed this step to the 1st Arab Industrial Development Conference, later, KFAED convened a meeting of Arab Financial experts to study the diffierent aspects of the Question. By 1970, KFAED had prepared a draft convention, and 
by the beginning of 1973 The Convention had received the approval of 13 Arab countries, Michael Field, A Hundred million Dollars a Day (sidwich & Jackson,London 1975) P. 239. 
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countries not all which are membe rs of OPEC, However* these 
funds were mainly concerned and limited with the granting of 
project loans on concessional terms to Arab countries. 
However, aid fix>m OPEC member countries before 1973, was 
not uniquely channelled through development finance institutions. 
Late in the 1960s three Arab oil exporting countries, Kuwait, 
Libya and Saudi Arabia, began to extend substantial grants to 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria in Pursuant to a resolution adopted in 
the Khartoum summit of August 1967. There were considerable 
differences between this particular type of aid and that provided 
by the funds. The payittents were in the form of grants not loans. 
They were not tied to projects nor to plans, but given as 
straight budgetary support. They were benefitting only three 
Arab countries while the Funds had, from the beginning a much 
wider vocation. They were motivated by a strong political 
imperative.^! the need to support the states victim to the Israeli 
armed attack of June 1967 and to the military occupation which 
resulted from it. Estimates of actual disbursements of OPEC 
4 
members in the years 1970 to 1973 are as follows (US $ million)* 
Table No-2: FUND DISBURSEMENTS OF OPEC MEMBERS - 1970-73 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
443.5 630.9 688.9 1740,0 
4, Sources: 1970»1972, World Bank« 1973 OECD 
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The data suggest that OPEC aid, even with the exclusion of the 
Khartoum payment, was already substantial before 1973, The Oil 
events of that year enabled OPEC countries to inaugurate a new 
chapter in their record of aid provision, but they did not mark 
an absolute beginning - institutions with proven capabilities in 
the provision of financial assistance which were in existence 
before 1973. Governments had already recognized the need to 
express solidarity with other developing countries, beginning with 
immediate neighbours, through foreign aid. Large disbursements 
in the form of grants and soft loans for budgetary suppoirt were 
being made since 1958 and the scope of aid in terms of objectives, 
geographical extent and scale of disbursements had broadened 
5 
significantly in I971e 
In general, OPEC members sensed early the need for a more 
conscious effort to assist other developing countries in a more 
concrete form. The interesting point to be noted here is the 
existence of a direct relationship between the economic 
emancipation of OPEC countries - at least as far as petroleum 
is concerned/ their overall chances of development and their 
level of income; and their willingness to assist other developing 
countries. 
The events of 1973 had a significant impact on OPEC -
Third World relations. First, the oil embargo of 1973 and the 
5, Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, see Chapo The OPEC Aid Record' in 
other Pace of OPEC (Longman*, London & New York 1982) PP.42-43, 
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ensuing oil price increases demonstrated for the first time the 
new vulnerability of industrialized countries to OPEC actions, 
and at the same time resulted in a considerable transfer of 
financial assets from the industrialized countries to OPEC members, 
ultimately leading to a relative shift of the balance of bargaining 
po\-jer in favour of OPEC. Second; these developments, by causing 
great hardships for the Third World, created new responsibilities 
for OPEC towards these countries. The combined effect of 
increased OPEC responsibility towards the Third World, and 
increases in its power, was a closer interaction between OPEC and 
the Third World countries, focused principally on the reform of 
the international economic system, to make it more responsive 
to Third World needs. 
However, it took OPEC and the Third World countries some 
time before they could agree on an operational and conceptual 
frame work for their cooperation. This was so because not all 
OPEC countries were equally interested in this matter. Their 
differences in outlook and interests were made manifest in tlieir 
individual approaches. For instance, the Israel and the West 
Asia conflict in general concerned more to Arab countries 
against the countries who take side with Israel. The Arabs with 
the exception of Iraq, worked together in inposing the 1973-74 
oil embargo, while non-Arab states continued to export oil at the 
same level (Venezuela) or at slightly higher levels (Iran, Nigeria 
and Indonesia). Iran maintained oil exports to Israel during the 
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embargo but at the same time pressed very hard for a price 
increase. Hence the preoccupations of the industrialized 
countries with the security of their oil supplies and their 
efforts to reach some sort of agreement with OPEC on this issue, 
also meant that the qvie stion of Arab - Israeli conflict, energy 
shortagess in the west, and the link between these two questions 
and not the broader problems of the Third World, dominated 
early international negotiations. 
In addition to traditional political considerations, 
economic factors also contributed to the division among Arab 
oil producers. As conservative Arab countries were the-low 
absorptive, high surplus countries with large oil reserves, 
and thus were accumulating lar'ge monetary assets. These assets 
were held in the currencies of the industrialized countries and 
were deposited in their banks, thus making them vulnerable to 
serious economic disturbances in these industrialized countries. 
Therefore - at least in the short term, conservative Arab 
interests coincided - to a significant degree with the interests 
of the industrialized countries. Hence the scope of vital 
issues in the international forums, and the addition of 
the problems of development and raw materials, thus occured 
later. This was also partly due to the fact that the Arab members 
of OPEC came to realise the value of Third World support for the 
advancement of their cause. However, despite these delays, the 
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differences in the order of priority of OPEC and Third world 
countries, these events were extremely important since they 
led to the most ambitious joint OPEC - Third World efforts to 
reform international economic system to their own advantage. 
Short-term economic considerations were not, however, the only 
factors affecting the policies of these countries. Some OPEC 
members had over-riding national objectives which were 
determined to pursue consequently different approaches to this 
issue, 
Saudi Arabia - Having the world's largest oil reserves and being 
the world's largest exporter of oil, this country hag- an interest 
in maintaining a market for oil over the long rvin, maintaining its 
long run political influence derived from oil, retaining its 
position as the v/orld's largest oil exporter, conserving its oil 
reserves and keeping the world economy in a state that protects 
her own interest. Increased financial resources since 1968 had 
already enhanced Saudi Arabian impact on Arab politics and their 
evolution. For example after the death of President Nasser, 
Saudi Arabia contributed to the evolution of Egypt's foreign 
6 Policy in a more Pro-Western direction, it wanted to consolidate 
6. Egypt's attitude in its earlier phases towards Arab oil 
policies was both ambivalent and ambiguous. According to one 
expert writing about Egyptian Oil Policy during the 1950s and 
the I960sj Two tendencies have viewed with each other in 
Egyptian oil thinking. On the one hand the Egyptian government 
has sought to give the impression that it is not interested in 
benefitting from the oil revenues of the major Arab oil 
producers, and to that extent it has refrained from setting 
itself as a Pioneer of Oil Policies in the Arab worldo On the 
other hand, i n the course of its general Propaganda Campaigns 
against the traditional regimes, it has inveighed against 
deplorable squandering of Oil revenues by the privileged 
classes. This has led Egypt, in accordance v;ith its cult of 
Contd, on page 90 
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these gains, and at the same time recognized the In^ortance of a 
satisfactory resolution to the Arab-Isra^rli conflict. If it were 
to succeed. However, the Saudis also knew that they oouXd not 
achieve this objective without the United States' help. To 
obtain this US assistances, the Saudis, were prepared to make 
concessions on other issues - such as the price of oil, the 
early lifting of the (1973-74) oil embargo and the recycling of 
surplus funds in ways that would ease the balance of payment 
problems of the Industrialized countries* 
Moreover, even from a long-term perspective t>® interest 
of Saudi Arabia along with Qatar and UAE favoured stable oil 
prices^ sided the line of industrialized countries than those 
of other OPEC members. Kuwait, which in economic terms was also 
a member of the same group, often sided on price disputes with 
radicals like Algeria and Iraq. These states in contrast to the 
conservatives, seek higher prices and remained more aggressive 
in the use of political influence derived from oil. However, 
given their huge oil reserves, the Saudis were concerned that 
oil prices could make their oil non-competitive with otl^r 
sources of energy unlike, the countries with relatively small 
reserves but more potential for economic development wanted to 
sell their oil at the highest price and industrialise. However, 
Contd« from page %<] 
masses, to preach the ill defined gospel of some kind of 
people's takeover bid, 
David Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East (Faber and Paber Ltd., London, 1966), PP. 109-10 
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the Saudis could not be oblivious to Third World demands, if only 
to prevent the more radical Arabs from presenting themselves as 
the sole defenders of Third World interests. After the 
conference in Algeria in 1973, in that it produced a document 
incorporating the most important principles on the basis of 
which its members believed that the international economic 
system should be reformed. She also played an important role 
in developing a common OPEC apprx^ach towards global economic 
issues with other radical OPEC members, which was finally 
embodied in the 'Solemn Declaration' of OPEC head of States 
and Governments in Algeria in March 1975, But she also at times 
used the threat of closer cooperation with developing countries 
tp obtain concessions from the west. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia behaved in a contradictory 
manner, on the one hand pressing in the mid 1970s for redxiced 
oil prices and for the early lifting of the 1973-74 oil embargo 
and, on the other, was making the continuation of these efforts 
conditional on the west's favourable and cooperative response 
to Third World demands. However, ultimately the former 
considerations determined Saudi behaviour and led to its rather 
tepid support for Third World objectives. 
Iran and Venzuela; Given the absence of any overriding 
objectives, such as the Question of Arab-Israeli conflict 
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(which affected Arab OPEC members), the attitude of Iran and 
Venezuela towards the above mentioned issues was determined 
principally by their political preferences and other national 
7 
objectives and ambitions. As far as Iran was concerned, its 
Pro-Western orientation at the time, as well as its close 
political and economic links with Western countries, argued 
against its chanpioning radical approaches to these issues. At 
the same time, however, Iran's ambitions to play an increasingly 
important role on the international scene, plus its desire to 
enhance its influence and prestige in the Third World made it 
8 
a supporter of the letter's goals. Thus, whenever possible, 
Iran tried to make proposals which in its view would answer 
the needs of both industrialized and Third World countries. But 
whenever it was forced to choose, Iran supported the position 
of developing countries without, however, going too far in 
pressuring the industrialized countries. However, it is 
important to note that, given Iran's economic and financial needs 
its capcity for such action w as also limited. 
7. See for example the Shah* s interview with Blitz reprinted 
in Keyhan International, 21 July 1976, P,4, 
8, For exanple unlike the Arab countries which favoured intra-Arab organizations as channel s of aid to developing countries - Iran proposed an international fund with OPEC, ind\istrial and developing country membership, based on the principle 
of one - country, one vote, irrespective of the level of 
contribution. See the interview of Iran's Minister of 
Finance Jamshld Amouzegar. In Keyhan International, 3 toril 
1976, P-4- aIrq spp the editorial in Kevnan inteTRirtional 
11 April 1974, P.4 
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Venezuela's position on these issues bears considerable 
resemblance to that of Iran and emanated from its special needs 
and aspirations, including its desire to increase its influence 9 
among the central American and Caribbean natiOni; 
A principle consequence of the foregoing discussion 
demonstrate that throughout these years, OPEC remained as an 
amalgam of countries deeply divided along Ethinic and political 
lines, with serious differences in their resource mix -
including petroleum - reserves and their economic needs. These 
differences also affected its relations with the Third world 
countries, including its approach to the question of aid to 
these countries. Instead contacts were established at 
different levels - among OPEC and as between industrialiyied and 
developing countries in which OPEC remained reactor rather than 
initiator, responding to external circumstances rather than 
trying to shape them. However the tendencies to cooperate with 
the Third World intensified after the Sixth UN Gene ral Assembly 
9. Venezuela's active role at such an early stage is 
explained by the fact that the commercial production of 
oil in Venezuela had started as early as 1917, thus 
giving the Venezuela a better understanding of oil and 
problems related to it. Moreover Venezuela which by 
1945, had managed to establish the 50-50 principle in 
its relations with the oil companies, suffered from the 
competition of lower - prided Middle East oil. in fact, 
the oil companies increased oil production in the Persian 
Gulf in order to warn Venezuela against making heavier 
financial demands on them. Thus the creation of a 
cooperative front of oil producers served Venezuela's 
interest well - See Fuad Rouhani, A History of OPEC 
(New York, Praeger 1972). 
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session which produced a declaration and programme of action on 
10 
the NIEO held at Algerian request in 1974, 
A further, novel, response of the Third World to these 
events was to bend economic power to diplomatic ends, hitching up 
the OPEC horse to the UNCTAD Pantechnicono Very much against its 
will, the US administration was forced in 1974, by tl^ threat of 
further increases in the price of oil collectively, to give way 
over the calling of a Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation (CIEC) the so called North South Conference, to 
discuss a wider range of questions affecting Third World development 
in the new era of high energy prices. The same threat hung over 
the large number of negotiations in the three years following the 
October war. A new round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) 
started under the GATT, negotiations to repair or replace the 
crippled 'Britton Woods n®netary system', talks aimed at adopting the 
Yaound4 convention to a European Community enlarged to include 
Britain with its retinue of former dependencies, a third United 
Nations Conference, on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and a 
further full session of UNCTAD — held in Nairobi in 1976, all 
full under the shadow of Arab oil power, 
Svibsidies to Third V/brld countries especially affected by 
higher oil prices were an obvious step for the Arab members of 
10, Shreen Hunter OPEC and the Third World (Croom Helm, London, 
1984) PP. 25-29. 
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OPEC. Their action on prices had not simply been dictated by 
their opposition to Israel. It was important for them to maintain 
as extensive as possible a diplomatic coalition in the UN and 
elsewhere in order to isolate Israel, and aid offered a relatively 
simple and inexpensive way of securing cohesion. Saudi Arabia, 
Libya and Kuwait had already set out along this path. Their 
efforts now subsequently extended and reinforced by the addition 
of further resources from other OPEC members working through a 
variety of bilateral and multilateral channels. 
Let us straight away put on one side two large groups of 
transactions which ought not to be considered as concessionary 
development assistance. First there were the regular anraunts, 
believed to approach $ 0,5 billion a year by 1973, given to Egypt, 
Syria and Jordon to support their war effort, together with 
additional adhoc amounts for arms purchases. Second there were 
the very large amounts made available to LDCs through the IMP oil 
facility and the substantial Arab purchases of bonds of the World 
Bank and the various regional development banks, together rxinning 
into many billions of dollars. These funds, however, are not to 
be thought of as amounts transferred. They are more akin to 
11 
deposit earnings as they do generate commercial rates of interest. 
However, in addition to these substantial sums, the OPEC countries 
11. Mauric J. Williams, The Aid Problems of OPEC Countries 
Foreign Affairs, 54 (1976) PP. 309-315. 
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provided very considerable amounts of concessional development 
assistance. Amongst the institutions created to effect this 
transfer were the Special Arab Fund for Africa established in 
1974, The OPEC Special Fund, and the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa. Through these and other agencies OPEC 
states extended aid worth more than ^ 5 Mllion a year from 
1975 to 1977, only fractionally less than 40 percent of the 
12 total aid provided by the OECD countries during the same period. 
For the 1975-77 period Saudi Arabian aid averaged alnrast 5 per 
cent of GNP while aid from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates 
averaged 7.6 and 9.7 percent respectively* Since these three 
provided more than three quarters of OPEC aid, it will be 
evident that the contribution of the highly absorptive-oil 
expoirters - those populous states whose oil revenues were 
heavily committed to domestic development programme - was 
substantially less. Yet even Nigeria recorded a higher ratio 
of aid to GNP than Italy, while by the same measures, Iran and 
Iraq, and Libya easily outperformed the OECD, implying a very 
considerable devotion to the Palestinian cause# or to the deaand 
13 
for a new international economic order. In spite of the very 
12, It has been estimated that Arab Banks alone have lent or 
co-managed some ^ 40 billion worth of commercial loan 
Syndications between 1977-79, of which $ 32 billion went 
to developing countries. See Rehamn Sobhan, Institutional 
Mechanisms for channelling OPEC surpluses within the 
Third World, Third World Quarterly^ Vol. 2 No.4 October 
1980, P. 735. 
13. world Development Report, 1981 (New York, IBFD, 1981) 
Table 16, PP. 164-5. 
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substantial amounts involved, OPEC aid, no less than OECD aid, 
provoked criticisms from clients before long. Oil-importing 
LDCs outside the West Asia complained of neglecti pointing out 
that the bulk of OPEC aid, in the mid 1970s went to just two 
states, Egypt and Syria both of which were not exporters of 
Petroleum, while a further 25 percent went to Muslim states as 
was chalked out in the final communique of the'Islamic Summit 
Conference'of l97^f There were also the usual complaints about 
slow disbursement, and even generously treated states found that 
OPEC aid did not wholly compensate for higher oil prices. 
Discontent among the non-Arab African states found expression at 
the Cairo summit Conference of Afro-Arab States in March 1977, 15 
but were assured for the time being by promises of further aid. 
14, Islamic Summit Conference held in Lahore from 22-4 Feb,1974 
which turned its attention to economic matters and 
particularly to problems of the less developed Islamic 
countries. This conference set up a committee of 
representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and the United Arab Emirates, and 
empowered it to seek help from other Islamic states in 
order to find ways and means of realising the communique's 
objectives. In addition, the committee was entrusted with 
the task of studying the possibility of creating an Islamic 
Development Bank - MEED, Vol. No,18 No,9 1st March 1974, P,23, 
The Bank was established in 1975, 
15« Ian Seymour, OPEC: Instrument of change (London, Macmillian, 
1980) PP. 236-66; Paul Hailwood and Stuart Sinclair, Oil, Debt» and Development* O^EC in the Third World tLondon, Allen and Unwin, 1981), PP. 94-128, 
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However under the auspices of the OAPEC, several inter-
Arab development institutions were formed during the seventies. 
Notable among these are the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development (APESD) which was set up in 1970 to support 
development project in the Arab countries and which could 
increase its lending commitments for 1976 to $ 600 million from 
the 1975 level of 316 million; the Arab development Bank (ADB); 
and the Arab Development company set up in 1974 initially with 
a capital of 225 million which has since been expanded to 
300 million. 
The Arab States have given high priority to bridging the 
technological gap that currently exists between Arab World and 
the developed industrialized world. Not only are tVe Arabs 
importing on a large scale advance technologies from whatever 
sources these are available, they have also addressed themselves 
to the task to develop a home grown Arab technology, A ten day 
conference of representatives of the Arab states held in Rabat 
in August - September 1976, under the joint auspices of the Arab 
League and UNESCO, and known as CASTARAB, decided to devote 
500 million to research and development in the Arab world. 
One of the recommended project in this confeirence calls for the 
building of three 50 magawatt nuclear reactors as pilot projects 
to prepare for the eventual Solar Power, The Conference also 
set as its goal 500 scientists for every one million Arabs and 
asked each Arab state to devote one percent of its GNP to 
research and development. 
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Expended cooperation in such areas as those enumerated 
above is all the more ntcessairy in view of the fact that both 
OPEC and other developing countries stand to gain frx)m it. 
Hov;ever in their effort to control spending and calculated 
investment, the Gulf states have been - and are specially 
concerned with particular institutions, important among them 
are; 
Arab Investment Company 
The company studies specific plans and projects for 
their short and long-term viability and accordingly decides 
on the allotment of funds for these specific projects. For 
instance, the company approved a capital investment in the 
Sudanese Sugar-Gane Company of $ 24.2 million. It also studied 
a project for the production of trailers in Egypt in partnership 
with the Egyptian Government, A tourist project in Tunisia was 
also financed by this company. The revised economic thinking 
in the Arab world and the steps which they took have shov/n 
positive results in a short period of time. Between 1969 and now 
due to the various efforts involved the Iraqi per capita income 
has gone up from 90 to 350 Iraqi dinars. The emphasis which Syria 
gave for the construction of Euphrate Dam at Tal>aqa to its fourth 
five year plan has made possible for the Syrian planners to 
irrigate an extra 640,000 hectares of land besides producing 800 
MW of Power for domestic and industrial use.This Dam is further 
expected to boost Syria's textile and food industries, which rose 
100 
to 730/000 tons by 1980, Kuwait is also taking part in various 
Jordanian projects with an investment of over a 100 million 
dollars. The Sudan is attempting the world's longest canal-in 
the upper Nile Province. The Plan is to cut a Canal from 
North to South to eliminate the elbow to the West, The Canal is 
expected to be 175 miles long, Egypt and the Sudan have entered 
into an agreement on the financing of the project and a 
16 
consortium of French Firms is planning it. 
On 18 November 1975/ the members of the OPEC decided to 
establish a ^ 1,000 million fund to provide interest-free long-
term loans to developing countries but what is important to note 
is that these loans are to be repaid by the recipient countries 
not to the donor countries^ but to a central self-perpetuating 
fund. The amounts to be contributed annually by the members 
of the 13 nation organization will take the form of non-
repayable grants as far as the donors are conctmed. Unlike 
the other aid programmes such as the oil facility of the 
international Monetary Fund to which the OPEC member are major 
contributors, the new fund is administered directly by the OPEC 
Officials. A report by UNCTAD of 1975 revealed that its 
disbursement by Kuwait,Saudi Arabia,and Libya during the first 
16, However, in general most development assistance by Arab 
Investment Company, thus has tied to specific Projects. 
For explanations to this situation, plus merits and 
disadvantages of either approach see pavld Wall, the 
Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid 
(Basic Books, New York, 1973) P, 106o 
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half of 1975 alone amounted to $ 2,728 million of which $ 1,520 
million were contributed by Kuwait, ^ 1,020 million by Saudi 
Arabia, and the remainder by Libya. The report also stated that 
between 1973 to the middle of 1975 India had received ^ 515 
million, Bengladesh 181 million and Sri Lanka | 55 million. 
The OPEC official aid to non-Arab Asian countries during the 
periodiiamounted to | 1,600 million. The non-Arab African State 
received 680 million. The UNCTAD report also indicated that 
aid distribution by the OPEC members in 1974 amounted to ^ 3,400 
million and that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait ranked 5th and 7th among 
the world's largest donors. During the first half of the year 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Qatar, and the UAE had already 
exceeded 0,7 percent of their GNP set by the OPEC for its members 
for aid. 
The US exports to the West Asia and North Africa in 1975 
rose by 75 percent to ^ 6,000 million while its impoirts from 
the area rose by only 35 percent, leaving a surplus of ^ 1,700 
million in favoxir of the USA. The American agricultural exports 
to Saudi Arabia were greatly helped by the opening of Suez Canal. 
The surpluses in the current accounts of the trade balances of 
the industrial countries are good indicators of the economic 
restructure of the Third World countries. 
The world food conference held in Rome in November 1975 
decided to set up a | 1,200 million fund for agricultural 
development to assist developing countries in expanding food 
production. 
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African Development 
The O A P E C countries have started taking measures to help 
African countries tide over their economic problems and get on 
to the road of economic development. Early in 1977 the Afro 
Asian Ministerial Conference meeting at Dakar adopted an eight 
point economic collaboration charter. The charter was decided 
at an Afro-Arab sximmit conference in the following year with 
proposals for closer links between the organization of African 
unity and the Arab League. According to the charter, the 67 
Signatory states will strictly respect each others independence 
and sovereignty refrain from interfering in each others internal 
affairs, respect each country's sovereign rights over natural 
resources, strive to resolve bilateral differences through 
peaceful means only, struggle together for the final defeat of 
imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism, and for a new, more 
equitable World Economic Order. The African countries have 
pleaded to support the Palestine people's rights, and to press 
for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. 
The charter, then, has created suitable political climate 
for wide and deeper Afro-Arab Economic collaboration. The OAPEC 
countries have already allocated ^210 million in aid to 31 
African countries on the basis of these countries' needs and 
requirements as well as their own national priorities. Tanzania 
and Ethiopia had each been allocated $ 12.40 million and ^ 14.20 
million, followed by Zaire ^ 12.70 million and Zambia $ 12.40 
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million till 1977. These states had been chosen because they 
were more in need to help as a result of their landlocked 
economy or draught conditions or a large increase in the cost 17 
of their petroleum imports. However, the creation of a large 
number of new institutions for financial cooperation after 1973, 
necessary as it was, raises problems alsOo There is a danger of 
duplication, and manpower difficulties are often experienced. 
The pool of available talent is still so small in relation to the 
new demands for its services. 
In its short experience OPEC aid faced the chronic 
problem of balancing the advantages of project and general 
support aid. The emphasis on project loans as a mode of financial 
assistance has known advantages and drawbacks. Project aid often 
involves long administrative processes with feasibility studies, 
economic appraisals and the drawing-up of elaborate contracts. 
Donors may become victims of some illusion about the quality of 
the investment funded as the project - tied aid often releases 
other funds to finance different expenditures. The poorer and 
less developed countries, which are perhaps in the greatest need 
of aid are often least able to identify projects useful to the 
country and attractive to the donors. Project aid may 
inadvertently favour countries which have the specialized 
17. For details see Rashide, Galala~El 'The Arabs and The Third 
World Development in 'The Arabs SKd the World of the 
Seventies Development Pub. (Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., 
New Delhi, 1977) PP. 4l-43o 
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manpower resources for i^dentifying projects and for promoting 
them to the donors. Donors may also find that they are committing 
for project financing much smaller amounts than intended and that 
the distribution of their aid does not correspond to their 
preferred allocation. The advantages* however, are that project 
aid involves an element of technical assistance to the recipient; 
it ensures that certain standards are applied in the scrutiny and 
selection of projects; and it contributes in a certain way to an 
increase in the rate of investment in the recipient country. It 
also provides the donor with psychological and sometimes 
political rewards by associating him and identifying him to some 
extent with a concrete achievement. However, disbursement flows 
in this type of aid, whatever the volume of fureis allocated or 
commiteed, tend to be very constrained. Hence, the significant 
resources to general support grants and loans, which form a very 
large proportion of OPEC aid. 
OPEC aid includes considerable contributions to the major 
international financial agencies. One could argue that the 
contributors should have insisted from the outset on acquiring 
a role in the management of these agencies commensurate with 
their importance as contributors. Here again restraint was 
displayed suggesting that aid has not been fully used by OPEC 
members as a tool of foreign policy. Many developing countries 
are calling upon OPEC members to adopt a more aggressive policy 
in this respect for the promotion of the interests of the Third 
world in the agencies hitherto dominated by the developed 
industrialized countries. 
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Finally, OPEC members have not yet resolved in this 
short time the important issue of hov/ much aid should be given 
on a bil'iteral basis and how much on a multilateral basis. At 
present/ aid from OPEC as a group is provided through the OPEC 
Fund an international account to which all member countries 
contribute. In this area what matters most is not the size of 
the collective facilities but the concerted action of member 
countries, which ensures a greater degree of effectiveness. 
Recent experience has revealed the advantages of collective 
and concerted efforts, especially in international fora where 
co-ordination among OPEC member countries has been effected 
through OPEC Fund, such as in the case of the establishment 
of IPAD. 
Whatever are the likely prospects of OPEC aid in the 
immediate future and in the medium term? So far the volume 
of OPEC aid is not only large but in 1974-75 expanded suddenly 
at a very rapid rate. The events in the oil sector, which were 
associated with this expansion of aid efforts, were fairly 
unique and are unlikely to be repeated in the near future in 
the same v/ay. Barring unforseeable events, one should not 
expect, therefore, much growth in the grbss volvime of OPEC aid 
in the yf ars to come. 
It is unlikely, however, that the level of aid will 
remain high in the immediate future. Many of the forces and 
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interests which motivated a large part of OPEC aid in recent 
years are likely to decline. 
However the prospects of OPEC aid beyong- the short-term 
will be influenced by two factors; the manner in which aid is 
being channelled and the developments related to oil revenues. 
That part of aid which is channelled through the many institutions 
created by member countries will continue over time, as these 
institutions have their own capital endowments and are thus able 
to survive, even if confined to their present resources. That 
part of aid which is financed directly by governments may well 
be strongly influenced by political developments or further to 
oil prices and oil revenues. Though ail revenues and financial 
surpluses do not necessarily provide a case for aid giving, they 
are obviously the enabling factor. There is no need to indulge 
here in forecasts of future oil prices, as the main point is 
simply that stag - nation or decline in revenues (if they take 
place) would inevitably effect the volume of aid that OPEc 
member countries could afford. 
A further consideration is that needs of OPEC countries 
in respect of their own development are increasing. Absorptive 
capcity that is the ability to spend domestically on economic 
development has a tendency to increase with time. As oil is a 
depletable asset, the priority given to domestic economic 
objectives becomes more, rather than less, important with the 
passage of time. Oil-ejtporting countries are increasingly aware 
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that surplus funds at their disposal are not income but paper 
assets acquired in exchange for a natural asset on terms which 
are not/ from their view point* as favourable as suggested in 
the outside world. They depend crucially on these assets -
whether financial or natural 1 , - 1 for their economic future, 
and they have an importeint duty towards future generations in 
their countries, particularly, since, many have few or no 
resource other than depletable oil. Estimates of the accumulation 
of liquid assets of OPEC member countries as a group indicate at 
any rate of rapidly declining trend and several OPEC countries 
have already switched from a net surplus to a net deficit 
position. 
The medium - term may thus involve a decline in the 
volume of concessional flows for all the reasons mentioned 
unless revenues grow significantly. This decline, if it occurs, 
may, however, be partially offset by an increase in the volume 
of OPEC investments in other developing countries. Investments 
with adequate returns to both the OPEC investor ann the host 
developing country may present at any rate a more balanced 
pattern of co-operation in the context of Third World solidarity 
in view of the special nature of oil revenues and the future 
needs of OPEC countries. The slow pace of such Investments which, 
by definition, require a long period of time to materialize, may, 
it is to be hoped, accelerate, paving the way to greater 
cooperation in this field. The trilateral venture formula which 
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involves cooperation of third parties from the developed countries 
could help advance such a process especially when the legitimate 
18 
interests of all parties are secured. 
The level of sophistication of financial cooperation 
extended by OPEC countries, the modes of assistance and the 
patterns of allocation (irrespective of what happens to volumes) 
will also inevitably improve as the aid donors porgress on the 
road to economic development. As there are gains to donors when 
the recipients' economies grow and progress, there may be gains 
to recipients when the donors become more developed, even if they 
lose, in the process, some of the false appearances of wealth. 
18. Ibrahim F. Ishihata; Op.Cit. No.4 PP.51-59 
CHAPTER V 
CHAPTER - V 
GULF REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
ITS IMPACT ON INDIAN OCEAN POLITICS 
Granting aid to another country is basically a political 
decision and as such, therefore, a nations aid^programme is 
first and foremost a tool of its foreign policy. The historical 
record of foreign aid provided by traditional donors has anply 
proved this point. Among the objectives they have tried to 
achieve through aid, thus serving as its primary rreativations, 
most important have been those in the realms of security, 
politics, ideology, and economics. 
For example, during the 1960s major Western aid donors 
viewed under development and poverty in the Third World as 
being against their own security and political interests, since 
under development and poverty tended to destabilise societies, 
promote radicalism, and create opportunities for the West's 
competitors to gain influence in these countries and thus to 
weaken the Western position within overall East-West competition. 
Yet to emphasize that, over the last three decades, aid 
has essentially been used to achieve a wide range of national 
1. See for exanple, E.K. Hawkins, The Principles of Development, 
Aid (Harmondsworth. Penguin Books' England 1970), P.25. 
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objectives^ is not to imply that the traditional aid donors 
have never been concerned with the recipients*•social and 
economic development. On the contrary, for several reasons 
especially in the recent past this objective has played an 
important role. However with regard to OPEC Gulf countries 
this objectives/ to a considerable extent have been affected 
by their own security perceptions. 
Thus not ideological implications but security 
considerations have been the most influential factor In 
determining the aid policies of the number of oil producing 
West As4,an donors. This fact has derived from the essential 
characteristics of these countries, which creates special 
security problems for them. The most important of these 
characteristics have been the following! 
(a) they are small, with fabulous wealth that has 
enticed the envy and greed of their neighbours 
and other outside powers. 
(b) their non-oil resources are meagre; 
(c) they have small indigenous populations, a fact that 
has put severe limitations on their ability to 
develop viable military forces. 
Ill 
(d) they have large non-indigenous populations which, 
together with their religious divisions, could be 
a sourx;e of subversion and domestic unrest; 
(e) given the conservative nature of their governments, 
in the past they have had - and still do - legitimacy 
problems with large segments of Arab opinion; 
(f) the institutional capacities of their governments are 
not fully developed; and 
(g) geo-strategic conditions have not been favourable; 
they are located in a zone of great power rivalry 
and thus have been highly permeable to outside 
forces. Moreover they have faced far stronger 
neighbours vying for regional leadership, a 
situation that has created an unstable regional 
environment for them. Also, some of these countries 
have been openly coveted by some of their stronger 
neighbours. 
The combination of these factors has created special 
s e c u r i t y problems f o r these c o u n t r i e s , the most Important o f 
which have been d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t mi l i ta ry take over attempts 
by t h e i r l a r g e r and stronger neighbours; a d e t e r i o r a t i n g regional 
environment as their being located in a zone of great power 
rivalry over the base facilities in the Indian Ocean; and 
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internal subversion by radical Arab and other forces, in some 
2 
cases using irrmigrant populations. 
Thus since the very early days of its independence in 
1961, Kuwait has faced such a threat from Iraq, which laid 
claim to its territory. Although this claim did not go beyond 
words and was warded off by the sending of 6,000 British troops to 
3 
Kuwait, Other Persian Gulf countries have not had the same 
traumatic experience as Kuwait, But they have also been 
potentially vulnerable to such threats. 
The other major threat to these countries has been a 
deteriorating regional security envi^-onment. In fact, this 
has meant that the predominance of hostile forces in regions 
of interest both-immediate and more distant - would be hazardous 
to their security and would thus have needed to be prevented. 
Since these countries have lacked the military potential to 
deter these forces, they have essentially relied on aid to 
neutralize and pacify existing hostile forces; to moderate - as 
far as possible - the positions of hostile forces; afid to 
strengthen existing moderate and friendly forces. The West Asian 
countries have applied this strategy in their immediate region -
2, Since the Iranian revolution, Iranian inspired regligious 
subversion has also become quite threatening. 
3. As far as Kuwait was concerned, the following st*atement is 
Instructive: 'In spite of General Kass^^ms' arrogant response, 
the rest of the Arab States agreed to' recognize the 
Sheikhdom as an independent state and Kuwait was admitted 
as a member of both the Arab League and the United Nations. The price of these Pan Arab,, mercies, however, was a share in Kuwaiti oil revenues', David Holden, Farewell to Arabia, (Paber & Faber London: 1966), p. xt>y. 
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the Persian Gulf - in the Arab world, and in their peripheries. 
Extensive aid given by the OPEC Gulf countries to the 
Arab confrontation states - as well as to such radical states 
in the Gulf region as south Yemen/ and to such peripheral states 
as Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan - has all been justified in terms 
of the above factors. 
Moreover, at the global level the ^ulf countries have 
essentially viewed their security interests as being linked to 
those of the Western world, although they have proclaimed 
non-alignment but infact like Kuwait - and have followed a even 
handed policy towards the East - West conflict. Thus, through 
this aid they have tried to strengthen western positions in the 
above mentioned regions, 
AS with other OPEC Gulf countries, security considerations 
have paramount in determining Iran's aid policies. In fact, 
Iranian leaders were quite candid in admitting that the ultimate 
purpose of its aid programme was to complement its overall 
4 
security policy, Iran's views of threats to its security arcl 
thus its security needs, have essentially been determined by its 
geo-strategic considerations and historical experience. The most 
consequential aspects of Iran's go-political conditions have been 
its territorial contiguity to a great power (Russia/Soviet Union) 
4, See for example, the Shah * s interview with Blitz, 
represented in Keyhan Intemation, 21 July 1976 P,4 
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and its location in a zone of great power rivalry. This 
situation in turn had gaused Iran (and still docs) to be subjected 
to pressures and military incursions by its great pov/er neighbour* 
as well as by the extra-regional competing great power -
historically Britain and now the United States. Also, Iran 
had suffered as a result of occasional collusion between the 
competing powers and had several times even faced the danger 
5 
of partition because of such collusion. By the time of the 
1973 oil revolution/ the negative aspects of Iran's geo-
strategic conditions had been somewhat lessened* largely because 
of changes in the international system, plus internal changes both 
in Iran and in its great power neighbour, the Soviet Union. Yet 
Iran's basic security dilemma remained the same since not all 6 systemic changes served Iran's security interests. Consequently 
5. For a study of the impact of Iran's geostrategic condition on 
its foreign policy see: Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabini The 
Foreign Relations of Iran, Angeles (University of California 
Press, Los Angeles 1974). 
6. In fact, some of the systemic changes created more uncertainties for Iran, For example, while the end of the cold war and on the onset of detente had somswhat eased Soviet pressure on Iran, it had also increased the danger of great power collusion at Iran's expense. The Shah had also increased the danger of great power collusion at Iran's expense. The Shah had expressed the fear that the Super Powers might interpret detente as a t .acit agreement to choose their 'hunting grounds' elsewhere. For a detailed analysis of this aspect of Iran's security dilemma, see Shahram Chubin 'Iran's Defense and Foreign Policy' in 
A. Amiris and H.H. Twitchel (eds) Iran in the 1980s, 
(Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1978), PP. 309-27. 
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Iran's primary security objective was tlie reduction of the 
negative impact of Soviet Power on Iran's regional environment. 
In 1973, there was no threat of direct military attacK 
against Iran from its neighbours - given its friendly relations 
with Pakistan and Turkey and its reasonably good relations with 
Afghanistan. Iran's essential problem in regard to these 
countries was the possibility of changes in regimes through 7 subversion or internal turmoil - in Pakistan, for exanple. 
The only potential source of direct military attack was Iraq, 
because of the long history of animosity between Iran and Iraq 
and the latter's military capabilities. But in 1973, such a 
threat was less credible in view of Iraq's domestic problems -
notably the rebellion by its Kurdish population. Nevertheless, 
Iraq was still a primary source of threat to Iranian security, 
since during the 1970s it had become a major source of 
subversion in the Persian Gulf - and indeed thrxDughout the 
West Asia. 
7. The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 that resulted in Pakistan's dismemberment and during which the Soviet Union has supported India - Pakistan's dismemberment was followed by a wave of internal unrest and the growtti of separatist movements in its North Western Province and Baluchistan. 
Baluchi unrest was very disturbing to Iran, given its own population. The Iranians were particularly worried by evidence of direct or indirect - (Through Iraq) Soviet involvement in these Pakistani events. The Iranians feared that the rebel movement in Baluchistan, with Soviet and Iragi help, could lead the separation of this Province from Pakistan and thus remove a buffer area on Iran's eastern border. (For a detailed treatment of Soviet and Iraqi involvement in the Baluchi separatist movement see* R.M. Burrell and A.J. Cottrell, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan: 
Tension and Dilemmas, (Sage Publication California, 1979), PP. 7*-8o 
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Moreover, Iran was worried about Iraqi designs on other 
Gulf countries, especially Kuwait - designs that, if successful, 
would have led to the installation of more radical regimes that 
wovld have been mor'., hostile to Iran, thus causing its security 
environment to deteriorate. Consequently, beyond the threat from 
the Soviet Union and to some extent from Iraq, Iran was primarily 
preoccuipied by regional subversion, focused on the Persian Gulf. . 
On the other hand since 1973, with the three fold increaseJn 
oil prices Saudi Arabia has emerged as the largest OPEC (Aid donor. 
During 1975 and 1976, she even ranked as the second largest 
global donor after the United States and is most likely to 
8 
maintain large scale foreign aid over a long time. Yet despite 
tremendous wealth Saudi prospects for creating a diversified 
economic base are not promising^ Also, despite large amounts 
spent on military hardware and training, her capacity to develop 
military forces sufficient to defend itself and to maintain 
regional stability is still in doubt. 
Thus, as with Iran, Saudi Arabia's security needs have 
had the greatest impact on its aid policies. The linkage 
8. Other OPEC countries have either terminated their aid 
programmes beyond a minimum, as in the case of Iran, or 
may have to do so in the future. Only Kuwait and UAE 
are other candidates for a sustained foreign aid 
programmes in the future. 
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in Saudi thinking between security and aid has been even closer 
than was the case with Iran, forathe following reasons: 
(a) The nature of Saudi leaderships whos.e 'most fundamental 
value is security, both in its internal and exti mal 
9 mcinifestation 
(b) The country's resource base, which makes problematical 
the development of other elements of power - such as 
military forces - thus putting a high premium on the 
Judicious use of financial power to achieve its 
security objectives. 
However in comparison with OPEC's other Persian Gulf 
members Saudi Arabia's geo-strategic situation and the nature 
of its alliances have provided it with a more favourable security 
environment, particularly concerning certain types of threats. 
Unlike Iran, for example, Saudi Arabia is not contiguous to a 
great power and thus has not been directly subjected to 
expansionist or other great power pressures th^t could emanate 
from such a position. Nor is Saudi Arabia Sandwitched between 
larger and stronger neighbours as are the smaller Gulf countries. 
Combined with other factors such as Saudi Arabia's size 
and difficult terrain, this situation has greatly reduced 'the 
9« Addeed Dawisha, Saudi Arabia's Search for security, Adelphi 
Paper No.158, Winter 1979-80, p.6. 
118 
danger of a direct all-out attack on Saudi Arabia, without of 
10 
course completely excluding it. 
Of even more significance is the nature of Saudi Arabia's 
alliance with the United States - an alliance which is 
quantitatively different from, for example, the one that existed 
11 
between the United States and Iran. The high degree of identity 
lOo Theoritically however, at least two of Saudi Arabia's 
neighbours - Iran and Iraq - could launch a direct attach 
against it. Given its territorial contiguity, Iraq is in 
a better position to do so, whereas Iran would have to 
depend on amphibious operations, unless it first attacked 
through Iraq and Kuwait, In the past Egypt's massive 
military intervention in North Yemen demonstrated its 
capacity to come very close indeed to Saudi borders, and 
of course there is the possibility that under certain 
circumstances Israel might attack Saudi Arabia, For 
example, Israel might want to punish Saudi Arabia for its 
financial assistance to the confrontation states and its 
role in the oil embargoes, Israel's past intrusions into 
Saudi air space have demonstrated its capacity to do so. 
The impact of the American factor makes such an attpck 
unlikely. See R.p. Tahtip National Security Challenges to 
Saudi Arabia, Cwashington D,Co^ American Prise Institute 
Washington D.C, 1978) PP, 4,5 and P.24, 
11, The foundations of Saudi-American relations are generally believed to have been laid at a meeting between President Franklin D, Roosevelt and King Abd-al-^iz in 1943, But US interests in Saudi Arabia originated earlier in the second world war when US came to appreciate the importance of the oil for its tuture war fighting capacity. The following statement by then US Secretary of Defense James Forrestal illustrated the extent of American interest in SAUdi Arabia, Warning of American need for oil in the next 25 years, he said: 'I don't care which American companies develop the Arabian reserves, but I think most emphatically that it should be American^ See Win lamr..a, Quandt, Saudi Security in the 1980s (Brookings institute, Washington D,C, 1981) P,48, Beginning at that time Saudi American interests grew closer together and by late 1960a, as one expert has put it, there developed a coincidence of interest between the U,So and , Saudi Arabia, on almost every issue except on 'Israel. 
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of U.S. Saudi interests guarantee a US response to any direct 
attack on Saudi Arabia, as indeed experience has indicated. 
This situation in turn has eliminated direct military attack as 
a credible security threat to Saudi Arabia. The most serious 
threats to Saudi Arabia's security thus have emanated from those 
factors that adversely affected regional evironment of interest 
to it, and have increased the danger of internal instability and 
subversion. 
From the Saudi perspective, these factors have been 
radicalism of all shades - but particularly that of the left -
and 23bnism, In fact, the Saudis have seen a direct link 
between these two factors, at least concerning the events in the 
13 
Arab world and even to some extent in the Islamic World. Prom 
the Saudi perspective, one particularly disturbing consequence 
of this linkage is that it has led to the growth of anti-western 
- particular anti~American feelings and has drawn to some extent 
some Arab and Islamic countries towards the Soviet Union. 
12. For example during the Yemeni civil war in 1963, the United 
States sent military aircraft to Protect Saudi Arabia 
against possible Egyptian attack. More recently after the 
outbreak of Iran - Iraq war, the United States sent its 
Airborne warning and control system to Saudi Arabia, 
13. As revolution, Soviet influence and secular ideologies 
grew in the Arab world, many studies concluded that were 
it not for Israel .... the Soviets never would have gained 
a foot hold in Egypt, and without the Soviet in Egypt the 
Middle East would a far safer place for conservative 
regimes such as Saudi Arabia William B. Quandt Saudi 
Security, op.cit No. 11, p.4. 
THE INDI.-\N OCEAN REGION 
n 
0 
13 iCI 
€U t! 
I 
Map No.3 
120 
Thus as highlighted, the political issues of the 
petroleum exporting countrie s of the Red Sea and the Persian 
Gulf have been affected to a great degree by their economic 
links, with the inside and outside pov/ers of the region. Hence, 
the importance of Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and that of the 
Indian Ocean is obvious not for only the littoral countries of 
* 
the region, but for the region as a whole. 
Here the terms 'Red Sea reigion' and 'Persian Gulf 
region' may be used in atleast three different sense and at 
three different points on a scale. The links between the two 
regions become generally more evident as the scale increases. 
The connections are as follows: 
(1) The Seas themselves: In the Red Sea this includes 
the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of Suez in the North, 
and extends South to the narrow entrance at Bab 
al-Mandab, The Persian Gulf extends to the strait 
of Hormuz. 
(2) The Seas themselves, with adjacent land areas 
clrarly associated with them in terms of Physical 
geography (for example, coastal low lands or 
drainage basins) or human geography (for example, 
coastal settlements and their spheres of influence), 
(3) The seas themselves, with their coastal states and 
certain areas beyond which may be regarded as part 
a border geo-strategic region. Thus, for example. 
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Somalia and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) are invariably seen as part of the Red Sea 
geo-strategic region while Afghanistan and the Baluchi 
areas of Pakistan often feature in strategic discussions 
15 
about the Persian Gulf region, 
A geo-strategic region can be defined as one in which 
the strategic thinking of the local states or the super powers 
(or both) tends to be dominated by certain geographical facts 
which are perceived to have political and military significance. 
In the Persian Gulf region this obviously means the production and 
transportation of oil, while in the Red Sea region it means the 
passage of commercial and military ships. There are clearly 
other geo-strategic influences that have affected both the regions 
16 
respectively such as the hydropolitics of Nile Valley or the 
rivalry between Iraq and Iran. Thus the neutrality and stability 
of both the regions will largely depend on American-Soviet 
14. See Ruth Lapldoth-Eschelbacher, The Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden Vol.5. International Straits of the world (Martinus Nijhoff, the Hque, 1982) reproduced from Abdul Ma.jid Farid The Red Sea. (Arab Research Centre, Groom rieim LortdCh"1^84) P. 84. 
15. See, 'Defending the Gulf: a Survey', The Economist 6 June 
1981, PP. 3-38. 
16. John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, (Syracuse Univei. sity Press, Syracuse, New York 1979), The author predicts competition for Nile Water between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt within a few ycarSo 
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activities in the Indian Ocean, Both countries are engaged in 
serious tal)cs aimed at reaching an agreement 'on the general 
terms of an accord limiting naval activity in the Indian Ocean.' 
Unquestionably, an American-Soviet Agreement in the Indian Ocean 
will restrain their rivalry in the Red Sea. It may also put an 
end to the emerging polarisation of the Gulf powers. 
Characteristics of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf - Both have 
a large number of coastal states, half of which are totally 
dependent on the Red Sea or the Gulf for access to the oceans of 
17 
the World, As the given statistics of the two seas in the table 
shows I 
Table No. 3 
Red Sea Arabian/ 
Persian Gulf 
1, Costal states 9 8 
2. Arab Coastal States 7 7 
3. States with no other out 
to the sea 
let 4 4 
4, Length of coast line 5, 776 km. 3,340 km. 
5. Length (North South) 1, 930 km. 800 km. 
6, Breadth (East-West) 23-•360 km. 50-320 km. 
7, Maximum depth 2, 000 m 200 m 
8, Water Depth 455, 680 sq. km 248,320 sq 
9, 
10, 
Offshore^ oil production (,l80:b/d) 
Offshore gas production 098O; Cu,(+perday) 
390, 000 
58 mn 
4,354,000 
1,434 mn 
11, Major Ports 9 19 
12, Minor Ports 8 13 
17, Source: Various, Oil and gas production from E.M, Borgese and N, Ginsburq (eds.), Oceaa Yearbook 3 UnivSi^^ity Of 
Chicogo Press, Chacago III, 1982, PP.541-4, Reproduced from Hassan el^Bazzaz 'The Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf: Strategic 
and Economic Links (2), Abdul Majld Farld ed; op.cit. No,14, P.97, 
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The geo-strategic importance of both seas depends largely 
upon their constricted outlets. The Persian Gulf is connected 
to the Indian Ocean via strait of Hormuz, which is some 40 km 
at its widest point. The Red Sea has access to the Mediterranean 
via the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean via Bab al-Mandeb which 
18 
is some 16 km at its widest point. it does not matter toomuch 
how vulnerable these 'water ways* really are; it is 19A 
enough to say that they are generally believed to be vulnerable. 
Their vital role in international shipping is well known. About 
27 percent of world oil production in 1981 came from oil fields 
within 500 km of the Gulf, most of which was lifted by tanker 
for transportation via the strait of Hormuz. The Red Sea is 
equally Important to shipping, although for different reasons. 
In 1981 approximately 200 million tonnes of mixed cargoes 
transited the Suez Canal, and it can be assumed.that a similar 
quantity passed through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab; equivalent 19B to approximately 6 percent of world Sea borne trade. 
Prom the beginning of the late fifteenth centuiry, thus, 
the European powers have sought to control the area whether the 
Gulf or the Red Sea. Albuquerque - Portuguese admiral who was 
by far the greatest of all the colonial adventurers in the West 
Asia - succeeded in reaching the mouth of Persian Gulf and 
18. See Gerald Blake, Wartime Aspects of Arabian Geo-politics, 
Arab papers. No.11 (Arab Research Centre, London 1982)» 
19A. For detailed study of the Straits see Appendix I 
19B. Gerald Blake, The Red Sea and the Arabian Gulfi Strategic 
and Economic Links, Abdul Majid Farld ed, op.cit. No.14, 
PP. 84-94. 
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controlling the strait of Mormuz. He insisted, however, that 
real success would be achieved only if the Portuguese effectively 
20 blocked the entraces to the Gulf and the Red Sea. This clearly 
shows the historical connection between the two parts of the 
21 
region. 
Control of the Red Sea was regarded important by several 
powers, particularly Great Britain in its concern for the 
imperial route to India (as well as to establish African colonies) 
In 1770 the British tried to open up direct communications 
between India and Britain. Italy, in its ambition to establish 
an African empire, governed Eritrea firom 1889 to 1941, 
and its efforts to extend its influence across the Red Sea to 
the Yemen and Saudi Arabia gave the British cause for concern for 
many years. The Ottomans, also realising the strategic economic 
importance of the area as a whole, extended their hold over most 
22 
of the region. It thus came under the Influence of desperate 
elements of the Ottoman legal system. 
Historically, trade from the east reached the West Asia 
by way of the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea. Trading colonies 
20. Mordechai Abir, 'Oil, Power and Politics; Conflict in 
Arabia, The Red Sea and the Gulf (Prank class, London, 
1974) P. 119. 
21. Ibid. P. 120 
22T Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mandlorltz (eds.) Regional 
Politics and World order (W.H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 
1980), P. 363. 
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established along the coasts bear witness to the prosperity of 
this trade. As is v;ell known, thus, the future political issues 
of the region as in the past will be affected to a great degree by 
their economic links, which v,'ill in turn be determined in part 
by the structure of world politics. The growing inter-dependence 
and integration among nations has become one of the basic 
phenomena of International relations. Hence, the importance of 
the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf littoral states comes as a 
natural result of strategic as well as economic dimentions. 
Super Pov/er Rivalry - Rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the West Asia goes back to the 1950s. The United 
States Post-war policy of 'containment' of Soviet influence in 
the region failed, hovrever, as Egypt (1955), Iraq (1958), Syria 
(1958) anc the PDRY (1968) sought arras and assistance from the 
Sovi-it Union. Super Power confrontation spread to the Horn of 
Africa in 1963, when Sornr-dia sought Soviet Arms to fight Ethiopia. 
United States influence in Ethiopia was extensive until the 
revolution of 1974 led her to the- adoption of stronly Pro-Soviet 
Policies. In 19 78 Somalia broke with the Soviets and received 
United States aid in return. These events are siirply well known,but 
they have severe geo-strategic implications for the Gulf and the Red 
Sea, for example, for the deployment of Superpowers navies in 
Indian Ocean region, and for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 
23. C, Fred Bergsten arx3 Lav;rence B. Krause (edSo), World 
Politics and International Economics (Brookings Institute, 
V7ashington DoC. 1975), Po4. 
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The Soviet navy appeared in the Indian Ocean for the 
first time in 1968. It has political and military tasks assigned 
to it which may take ships into the Gulf or Red Sea from time to 
time. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is actually 
quite modest, including on average seven surface warships, three 
24 
submarines and eighteen support ships* During times of crisis 
considerably larger numbers of ships can be deployed. The Suez 
canal is occasionally used for the transfer of Soviet ships to 
and fromthe Indian Ocean, from the Black Sea and Mediterranean, 
Political influence in the Red Sea States has given the Soviet 
Navy access to strategic port facilities in Aden and on Socotra 
Island (The PDRY)^ on the Dahlak Islands and Massawa (Ethiopia), 
and in the Gulf at Basra and Um Qasr (Iraq), although the latter 
have not been used since 1979, Aden is the most advanced naval 
base and includes repair facilities and submarine Pens. The 
significance of all these facilities has probably been over stated 
in the west, but they are often seen as evidence of the Soviet 
capacity to interfere with the vital shipping lanes associated with 
25 the Red Sea and the Gulfo 
The US nav. y already has the use of port facilities in a 
number of friendly Red Sea and Gulf States including Bahrain, Oman 
(Muscat and Salalah) and Somalia (Berbera and Mogadishu). 
24, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 1982-83, (IISS, London, 19§2) P. 10. 
25. For example, Rober J. Hanks, the Cape Route: Imperiled 
Western Lifeline (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
Cambridge, Mass., 1981). 
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Negotiations for the use of Ras Banas in Egypt, however, wstc 
suspended in 1981. The linchpin of the US Military and Naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean is at Diego Garcia,-a small island 
leased from Britain but claimed by Mauritius. Only the northern 
half of the Red sea is farther from Diego Garcia than the Gulf, 
a distance of 3,500 km. The United States has a pov;erful naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean currently comprising one carrier 
26 
task force, including six warships and thirteen support ships. 
In addition foitfor five warships are also located permanently 
in the Gulf. There are also US nuclear submarines operating in 
the Indian Ocean, The US navy has assumed combatant postures 
on a number of occasions in recent years when political events 
onshore have seemed to call for a demonstration of power in the 
Red Sea off the YAR in 1979 and in the Gulf of Om an in 1980, 
for exan^le. The idea of a US mobile force capable of deployment 
anywhere in the world goes back several years, but the RDF was 
evolved in 1979 largely in response to the-Iranian revolution. 
Its declared function is to prevent the interruption of oil 
supplies to the West from the GUlf region. This might involve 
the occupation of oil fields, the protection of a friendly power 
27 
during the domestic upheavals or securing the strait of Hormuz, 
It is also presumably intended to be able to repel 'any attempt 
by any out side force to gain control of the Persian Gulf^ as 
stated by President Carter in 1980 ~ the outside foice meaning the 
Soviet Union, 
26, IISS; op.cit. No,24, P. 16, 
27, Fred Halliday points to the willingness of Western Powers to intervene in Middle East States to maintain the status quo. See Fred Halliday, Arabia without Sultans (Penguin 
Books, Harraonds Worth, 1974), P.802, 
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This is not the place for an analysis of the RDF. Its 
political and military aspects have been called into question 28 
often enough. It is sufficient to emphasise that, while it may 
be primarily designed for intervention in the Gulf region, it 
cannot be isolated from the Red Sea for atleast three reasonso 
First, the needs of Western Security might be thought to 
require intervention in the Red Sea region in support of a 
friendly regime, or to secure Bab al-Mandab for example. 
Secondly, the PDF could be challenged by the Soviet Union, 
perhaps on behalf of a local ally. In such circumstances, the 
Red Sea would inevitably become part of the theatre of conflict 
to secure lfl.nes of communication, or to neutralize Pro-Soviet 
forces. It should be remembered that the Soviet Union has the 
equivalent of an RDF stationed in Tashkent, units of which have 
conducted joint manoeuvres with PDRY forces; in 1978 huge 
quantities of military equipment were airlifted to Ethiopia from 
29 
stores in Southern USSR. Thirdly, RDF deployment presupposes 
logistical support from the Red Sea region, whether or not the 
Soviet Union is involved. The RDF implies the immediate despatch 
of a small force f rom the Diego Gaircia base, where equipment and 30 
supplies are pre-positioned. This would require access to bases 
and facilities in friendly states. Access agreements for bases 
have already been reached with several Red Sea regional governments, 
including, Egypt, Somalia ^  Djiboutii^ Morocco, Sudan^Oinan, 
Kenya and Israel, 
28, 'Rapid Deployment! Force or Farce?', South (March 1983) 
London, PP. 10-15, 
29, Amnon Sella, Soviet Political & Military conduct in the 
Middle ^ast (Macmillan, London, 1981), P. 19. 
30, Frank Bamaby 'The US Rapid Deplyment Forcei a Military 
Mammoth?' Middle East Review 1983, PP. 105-7. 
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in January 1983 the ^ ^ ^^s apparently transformed 
into a new command, the US Central Command (Ceritcom), 
responsible for the protection of US interests in 19 states 
from Morocco to Pakistan and thus embracing the Red Sea. 
The number of troops available was also reported to have been 
greatly increased, perhaps to as many as 400,000 from tY^ 
previously quoted 220,000. If the RDF concept continues to 
carry this kind of importance, much US policy in the West 
Asia will be geared to the pxfcservation and maintenance of 
access facilities and bases, geographically dispersed in 
both the Red Sea and the Gulf, 
Thus nearly in all littoral and hinterland countries 
of the Indian Ocean the Super Powers have acquired certain 
interests ~ economic and political that have affected even 
in peace times their objectives and aspirations as is 
witnessed in the following countries. 
Saudi Arabia - As with other OPEC donors, Saudi political 
interest has remained essentially been an extension of its 
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security needs. Saudi Arabia's essential political interests 
have been: (1) combating radicalism and subversive forces 
within its immediate security environment, the Arab world 
31 
and their periphery; (2) preventing the spread of Soviet 
influence both in regions of direct interest to it and 
globally. (3) preservation of a rough balance of power within 
the Arab world that would exclude the overwhelming predominance 
of any single Arab power; and (4) the enhancing of Saudi 
influence and prestige in the Arab world, the Islamic world 
and internationally. 
Thus, thwarted, Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in 
preventing the hegemony of any single Arab state in the 
31. For example, Saudi diplomacy on the Arab Israeli conflict focused on changing the attitude of the Arab countries, the European, and the United States - encouraging to adopt a more Pro-Ax-ab, posture, principally through use of financial leverage. Later in November l98l Saudi 
Arabia even presented a peace Plan named after the then 
Crown Prince Fahd, Also, on several occasions the Saudis 
have tried to mediate in intra-Arab conflicts, including 
that between Morocco and Algeria over Sahara, 
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regio^? Needless to say, u n d e r conditions of rough balance, 
Saudi Arabia could use its financial assets to increase its 
influence and leverage, and hence its capacity to shape 
events, hs a result over the last three decades the Saudis 
have shifted their regional alliances and sometimes even 
33 using non-Arab West Asian Countries to secure this objective. 
Given Saudi Arabia's iresource base, its'development potential, 
its security needs, and its special links with the United 
States, a high degree of convergence has also developed 
between its economic interests and those of the West, As a 
result, Saudi Arabia has not ^>ushed for acceptance of the 
developing countries demands to the extent it could, although 
it has given their support more than any other OPEC countries. 
32. See William B. Quandt; op.cit. No,11, P. 34, However, 
failing to become the centre of the Arab world, the 
Saudis would like to establish their uncontested 
influence in Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and 
the Red Sea - approaches to Saudi Arabia. 
33, For example during the 1950s when the Hashemites became 
stronger and ideologically different in the West Asia; 
the Saudi cooperated v;ith Nasser's Egypt despite their 
disagreements. Later, the Saudis overcome their dislike 
for the Hashemites and supported Jordan against Egypt, 
They even joined politically Iran to fight Nasserism, The 
recent reversal of alliances has been the friendly 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the Ba'athist Iraq, 
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Volume of Saudi PDA - As noted earlier since 1973 Saudi Arabia 
has become one of the largest economic aid donors, as the table 
34 
illustrates. Saudi Arabia's Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) has shared many of the characteristics of aid provided by 
other OPEC countries, including the following: 35 
Table I^: Volume of Saudi ODA* US million) 
Year Commitments Disbursements Percentage of GNP 
1973 568,2 304,9 3.75 
1974 1,287,6 1,029,1 4,56 
1975 2,790,1 l,997o4 6,01 
1976 2,802o6 2,315,8 5,77 
1977 — 2,400 4.30 
1978 — 1,500 2,32 
1979 
• 
2,300 3.00 
1980 3,000 2,60 
1981 — 5,798 4,77 
34, Prior to this period, Saudi aid (which began in 1967 following the Khartoum agreement) consisted of the following; Eqypt, Jordan, and Syria (1967-74)^ ^  1,263 million; North Yemen (1970-3), i 400 million; Sudan (1972-4), ^ 52 million; Somalia 29 mplion (interest free loan), Niger, | 2 million (Grant); and Uganda $ 15 million (interest free loan). Source: Annual DAC Review 1974 Reproduced from Case Studies? 
Iran and Saudi Arabia Shireen Hunter, OPEC and the Third World (Croom Helm, London, 1984), -PP. 134-35. 
35, Source; Annual DAC Reviews, France, l979-82r Reproduced from 
Shtreen Hunter, op.cit. No,34 P,135. 
* ODA,or Official Development Assistance, is defined in OECD 
Publications as "grants or loans undertaken by the official 
sector, at concessional financial terms (if a loan, atleast 
25 percent grant element, using the conventional discount 
rate of 10 percent) with the promotion of economic 
development and welfare as main objectives. It has been 
argued that this definition may not be sutable for assistance 
from OPEC countries where a higher discount rate should 
apply. See the OPEC Aid Record, Shihata & Maly;ro from Other 
Pace of OPEC, Ibrahim F,I, Shihata (Longman, London, 1982) 
PPo 40-41, 
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Concentration: During the period under 
discussion, Saudi Arabia's economic aid has been highly 
concentrated in Arab countries of major interest to it in terms 
of forign and Security Policy. Pakistan and Indonesia, located in 
two other area of Saudi interest, have been similarly favoured. 
Until 1978, therefore, Egypt was the largest recipient of Sauai 
aid, a relationship that ended when President Sadat signed the 
peace treaty with Israel. For similar reasons of Saudi foreign 
policy interest, other principal recipients of Saudi aid have 
included Syria, Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, North Yemen, and 
Indonesia, Most of these countries have (received aid in the 
form of general budgetary or balance of payments support - which 
as noted above, is tangible in terms of military support-in 
addition this aid is tied to specific projects and disbursed 
through the Saudi Fund for Development (SPD)« 
Beyond, Funds provided to specially favoured countries, the 
geographical scope of Saudi aid provided through the SPD has been 
much biroader, though of lesser volume. This type of aid, after 
all, has demonstrated Saudi Arabia's commitment to the social and 
economic advancement of the developing countries, and has been 
the 'prestige' entry for Saudi Arabia in the aid field. Thus it 
has touched a broader clinetele. 
High Level of Concessionality? Compared with Iranian aid, for 
example, the concessionality of Saudi aid has been much higher, 
reflecting Saudi Arabia's greater financial surpluses beyond its 
own development and other internal needs. This practice has been 
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reflected in a larger percentage of grants within total Saudi 
ODA, The following table gives some indication of the 
concessionality of Saudi ODA# as well as the level of 
concessionality of loans provided by the Saudi Fund for 
Development, 
36 
Table V : Concessionality of Saudi ODA 
Year Percent of grants in 
Total 
commitments 
Percent of 
grant 
Element in ODA Loans 
Percent of 
Grant 
Element in Total ODA 
1974 79.7 51.7 9.2 
1975 46.1 43.1 69.3 
1976 56.8 47.7 77.4 
1979 — — 62.1 
1980 — — 86.7 
1981 75.9 
Source: Annual DAC Reviews^ France 1977| 1982. Reproduced 
from sHireen Hunter, op«cit. No.34, P« 136« 
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Yet these figures did not present the whole picture 
concerning the concessionality of Saudi ODA, and thus the 
following observations are necessary. Not surpcisingly, the 
most concessional, of Saudi Arabia's aid efforts - mostly 
provided in grant form - have been directed towards a handful 
of countries that, like the geographical concentration of Saudi 
aid, have been important to it in security and political terms. 
In sum, therefore, Saudi Arabia has used foreign aid -
both economic and military, through paying for arms - to try 
enhancing its security and to achieve national-political goals. 
But concerns such as the developmental impact of aid or 
achievement of Third World goals have had a minimal impact on 
Saudi Policies, in part because of its own relative lack of 
experience in dealing with developing countries very different 
from itself, and in part reflecting the deeply 'political motives' 
for its aid. This situation has also resulted from Saudi Arabia's 
military weakness, internal contradictions, and external 
dependencies, as discussed earlier, 
2. Iran - For many years, Iran's political objectives have been 
essentially determined by its security needs. Thus, the 
reduction of Soviet and Iraqi threats and the fight against 
regional subversion were also important Iranian political 
objectives. Furthermore, Iran was concerned about some aspects 
of systematic change. It feared that this might increase the 
risks of great power collusion at Iran's expense, and it wanted 
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to forestall this development if it could. Also, Iran wanted 
to increase its capacity for autonomous action, to have a 
greater impact on the evolution of regional events* and to 
enhance its international prestige and standing. 
By 1973, Irani pursuit for these objectives had led it 
to develop a foreign policy whose basic objectives were the 
following; 
(a) to minimize the great powers presence in the 
region of the West Asia/Persian Gulf and the 
Indian subcontinent, and their penetration of 
inter-regional affairs; 
(b) to resolve intra-regional disputes in order to 
eliminate as far as possible the resort by regional 
countries to the super powers for maintenance of 
their security or restoration of their rights; 
(c) to promote moderate forces and to create incentives 
for moderate behaviour; and 
(d) to present regional alternatives to problems of 
regional security and economic development. 
Iran's method's for achieving its policy goals were 
37 
essentially pragmatic, flexible and non-doctrinaire. The lack 
37, In fact, some Iranian proposals for regional cooperation, 
such as that for an Indian Ocean common market, were 
inspired by functionalist thinking like that in Europe 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, Iran judged other 
countries essentially by their attitude towards it and its 
interests rather than by their Ideology. In fact, to have 
friendly relations with countries with different social. 
Economic, and political systems became a tenet of Iran's 
so-called National Independent Policy, Iran's extensive 
relations with socialist countries and its friendly 
relations with the PRC illustrate Iran's pragmatic and non-ideological foreign policy. 
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of any particular ideological focus in Iran's foreign policy -
in addition to a sense of political pragmatism - derived from 
its Ethnic and cultural characteristics did not always vvork in 
38 Iran's favour, in fact, despite its grov/ing military and 
economic Power, by 1973, Iran felt isolated - a feeling that 
contributed to some of its policy choices, including that of 
39 foreign assistance. This attitude has been natural given to 
38o For example, unlike Arab members of OPEC or even Venezuela 
and Nigeria, which were subject to pressures of Latin 
American and African Solidarity-Iran's foreign policy did 
not have to respond to any special pressure deriving from 
Ethnic or rtligious considerations. Even Islam - which is 
a potent force in Iran-under the secular regime of the 
Pahlavis did not play an important role, even though Iran 
had occasionally used it in its relations with Arab 
countries. However, Iran did not have any illusions about 
the impact of Islam, In fact, the Shah complained that the 
Arabs put more emphasis on their Arabism then Islam and say 
'we Arabs' and not 'we muslims'. See the Shah'sinterview 
with Der Spiegel reprinted in Keyhan International» 
7 January 1974, P,4, 
39, For example, Iran's Policy of expanding its relations eastward in Asia v/as prompted by a desire to break up this isolation, as the following statement illustrates; Bound by the USSR to the North and blocked by the Arab-
Israili conflict to the West, Iran is looking east in search of new friends, partners, and areas of economic and political activityo Amir Taheri, 'Policies of Iran in the Persian Gulf Region in Abbaa Amirie (ed. The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in lhternatl6rial Politics, (Institute for International political and Economic Studies, Tehran, 1975) P, 262 See also Shaul Bakhash, Iran is looking Eastward, Keyhan International, IT7"April 1974, P,4. 
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Iran's limited financial resources for its huge developmental 
needs - compared to those of Arab members of OPEC. In fact, 
while promising Iranian participation in aid plans for the 
Third World, the Shah constantly emphasised that Iran could 40 
spend its last penny on its own economic development. 
For the same reason Iran - together with Algeria and 
Venezuela but unlike the Persian Gulf Arab countries - supported 
and even suggested international schemes for aid, since limits 
on financial surpluses argued against aid large enough to justify 
bilateral programmes. These donors could not on their own reach 
most of the developing world with foreign asr.istance. Yet they 
could hope to attain influence in the Third World through 
multilateral aid programmes. And it was only when prospects 
faded for establishing such a fund because of Arab opposition, 
41 
Iran embarked on its individual aid programme. However, Iran still 
did not emphasise the theme of 'aid', but rather talked about 
economic cooperation. Iran's thinking is clearly illustrated by 
the facts that it did not establish a 'Development Fund' like 
most other OPEC countries, and that its aid programme was 
headed by the 'Organization for Investment, Economic and 
40. See Keyhan International 5 January 1979, P, 4® 
41. For example in an Interview with "Hie Dally Telegraph,',the Shah said: Let's set up a completely neutral International board that will study the needs of the developing countries and then put orders quite imparially to the industrialized 
countries. Reprinted in Keyhan International 9 Feb 1974 P.4, 
see also Finance Minister, Amouzeqar's int^view in Keyhan 
International "How the J'und will Work" 12 March 1974 P,4. 
On Arab opposition, see Keyhan International "Aid Fund Needs Arab Support, 11 April 1974, p,4. ~ 
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Technical AssiBtance of iranV as part of the Ministry of Finance, 
Principal characteristics of Iranian aid during its short life 
time to some extent bore a resemblance to that of other OPEC 
members, except for volume trends, as has reflected in Iran's 
particular needs. 
The volume of Iranian aid has followed a down-ward 
trend, illustrating the impact of both falling oil revenues 
and political change, as indicated in table VI. 
Table VI-Volume of Iran's PDA US Millions) 42 
Year Disbursement Percentage GNP 
1974 739,4 1,59 
1975 936.1 lo79 
1976 807o3 1.22 
1977 315.5 0.38 
1978 333.4 0.40 
1979 25 0.03 
1980 3 na 
42, Source: Annual DAC Re-vjews France 1974~81« Reproduced from 
Shlreen Hunter; op,cito No,34 P. 117. 
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High Geographic Concentration - Iran's bilateral aid has been 
highly concentrated in a few countries. For example, in 1974 
and 1976 Pakistan accounted for 94 percent and 82 percent of 
Iran's bilateral aid respectively. In 1975, India was the largest 
recipient of Iranian aid followed by Egypt. 
In addition to India and Pakistan, which held special 
strategic. Political and Economic significance for Iran other 
principle recipients fell roughly into the following categories: 
1. Those West Asian countries that had a history of 
hostile relations with Iran and with whom Iran wanted 
to improve its relations, as well as to encourage 
moderate tendencies. Egypt and Syria fall in the 
category. 
2. Friendly African countries in the stability of whose 
regimes Iran was interested - notably Morocco and 
Tunisia. 
3. Other neighbouring countries with which Iran wanted 
either to strengthen further its relations or to 
induce some changes in their policies. Afghanistan 
and Turkey are in this category. 
Even though for this purpose Iran initially favoured 
multilateral channels for aid - as its proposal for an 
International Fund illustrates - when its suggestion did not lead 
to results^ it channelled the bulk of its aid bilaterally. For 
example, Iran did not contribute to IDA, to regional development 
banks or to the Islamic Development Bank, Its multilateral 
contributions were limited to UN Agencies and the UN Agential 
Account, 
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43 Tcible 1 'Iran's PDA Contribution to Multilateral 
Organisation (dlsburgements In $ US million) 
I PAD 
Agencies 
IBRD 
IMP 
ileg. 
Dev. 
Banks 
Arab 
Agencies 
OPEC • 
Fund 
Total *GNP 
1973 - 1.5 - - - - 1.5 0.01 
1974 - 22.5 - - - - 0.05 
1975 - 5 S - - 5.5 0.01 
1976 - 5.6 1.7 - - 54,6 61,9 0.10 
1977 - 5.4 1.8 - - 2.7 10,0 0.01 
1978 41.6 0,4 1,9 - - 13.7 57.6 0.08 
1979 - 4,6 1.9 <a» - 14.3 20.8 0.03 
1980 - .0 - - - 28.7 32.7 0.04 
1981 - 0.4 - - - - 0.4 -
These contributions, in turn, somewtj^t changed the ratio, of 
multilateral to bilateral aid in total Iranian ODA. Thus, according 
to official Iranian figures, in 1976 multilateral commitments 
accounted for 56,2 per cent of Iran's official Development 
Assistance (ODA), and OECD figures put the multilateral 44 
disbursement for that year at 10 per cent of Iran's ODA, 
43. Sourcet OECD. Aid from OPEC Countries 1983, op.cit; No,34 
P, 119. 
44, Ibid. P, 119, There is, however, some discrepancy between 
official Iranian estimates of the concessionality of Iranian 
ODA and those of the OECD. For example, Iranian sources put 
the overall grant element of Iran's ODA at 45 percent and 
76 percent for the years 1975 and 1976. 
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T.ow rnncessionallty - The terms of Iranian aid were among the 
hardest of the OPEC donors, although the overall terms of 
Iranian ODA improved somwhat by 1976 because of large Iranian 
contributions to the OPEC Special Pimd. Iran extended very 
few grants as opposed to loans and - although the interest Iran 
Charged on its loans was not much higher than OPEC average - in 
view of their short maturity their grant element was low, 
softer terms seem to have applied to general balance of 
payment support loans extended to countries Iran deemed 
particularly important, as well to loans it extended for the 45 purchase of Iranian goods. 
In short therefore Iran's capacity to extend financial 
aid helped it realise some of its basic national goals, such as 
bolstering friendly countries and expanding its ties v;ith the 
Indian sub-continent. However, in view of Iran's relatively 
limited finacial resources, the nature of its interests, this 
assistance did not result in a situation of political dependency 
on the part of the recipients. Even in regard to countries such 
as Pakistan - in which Iran had significant (but by no means 
pre-dominant) influence, the influence derived more from Irans 
military strength, its geographic proximity and its regional 
conditions than from aid relationships. 
interest charged on a | 500 million Iranian Oil credit to India was 2.5 percent; and the | 47 million 
interest f^ee 
NO. 23, March 26, 1979, p.l. 
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3. Kuwait - Until 1978 Egypt was the principal recipient of 
Kuwait's aid. After the cessation of aid to Egypt following the 
Camp David agreement Syria became principal recipient of Kuwaiti 
aid followed by Bahrain, Jordan, and Lebanon. Other important 
recipients of Kuwaiti aid have included the two Yemens and 
Somalia. In addition as early as in 1953 Kuwait extended aid to 
smaller Gulf Sheikhdoms now members of the UAE and the Yemens and 
Oman, Since 1966 this type of aid has been dispensed through the 
General Board for the South and Arabian Gulf. Most of this type 
of aid has been for health, education and other social services. 
Between 1966-9 the Board had given $ 14.6 million in aid. 
However aid through this channel increased considerably between 
46 1975-81. 
It is important to note that the bulk of Kuwaiti aid in 
grant form has gone to the Arab confrontation states, the 
Palestinian?? and a few other states^ Regarding the distribution 
of Kuwait's multilateral ODA, the bulk of it has been extended 
through Arab organisations, followed by the OPEC fund, the world 
Bank group and the IMF. The UN agencies have received the 
lov\rest share. 
The UAE - UAE aid has also been highly concentrated 
geographically in the Arab countries. In addition to grants to 
the confrontation states, according to OECD figures 81% and 95% 
46. For details see Organization for Economic ^operation and Development (ParlsTT Aid from OPEC Countries, 19l3l 
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Of the Abu Dhabi Fund's loan commitments for 1978 and 1979, 47 
respectively, were to Arab countries. In 1980, too, almost 
ninet.enths of bilateral grants benefited the Arab countries. 
Grants for non-Arab countries were small, with the exception of 
Pakistan. In the case of Abu Dhabi, too, multilateral ODA has 
constituted a small share of total ODA, particularly if 
contributions to Arab/OPEC institutions are excluded. Among 
multilateral organisations v;ith b^ ibad membership, UAE aid has 
been more evenly distributed among the UN agencies arx3 the World 
Bank Group. Among the regional banks, the UAE has contributed 
to the African Development Bank. 
5. Qatar - Since 1977 most of Qatar's aid has consisted of 
grants to confrontation states, Qatar's aid also has been highly 
concentrated on the Arab countries. The share of multilateral 
ODA has not been very high in Qatar's total ODA, and most of it 
has been to Arab institutions. In addition, unlike other.Gulf 
countries she seems to lack a coherent development strategy and 
a well planned aid policy which would take into account the 
principal needs of the developing countries. 
The level of geographical concentration of Iraq's aid has 
also been very high. For instance, according to UNCTAD, in 
1974, 94 per cent of all Iraqi bilateral aid went to four 
countries - India, Labanon, Sudan and Syria. OECD sources, 
however, have cited Egypt as the principal recipient. Since 
1978, Jordan, Syria and the West Bank have accounted for the bulk 
47. Ibid. 
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of Iraqi corrunltments. But in terms of disbursements, the 
situation has been less clear. For instance, it is unlikely, 
after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and Syria's support for 
Iran, that any funds have been disbursed to Syria. Among 
non-Arab countries, India has been the principal recipient of 
Iraqi aid. 
Iraqi aid beyond that to confrontation states has been 
largely tied to the purchase of oil. But the share of aid tied 
by project has not been very high. As far as multilateral ODA 
is concerned, most of Iraq's contributions have been to Arab 
agencies. 
In general the oil rich Gulf countries have used aid 
with considerable success to achieve both their collective and 
individual objectives. For example, at a Pan-Arab level Arab 
aid has played an important - although by no means determining 
role in enhancing Third World support for the Arab cause against 
Israel. The net effect of this situation, in turn, has been a 
dilution of Arab influence and prestige among Third World 
countries, and hence a reduced rate of efficiency of Gulf aid. 
Thus the characteristics of regional subsystems to which 
key OPEC members belonged have played an important role in 
determining their behaviour towards a number of important issues, 
including that of reforming the international economic system. 
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Moreover for reasons elaborated earlier, their 
goals of achieving Third World objectives have been 
subordinated to the more immediate objectives of persuading 
developed countries to change their policies more in favour 
of their interests. 
In sum, one comes to the conclusion that solution 
to the problems of West Asian oil rich countries are no 
less coirplicated that the difficulties themselves. Simple 
answers are not readily available^ Military force, by 
itself offers no single alternative. Nonetheless, without 
the clear ability to use such relevant force, and the 
manifest will to do so, it is almost certain that no 
SO' lution will be discovered, given the threats which hang 
over this critical region today. Answers, if they are to be 
found, must be sought primarily in the field of patient 
negotiation. Inflammatory rhetoric will serve no useful purpose. 
CHAPTER VI 
CHAPTER - VI 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES IN THE GULF^ 
CONFLICTING NATIONAL CLAIMS IN AFRICA AND THE SUPER 
POWERS: THE QUESTION OF THIRD WORLD SECURITY 
In todays' complicated world, there is not one single 
country free from international interventions. Such interference 
of one country in another's affiairs is no longer controversial, 
unless it takes the shape of invading armies crossing other 
countries' borders without their consent* Otherwise, world 
opinion variously ignores covert aspects of interference. 
These prevailing facts are clearly noticeable in the Gulf area 
and have shaken the entire Gulf today for its political stability 
and economic inr^ependence. Therefore it goes without saying that 
any new conflict in this region would be fatal for it. The 
experience of the Third V7orld countries during the last three 
decades has been that attempts to create or perpetuate Great 
Pov;er presence in the Gulf region has been the biggest source 
of Insecurity in the region and consequent threat to the 
safety of the sea lanes. Whereas there is no denying the fact 
that one potential source of conflict for every Indian Ocean 
littoral states especially of West Asia is lie in its attempts to 
protect its economic rights upto the proposed 200 miles exclusive 
economic resource zones. Even without such extensive limits. 
1, Mohammad El-Rumaihi; Oil and Security in the Gulf: An Arab 
point of View, Abdul Majid Farid; Oil and Security in the 
Arabian Gulf (Arab Research Centre, Croom Helm, London, 
1981) P, 134. 
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conflicts could result from attempts to guard coastal resources 
against foreign exploitation or ruination as a result of 
2 
pollution caused by transiting Vessels. Thus th^ interest shown 
by many littoral states in acquiring small, fast petrol boats 
armed with missiles and/or rapid fire, large-caliber guns 
indicates thc'ir concern in this regard. 
There are tv^;o types of conflict that could br<^  akout in 
the Indian Ocean offshore areas, particularly if the 200 mile 
economic resources 7.one is claimed by a large number of littoral 3 
states. The' first would involve the ships of the major powers 
as they extend their search for better fishing grounds and new 
sources of mineral wealth and fossile fuels. The second v/ould 
involve disputes between neighbouring states - over demarcation 
lines, particularly in regard to small uninhabited islands or 
rocks. Such problems have occured even before the 200 miles 4 economic resources zones were claimed. 
The present development highlights more grim picture for 
the third world as one focus more on specific local problems of 
the littoral r.tates that could bring about external interference, 
2. For the various steps taken by West Asian countries for Marine lr'6iiution (jontroi seeappendix I. 
3. For the detail study of Exclusive Fishing Zonesi Exclusive 
Economic Zones see appendix No.II. 
4. J.R.V. Prescott 'Claims to Territorial Seas' in 'The 
Political Geography of the Oceans' vl^ avid and Charles Newton 
Abbot, London 1975) PP. 68-69, 
149 
A race war in Southern Africa provides one of the most 
plausible war scenarios amonq Indian Ocean littoral countrieso 
Northward on the East African littoral states in the horn area, 
critical problems may spring from the concept of Pan-Somalism, 
which has remained till date a dominant element of Somali 
5 foreign Policy. 
The Somali constitution states in its introduction that 
"the Somali Republic proTnotes, by legal and peaceful means, the 
Union of the Somali territories. The government grants citizenship 
to all ethnic Somalis, regardless of their country of birth or 
residence, and the size of the National Assembly remains unlimited 
to allow for the inclusion of resprcsentatives from newly acquired 
territories. 
Even the design of the national flag promotes Pan-Somali 
ambitions: the points of its star represent the five Somali lands 
5. This policy seeks to unite under one flag all Somalia, 
includina those living in neighbouring countries who were 
separated from Somalia when Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia 
drew new borders between 1897 and 1925. These ethnic . Somalis inhabit the Northern Frontier district of Kenya, the Ogaden and Haud regions of South-eastern Ethiopia and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, Arguing that these frontier demarcations are unjust, the Somali government has publicly manifested concern for the welfare or the neighourinq Somalis. It has sought rectification by demanding that they be given the riaht of self-determination, which it expects them to exercise in favour of Joining the Somali flepublic. For a more extensive background on the Somali and Kenvan situation seft Iryjng Kaylan, et al. Area Handbook for Somalia (Washington, D.C.j American University, 1969), PP. 224-232, which has been particularly helpful in providing historical details. 
6. Ibid; P. 226. 
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to be United, basically the present state and the four areas 
7 
where ethnic Somalis now reside. 
Since neither Kenya nor Ethiopia recognizes the Somali 
position as reasonable, there will probably be some sort of 
hostilities. Indeed, since gaining their independence in 1960, 
thf Somalia hnve engaged in Skirmishes with both of their two 
main neighbours. 
At present, the situ<ition involving the Ethiopian regions 
of Ogaden and Haud and part of the French Territory of the Afars 
and Issas is the more explosive. The Somalis hold that the 
pre-independence treaties between Britain, Ethiopia, and Italy 
were not conducted in accordance with previous agreements between 
the colonial powers and the local Somali tribes. They further 
claim that, since these tribes were not consulted, the current 
traditional divisions are illegitimate. The disagreement over 
their lands provoke border clashes, which escalated into armed 
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964. Although a peace 
was arranged by the Sudan and the Organization of African Unity, 
verbal hostility has continued and the potential for further 
conflict remains. 
The spark that could ignite these smoidering issues may 
emanate from the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. This 
territory, a part of France with representation in the national 
7, Ibid; P. 227 and Jalnes Buxton, Trouble Brewing in the Horn 
of Africa, 'The Financial Times (London), June 16, 1976. 
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assembly in Paris, is approaching full independence. Somalia 
fears that moreof its ethnics - particularly the Issas - stand 
in danger of coming under Ethiopian irule after years of French 
and Afar hegemony. At the same time the Ethiopians are worried 
that the Somalis may deny them unimpeded access to the territory's 
main resource, the strategic port of Djibouti. The Franco -
Ethiopian rail road runs from there to, Addis Ababa, the capital 
and main city of Ethiopia, and carries some 80 percent of 
Ethiopian imports and exports. Ethiopia depends more and more 
on this outlet because the protracted secessionist war in Eritrea 
has made the other Ethiopian ports, Assab and Massawa, less 
8 
accessible. Thus, the mere threat of the loss of Djibouti could 
compel the Ehiopians to reso rt to war. 
While Ethiopia has signed a fonnal declaration pledging 
to respcct the integrity and independence of the French Territory, 
Somalia has declared that the territory must bccome independent 
under conditions that give full rights to ethnic Somali^. If 
these conditions are not full filled, Somalia threatens to claim 
the land. Should it win Djibouti, Somalia would have a 1pvpr 
for exerting pressure on Ethiopia to reduce its control over the 
other disputed regions. 
Since France's announcement at the beginning of 1976 of 
its intention to relf .nse the territory, rival liberation groups 
have formed and Afars and Issas have clashed in Djibouti. The 
8. Michael T. Kaufman "Tension Increases in French Colony" 
New York Times, July 1, 1976. 
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Afar President of the Council of Ministers has resigned and 
Ethiopian army units have carried out maneuvers in the tri-border 
area. Meanv/hile/ Somalia has reportedly moved heavy weaponry 
north to the same general vicinity and dispatched some 2,000 
p 9 armed irr^ulars into Ehiopia's Ogaden, h' 
During these years the United States and the USSR had 
aggravated the situation by giving military assitance to Ethiopia 
and Somalia respectively. The United States thus maintained 
a communication facility at Asmara, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union 
uses facilitied at Berbers, Somalia. Thus the great powers are 
juxtaposed through their client states. While the USSR appears 
to actively supporting Somali ambitions, U.S. backing of Ethiopia 
seemed less firm and irrevocable. Still, a Soviet - sponsored 
Somali challenge could place the United States in a predicament. 
Partly at stake, in addition to the territory itself, is strategic 
control of the strait of Bab el Mandeb at the entrance to the Red 
Sea. Somali acquisition of Djibouti therefore holds the promise 
of strategic gains for the Soviet Union, if it attains a position 
of Influence with Somalia, However the next area of local 
strategy in the Red Sea pertains over the development where Arabs 
are torn between their different commitments^ syirpathies and 
interests. Ethnically and religiously, they feel compelled to aid 
10 
the Somalis and Eritreans against the Ethiopians, Politically and 
9, David D. Ottaway 'Ethiopia, Somalis in War Mood' Washington 
Post, July 1, 1976, 
10, Under inducement from the Soviet Union, Libya and the PDRY Swi'cched their support from the Somalis and Eritreans to the Ehiopians. 
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perhaps economically, they are drawn towards Ethiopia. The Arabs 
are naturally interested in a stable Africa. On the one hand, 
Egypt has a vital interest in stability and tranquil ity at the 
Nile water sources in Ethiopia. On the other hand, Saudi fears 
that the break up of Ethiopia may strengthen the communist 
influence in eastern and interior Africa. 
The Arabs also realized that the conflict in the Horn was 
seriously threatening the fragile cohesion In Africa. At stake 
is a delicate stability that may be shattered wj.th Africans 
suffering the ravages of this conflict and the superpoi-;erspulling 
the strings. 
However for the Arabs the ties with the Arab Muslim Somalis 
were too strong to ignore. And despite their preoccupation with 
the Palestinian question, they believe that there is a strong 
connection between the events in the West Asia and those in 
Africa. At the Rabat Conference in 1974, the Arab League 
allocated 100 million to help Somalia make Arabic its official 
lanauaqe. However at first only Iraq, Libya and the United Arab 
Emiratf s (UAE) fulfilled their financial obligations. As a result, 
Somalia received only 40 million, for the Saudis froze their 
contribution as long as Mogadishu maintained its close ties with 
12 
Moscow. Interestingly, Washington treated Somalia similarly, 
particularly when the US was enjoying a favoured position in 
Ethiopia. It seems that neither Washington nor Riyadh appreciated 
11. Saudi Gazette, 14 March 1983. 
12. Al-Ahram, 27 May 1977 Translation obtained from the C.W.A.S. 
Aligarh. 
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the position of the somalis, who were struggling for national 
unity/ a goal that took, precedence over any other commitment. 
TQ achieve this objective, the Somalis were determined to seek 
aid from whatever source was available irrespective of race, 
religion or ideology. 
By 1977 the political winds blowing across the Red Sea 
began to change direction and effect major realignments. 
Yesterday's adversaries became allies and vice versa, American -
Soviet rivalry became a major determinant in the new alignments 
established in the Red Sea. In the new game, the Arabs, who were 
primarily concerned with Israeli designs, found themselves 
menaced by the bold Soviet encroachment in East Africa, The 
crucial question was whether the Arab and African nationalists 
would withstand the communist encroachment designed to create a 
'Red Belt' in Africa? 
It is evident that the Soviet Union is giving Africa a 
higher priority than is the United States, where foreign Policy 
has been crippled by the debacles of Vietnam and Water gate. 
Meanwhile, Soviet Policy has been bold and certainly adventurous 
in East Africa, The Soviet hoped to achieve certain objectives. 
First, ultimately to create a 'Red belt' across Africa, extending 
from Mozambique and Tanznia on the Indian Ocean, and possibly 
13, Enver M. Kouy and Emile Nakleh ed, 'The Arabian Peninsula, Red sea and the Gulf: Strategic Considerations' (Hyattsville, Maryland, Institute of Middle Eastern and Nortti African Studies, 1979) , P, 97, 
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Somalia anri Ethiopia at the Hom to Angola on the Atlantic. 
Secondly, to weaken the influence of the West and its allies* 
notably Kenya, Zaire and Sudan, by encouraging secessionist 
movements there. Thirdly, to consolidate Soviet gains in Africa 
by offering economic and military assistance. Significantly, 
Podgomy's delegation included approximately 120 experts or 
advisors to study the needs of the African countries visited. 
Meanwhile, ^astro visited Libya and Ethiopia, from where he was 
expected to exert heavy pressure on Egypt and Sudan, TO", 
Ethiopia, he offered military advisers to help crush the 
Eritrean rebellian. He also tried to resolve the conflict 
between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa by proposing a federal Union 
that would also include the PDRY, Somalia rejected such a 
solution, since Somali national unity was more important than 
•^ he common ideology it shared with Ethiopia. In other words, 
for the Somalis nationalism came before socialism, although 
Somalia was the first b lack African country to sign, in 1974, 
a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, the Soviets were so entrenched in Somalian economic 
and military life that a break between the tv;o countries was 
regarded as only a remote possibility. 
However, the rise of Marxist regime in Addis Ababa changed 
the political equation dramtically. As Moscow began shifting its 
focus to Ethiopia, Somalia started drifting towards the 
conservative Arab Canp, Massive Soviet arms to Ethiopia placed 
Somalia in a very awkward position. Clearly, Mogadishu could not 
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break away from the USSR without an adequate military and 
economic substitute. For the ^omalis the situation was critical 
and the stakes were high. Somalis would have to find alternative 
sources before deserting to Marxist Camp. So far the only 
possible sources the US and Saudi Arabia, wore hesitant and 14 reluctant to step in and fill the gap. 
On the other hand the Somalis h oped that Soviet support 
for Ethiopia would be limited n^d restrained for the following 
reasons. Firstly,the USSR was not certain of the outcome in 
Eritrea. If the Eritreans (who were supported by the Somalis 
and might eventually unite with Somalis) gained independence, 
Ethiopia would have no naval facilities to offer the Soviets, 
Secondly^ after losing its footsteps in Egypt and Sudan, Moscow 
could hardly afford another setback that might seriously affect 
its position and credibility in Africa and perhaps throughout 
the Third World. Thirdly, the Soviets were fully aware of the 
intensive American - Saudi efforts not only to lure the Somalis 
away from the socialist camp, but also to eject the Soviets from 
the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. 
Hence, in November 1977, Somalia took the long awaited 
dramatic steps: it severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and 
gave the Cubans 48 hours to leave the country; it expelled all 
Soviet advisors and ordered a reduction in Soviet diplomatic 
14. Anthony Sylvosllr, Arabs and Africans (Bodley Head, London, 
1981) P. 252. 
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staff; it withdrew the use of all facilities enjoyed by the 15 • 
Soviet Union on land and Sea; and finally it abrogated the 
treaty of friendship and cooperation of 1974 with Moscow, For 
the Soviets, Somali action was a shattering blow that uprooted 
their influence from the Horn of Africa and denied them the 
valuable Somali air and Naval facilities. Clearly Moscow's 
risk gamble had failed and the dream of creating client states 
in that strategic region ended abruptly. Three times within a 
few years, the Soviets had turned out to be los'ers. Soviet 
advisers had been expelled from Egypt, Sudan and Somalia, three 
countries which were completly dependent on Soviet Economic and 
military aid. NQW MOSCOW had no choice but to put all its 
political eggs in the Ethiopian basket, hoping that Addis Ababa 
would crush the revolts in Eritrea and the Ogaden. If this was 
accomplished, then the Soviets would have gained lucrative 
foothold on the Red Sea. 
The expulsion of the Soviet advisers was also the 
culmination of the Arab effort (Egyptian, Sudanese and Saudi) to 
lure Mogadishu away from the Marxist orbit. Meanwhile, the US was 
moving slowly to strengthen its ties with Somalia. By the end of 
April 1978 Washington was giving Mogadishu strong political 
support when the US announced that it was seriously considering 
selling arms to Somalia, But a reconcilation between Washington 
and Mogadishu was abruptly halted when Somali troops moved into 
15. New York Times, 6 Oct. 1977< 
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the Ogacien. The US was worried that a Somali victory in the 
Ogaden would undoubtedly pose serious problems for its close 
ally, Kenya, on whom Somalia also has territorial claims. Hence 
the US was reluctant to assist Somalia in its struggle against the 
Marxist government in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, Washington is 
reminded that the Somalis are passing through a critical period 
and are in disperate need of military aid. Therefore, it is 
certain that while they would be grateful for any military 
assistance, they may never forgive whoever denies them such 
16 crucial help. 
However/Washington' s position has remained complicated 
by its varied and often, conflicting interest -md commitments. 
Ideologically although it was opposed to the Ethiopian regime, its 
support of the Eritreans and Somalis was restrained by its 
alliance with Kenya, Economically, together with its West 
European allies it needed Arab oil and world influence^but its 
Arab policy was hampered by its special relationship with Israel, 
Thus, when the US shelved Somalian's request for arms^Mogadishu 
regarded the American decision as a 'betrayal' that cost the US 
a golden opportunity to re-establish its influence along the Red 
Sea and the Horn of Africa. Washington had believed that its 
non-involvement was sound and wise in a rather difficult situation, 
But in that case an Ehiopian victory would clearly be regarded as 
a resounding victory for the Soviets, who have already achieved 
spectacular gains in Angola and Mozambique, not to mention 
Vietnam, from where the Americans had to withdraw. Another Soviet 
victory coming on the heels of the American expulsion from 
16. Ali Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy 
of Dependency and change, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Pres, 
1979), P.310. 
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Ethiopia would adversely affect American influence, interests 
and credibility in Africa along the Red Sea. Further more, 
pressure from Arab and African states may force -the US to take 
a firm stand against Soviet intervention in East Africa, in 
addition to its own concern over the Soviet role in the strategic 
region. Thus a crisis has been brewing between the superpowers 
for control of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, and this has 
subsequently affected the independent policiescfthe Gulf countries 
17 of the Red Sea regioHo 
Not only this, among the Persian Gulf countries, a number 
of foreseeable situations could also result in an outbreak of 
hostilities. In past many has involved Iran, whose defence 
preparations seemed to be more anticipatory of military conflict 
than those of any other regional states. It has already taken 
action in Oman, where it suspected that an unfriendly regime 
might bloc the passage of ships particularly oil tankers, through 
18 
the critical straits of Hormuz, By sending troops and additional 
weapons into Oman in an effort to quell the Dhofar insurgency, the 
Shah had already set up a precedent for Iranian intervention on 
the Arab side of the Gulf, Iran has engaged in some territorial 
17, Hasan el-Badri, 'Local Conflicts and their Implications 
over the Last two Decades in the Red Sea, ed, Abdul Malid Fa rid, (Arab Research Centre, Croom Helm, London, iyb4), 
PP. 77-79. 
* 
18, For Example, see A m and de Borchgrove, Colossug" of the Oil Lnes^' News We^k, May ly /S, Po40. 
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disputes that could erupt again and lead to conflict. In late 
1971, a day brfore the expirating of the British commitment to 
portect the territorial integrity of Trucial stat^-s, Iran 
occupied i.he Islands of Abu Mur>a nnd thr Tunbs in the strait 
of Hormuz, causing alarm among the Arab states, Ira^ ultimately 
severed diplomatic relations v/ith Iran and with Britain, which 
it believed to be in collusion with Iran, Since then Iran has 
concluded agreements with the states of Sharjah, to which Abu 
Musa belongs, and Ras-al Khaimah of which the Tunbs are a part, 
but the agreements art not necesscirily permanent and frictions, 
could develop, especially in the context of Arab suspicions about 19 
Iran's expansionism. 
Although the Shah renounced any claim to Bahrain in 1970, 
Iran might reassert that claim. Such a policy change might be 
justified on the basis of either the ansumption of power by an 
unfriendly government or the need to protect Bahrain's Iranian 
minority, A like situation exists in other Gulf Sheikhdoms, which 
have reportedly been pressured to allow greater irimigration of 
Iranians. 
It should be noted thdt any Iranian action against a 
smaller Arab State could have provoked a united military action. 
19, For details of the Conflicting Claims Over the Islands see 
appendix No,III. 
20. Enver Koury, Oil and Geopolitics in the Persian Guld Area 
(Hyattsville Md, institute for North African and Middle 
Eastern Studies, Inc. 1974), PP. 45-47, and Dale R. Tahtinen, 
Arms in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D,C., American 
Enterprise Institute, 1974) P.20. 
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This outcome could not have escaped Shah's mind. And perhaps 
the present regime would also foresee this danger. 
In general, conflicts could arise from declarations of 
territorial limits for oil beneath the Gulf, Reports noted 
several years ago that Iran was considering, claiming a fifty-
mile territorial limit did little to discourage the common Arab 
21 suspicions about - Iranian expansionist tendencies. 
The historical animosity between the Arab States and 
non-Arab Iran underlies all the these potential conflicts. 
Surprisingly, its basis is largely religious beca\ise of Iran's 
position as protector of the Shi'ite Muslims, who are generally 
in competition with the sunni moslems. The latter constitute 
the vast majority in the Arab world with the exception of Iraq 
where there is no appreciable difference in numbers between the 
two sects. 
Elsev;here in the Gulf, territorial disputes could 
conceivably flare up. Iraq may decide to reassert its claim 
over warbah and Bubiyan# Kuwaiti Islands although mllltdry action 
would probably stimulate a response from Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
22 
even Syria. As with Iran, provocation of that magnitude would be 
both risky and unlikely without a commitment of super power 
support. 
21, Stephen Lynton, Iran Moves Toward 50 Mile Limit in 
Gulf, Baltimore Sun, Sept. 10, 1973. 
22. For details of Iraq Kuwait dispute over Warbah and Bubiyan 
see appendix No.IV. 
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FLirther to the southeast, Saudi Arabia could become 
embroiled with Oman and the United Arab Emirates over the 
border in the area of the oil-rich Buraimi Oasis, If the 
negotiated agreement between the Saudis and the Emirates 
continues to be accepted by both sides, only the Omani 
situation would remain, unsettledo But, as mentioned earlier, 
there is also the possibility of a large-scale Saudi-Yemeni 
conflict. 
As this examination has shown, any number of conflicts 
might eirupt among the Red Sea and Persian Gulf littoraJL states 
of the Indian Ocean, and the huge amounts of weapons needed to 
conduct hostilities are already in the hands of these countries. 
Furthermore nothing suggests that the acquisition of arms will 
abate in the foreseeable future. 
This disconceming situation could be further immensely 
complicated by Super Power involvement in any local conflict. 
In addition to these dangers, there is the worrisome 
possibility that Washington and Moscow will display large 
permanent fleets into the area, which would heighten the 
temptation to intervene on behalf cf the client, A massive 
naval build up could intensify mutual suspicions to such an 
extent that one side might initiate an action on the mistaken 
assunption that the other intended to intervene in a local 
dispute. 
The present situation contains grimmer security consider-
ations for the Third World than for the developed North - Whetfeer 
the West or East,The experience of the Third World countries 
during the last three decades has been that atteirpts to create 
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or perpetucite Great Power prfsence in the Gulf region has been 
the biggest source of insecurity in the- region and consequent 
threat to the safety of the sea lanes. 
The Third World ne^ eds grf ater effort on the- part of 
concerned in order to be reassured their own safety and security. 
But a great responsibility for the containment and quick 
resolution of the conflict rests on the shoulders of tte Great 
Powers, It will not suffice that the v;orld community alone 
shrieks and appeals to them to do their best. They should be 
convinced through their own reasoning of the dangers invoked in 
their trying to use the situation to their own indivividual 
advantage. The Great Powers should also realise that the Indian 
Ocean littoral states have inherited a numb^;r of unresolved 
problems arising from boundary disputes, populations of common 
ethnicity divided by national borders, claims of self-determination 
based on independent ethnic identity,and the like. These nations 
are trying to grapple with these historical legacies and require 
23 
time and sustained effort to r< solve them. On the other hand 
falling oil revenues have reduced the level of spending by Gulf 
governments, forcing cutbacks in development projects, reductions 
in the salaries of government employees and delays in payments 
to contractors. These development have also induced on exodus 
on immigrant workers which, by reducing economic demand, rents 
and real estate values, has further depressed business. 
23. Tim Nib lock 'Can the Indian Ocean Stat*^? Keep Cut the 
Great Powers? op.cit. No.l PP. 131-133. 
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In their efforts to control spending the Gulf States 
have been - and are - faced with certain rigidities in their 
traditional patterns of expenditures. Moreover, despite the 
reduced oil prices defense and security-related items that 
constitute the largest items of expenditure in Gulf budgets 24 
have so far been immune from cuts. 
To look at the most basic trends, total annual West Asian 
militaiy expenditures have increased from $ 23.8 billion in 1973, 
in constant 1982 dollars, to ^ 60,9 billion in 1983, This means 
that real military expenditures in the region have tripled in 
the decade since the October War. And while the decline in oil 
revenues has recently cut the rate of real grcx/th in these 
expenditures, they are still rising at an annual rate 3,7 percent 
whereas arms imports are still increasing at an annual real rate 
of 6,5 - 8,0 percent, or at roughly twice the rate of total 
defence expenditures. These trends are even more grim if one 
considers th.Tt V^ e^st Asian military expenditures involve state 
which are largely dependent on importing weapons ^md associated 
technology that brings with them only peripheral benefits 
in terms of technology transfer and military production. 
Moreover imported mili';ary hardwares and arms are not 
24. Shireen T. Hunter; 'Gulf Economic Crisis and Its Social 
And Political Consequences Middle East Journal^ Vol,40 No.4 
Autumn 1986, PP. 593-613. 
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productive capital assets. Between 1973 and 1983 the states of 
West Asia spent $ 542 billion (in constant 1982 dollars) on their 
military forces. Roughly 122 billion dollars of this total, or 
23 percent, went directly for imported arms. At least another 
100 billion went to military related advisory and maintencmce 
services, military construction and other military related 
25 
imports. Political Scientists and development experts agree that 
the relationsrhlp between the level of absolute Poverty and 
Political instability is difficult to establish. They also agree 
that the process of modernization is highly destabilizing, 
particularly at times when societies experience a sudden drop in 
the level of their economic well-being, after a period of 
26, 
sustained prosperity and rising popular expectations. Gulf 
societies are going through such an experience. 
As noted earlier, external factors are still the Gulf States' 
biggest political headaches, but the economic recession also added 
to these troubles. 
What is necessary in the situation of today is that the 
great powers must realise that it is in their own interest, not 
only to withstand the temptation to get involved in it for any 
immediate or long term gain, but also to make every effort through 
constructive and open diplomacy for the resolution of the crisis 
25. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Middle East And the Cost of the 
Politics of Force. The Middle East Journal Vol.40 No.l 
Winter, 1986, Washington PP.6-7. 
26. P. Huntington, 'Political Order in changing Societies, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 
166 
without any further delay for in the nucle^ar age, a Super Power 
need not have large fleets and basis all over the \i/orld to be 
insulated from military challrnges. While the Great Powers could 
maintain some kind of naval presence in the Indian Ocean without 
any base facilities, the extent of such a presence would 
evi.^ently b^ - severely limited to this case. There are two 
problems v;hich the states of the Indian Ocean would encounter in 
seeking to pursue the strategy. One is that not all of the states 
may agree. Governments accept the establishment of foreign base 
facilities on their territories when they fear for their own 
Security, ^ whether the threat comes from internal opposition or 
from the activities of outside states) and when they stand to 
benefit economically from so doing. Given the pace of social 
change in the states of the Indian Ocean, the extent of opposition 
to some of existing ^o^rnments, and the number of conflicts which 
exist between the different states, it is difficult to envisage a 
time when one or other of the governments would not see a reason 
to host foreign base facilities. For some of the states, moreover, 
the economic benefits to be gained from hosting such facilities 
must seem attractive. The second problem is that, even If all 
of the states did persue a common strategy on this matter, there 
would still remain territories where Great Powers could retain 
base facilities such as the British owned Island of Diego Garcia, 27 
where the United States currently has substantial base facilities. 
27. Indu Prakash Singh, 'Oil and Great Power Rivalry in the 
G-alf Indian Ocean Kreaj Attitudes of Third -World Cotintries, op.cito No.l* PP. 127-129. 
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The conclusion which emerges from the above argument 
is that the states of Indian Ocean may simply not be able to 
keep the area fjree of any Great Power military p;resenceo They 
could no doubt effect the extent of such external military 
involvement/ but it seems unlikely that they could completely 
eliminate it. Given the fact, then,that some Great Power military 
presence is likely to remain, the freedom of action of the Indian 
Ocean OPEC littoral states - which is presunvibly their overriding 
objective - could we.ll be enhanced by ensuring that such Great 
Power involvement as is present is balanced. Foreign military 
involvement in the most crucial part of the Indian Ocean, the 
Persian Gulf, is currently very one-sided: the western powers are 
in a predominant position. Enjoying greater access to local 
military facilities, with more troops within easy reach, and with 
a long involvement in the area which would facilitate military 
action, the western powers (or specifically the United States) 
have feven been able to raise the spectre of their own intervention 
in local states without fear of a Soviet-backed response, A 
stronger Soviet military presence in the area^therefore, could 
conceivably give local states rather room for manoeuvre. Agreements 
on oil pricing and economic assistance could ^/ithin this frame work, 
be linked with agreements on preferential trade and protected 
investment. Not only this in return OPEC can ask from the 
industrialized states: the guarantee of a satisfactory remuneration 
for their financial investments in the west; effective coop<=ration 
to enable them to replace 'Oil' capital with industrial and 
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agricultural capital - investments, technology and opening up 
of world markets to the ir products; effective cooperation from 
the industrialize countrit-s in the development of Third World 
and in increase in aid to the df^veloping countries. 
ASSESSMENTS 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The geographical distribution of Jcnown usable energy 
resources, the global distribution of consumption, and the 
characteristics of the demand and supply of energy resources 
make the interdependence in energy imperative. In addition, 
the characteristics of the demand and supply of these resources 
contribute more to the imperative of interdependence^ As for 
example the short-mn demand and supply of energy are 
distinguished from those of other commodities vrhlch are traded 
internationally by the following characteristics! Various 
sources of energy are coirplementary inputs in the production 
of almost all goods and services. Also, energy is a necessary 
complement to consumption. It is a necessary input for 
transportation, electricity, industrial power, space heating, 
and a feedstock ingredient. Therefore, reduction in the demand 
for energy without reducing aggregate economic activity is not 
possible except through conservation measures and efficient 
methods of production. But of these factors require a 
significant adjustment in methods as well as habits of 
production and consunptiono 
Substitution among alternative energy resources is very 
limited. Modern technology employed in processes of production 
and consximption has evolved almost exclusively for the use of a 
single energy resource among usable alternatives. Thus, 
substitution among alternative resources of energy is affected 
not only by their relative prices but also by the cost of 
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scrapping existing equipment and constructing new productive 
capacity that can utilize a substitute energy resource. 
Though solid fuels are in abundant supply they are less 
efficient, less convenient and more damaging to the environment 
than oil and gas. In addition, technology and labour for 
efficient mining of coal is available only in few regions. 
These factors reduce further the substitution among alternative 
energy sources in the short run. The experience with 
quantitative and price controls in different countries has not 
been encouraging. The critical importance to economic activity 
renders inefficiencies of rationing very costly. 
It follows that the strategic significance of petroleum 
for the normal functioning of economic life renders the perils 
of isolationism potentially devastating to the global safety and 
prosperity of mankind. Under these circumstances, the oil-
producing and exporting countries cannot avoid their 
responsibility to the world's global welfare, as this is 
critically related to their export of petroleum. The optional 
path of pricing and production policies which maximize OPEC 
earnings in the past from petroleum is a subject of debate and 
controversy. Although some assessments of OPEC's decision 
relating to oil production and exports policies in the light 
of securing their foreign policy goals and Third World objectives 
in the light of NIEO have been discussed separately in some 
detail at the end of each preceding chapters, the following is an 
attempt to shed more light on the real capabilities of OPEC and 
to offer explanations to some of many fascinating myths. 
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It was a popular belief that the energy crisis (that is, 
the rising real cost of energy) has "caused" the v;orld economic 
crisis. This, in a way, reverses the sequence of events. The 
rising real cost of energy was the result of the overload of the 
world system, not its Cause, The fast rate of increase in oil 
consumption has led to a rapid depletion of non-renewable sources; 
this happened because the price of oil was kept artificially low 
by international oil companies for a long period. Paradoxically 
it was this artificially low price of oil which caused the 
eventual crisis by leading to an unregulated appetite for energy. 
If oil prices had not been set in relation to the cost of 
production - which was irrelevant in the West Asian and African 
context - but to the cost of alternatives, the adjustment 
process would not have become so abrupt and traumatic. It was 
widely believed that the oil prices were being kept artificially 
high at present through OPEC cartel like action; and with the 
diamantling of OPEC these prices would crash. Recent events have 
proved this to be a fallacy. The current spot price of oil is 
determined by the forces of demand and very little else. In fact, 
many OPEC members because of international considerations were 
producing more oil than is required by their own national revenue 
needs. 
However, after the second oil price rise in 1979, a number 
of factors collaborated to create a present oil glut and threw 
OPEC into such disarray. First was the planned iecession that 
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was irtposed on the Western economies; second, the significance 
of non-OPEC oil; third, the high level of stock most companies 
held after the Iranian revolution; fourth, the urgent need of 
some OPEC members for revenues in 1980-82 and fifth, the 
conservation policies pursued by the industrial countries. 
Finally, and most importantly, the real determining 
factor for the price of energy turned out to be on the demand 
side; the extent to which recessionist and conservation polictse 
were pursued. Thus the price of energy was and still is, being 
determined today like the price of any other commodity. OPEC 
was never able to manipulate market forces; its action often 
lagged behind them. 
The popular media drove home the belief that OPEC 
countries are extremely rich; that they "create" enormous 
financial surpluses which they cannot use themselves and which 
put considerable pressure on the world economy; and that they 
are responsible for compensating oil inporting developing 
countries for the rise of their oil import bills, but are as 
yet providing inadequate financial assistance to them. Such 
reasoning only tries to put OPEC countries on the defensive, 
without having the benefit of objective analysis or leading to 
any constructive results. To begin with, most OPEC countries 
are not rich. Their economies are liquid but they are not 
wealthy, though liquidity and wealth are being freely confused 
these days. Besides, most OPEC nations are underdeveloped, with 
low literacy rates, short life expectancy, unskilled labour, a 
low level of technology and research, little diversified 
development outside the oil sector, and with all the problems 
of a single resource economy. 
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If we look at OPEC aid figures some surprising facts 
emerge. Before 1973 the Arab-Oil Exporting Countries were xinable 
to give appreciable aid to other Third World countries, because 
the price of oil was depressed and therefore the revenues were 
correspondingly low. This situation changed by 1974, During 
that year OPEC countries gave aid to the Third world amounting to 
^2,5 billion, representing 1,7 percent of their GNP, During the 
same period the developed countries of DAC contributed no more 
than 0,33 percent of their GNP, The figures exclude other forms 
of assistance. If all forms of assistance are taken into account 
we obtain the staggering figure of $ 6 billion from OPEC, 
representing 3,69 percent of the donors' GNP, During 1975 OPEC's 
total aid to the Third World was $ 9 billion which was 50 percent 
more than the previous year, whereas for the same period DAC 
countries' aid was only increased by about 15 percent. What 
these figures bringout is that Gulf oil exporting countries are 
currently contributing a far greater share of their wealth to 
the development programmes of Third World countries than the 
Western industrialized nations. 
Moreover, of all the aid granted by OPEC members, 
assistance provided by the OPEC Special Fund - now the OPEC Fund 
for International Development - has been least affected by any 
particular security - political, economic or other interests 
since this aid was not designed to help OPEC members achieve 
such goals. This fact, in turn, largely explains the low 
percentage of OPEC members aid channelled through their 
collective aid institutions. Yet this does not mean that OPEC 
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Fund aid has had no other purpose than the social and economic 
development of the recipients. Quite the contrary, it has been 
supposed to serve two important purposes; to help offset the 
negative impact of oil price increases on OPEC Third World 
relations and thus to gain goodwill for OPEC; and to preserve 
and enhance OPEC's prestige among Third world Countries, 
In addition, its operations has also been influenced to 
some extent by principles developed in the context of the 'New 
International Economic Order* (NIEO). In fact, the Fund was 
created to demonstrate the solidarity of OPEC countries with 
aspirations of other developing countries, as articulated within 
the NIEO frame-worko The Funds annual report states that,'The 
OPEC special fund was established as one of the many instruments 
of ch.inufc and policy tools required for shaping the New 
International Economic Order,' 
Some other OPEC actions - largely carried out through the 
OPEC Fund - have also been justified as helping to achieve the • 
objectives of the NIEO. These have included large contributions 
to the International Fund for Agricultural Development and 
contributions to help establish a common Fund within the context 
of UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC), The 
OPEC Fund's commitment to the objectives of the NIEO has also 
led it to assist projects th<it encourage cooperation among 
developing countries, since the expansion of intra-developing 
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country cooperation v/as highly recommended by the programme of 
action for the establishment of NIEO. A good exarrple has been 
cooperation between the OPEC Fund and the United Nations 
Development Progranme (UNDP) in providing technical assistance 
to regional projects. 
Furthermore, as developing countries' ;OPEC members have 
shared many problems of other Third World countries - and thus 
have shared interests in some aspects of reforming the international 
economic system - there have also been significant and growing 
divergences of interests between thfese two groups of states. The 
most significant has concerned the price of oil and the vigour 
and speed with which alternative sources of energy should be 
developed. Logically, therefore, OPEC could not have been 
expected to press for reforms in the international economic system. 
In fact, had it not been for other reasons (fcr example, intra 
OPEC rivalries, OPEC members' internal weaknesses and contradiictions, 
and pressures emanating from the nature of the international 
political system and regional sub-systems), formulas reconciling 
essential interests of OPEC members with those of the Third World 
countries could probably have been worked out. 
On the other hand, the regional factors to which Gulf 
OPEC Countries are members have tended to mould their behaviour 
in certain direction over the number of concerned issues. For 
instance, the requirements of the oil rich countries of the Indian 
Ocean, region which has been on many occasions bedeviled by deep 
long standing conflicts and rivalries by outside Powers for their 
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own interests have compelled the Gulf members of OPEC to neglect 
their borader Third world objectives. Thus the combination of 
these factors and the like have both created special security 
problems for the West Asian countries and have imposed special 
demands on them in terms of their policy choices. For reasons 
eleaborated earlier, Icey OPEC members have been particularly 
vulnerable to these pressures. 
Basically/ OPEC is a limited-purpose alliance of 
governments interested in maximizing their monetary returns from 
oil. Driving strength from that limitations, it has survived the 
most startling political anomalies. Iran continued to send oil 
to Isreael despite three Arab wars; for years, it has supported 
the Kurdish rebels in Iraq. Territorial claims have been pressed 
by Iraq on Kuv/ait and by Iran on Behrain. Iran and Saudi 
Arabia as mentioned before, have indulged in a multi billion 
arms race across the Persian Gulf, No love is lost between 
monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and ideologues at Algiers, 
Tripoli and Baghdad, or indeed between one Arab "revolutionary" 
ideologue and another. Here too, the vulnerability of these 
countries has been manipulated effectively by the industrialized 
countries through, for example, offers of protection and support 
against internal and external challenges to the existing leaders 
in exchange for modernisation of oil prices or on the reform of 
international Economic system. 
The most pressing demand that the West Asian regional 
factors have generated for most of its countries - namely the 
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Arab states - has related to the question of Israel and specially 
to the means for dealing with the Israel and for restoring Arab 
rights. The paramountcy of the Palestine Question for ths Arab 
has meant that no other isaue could be allowed to distract 
Arab attention and energy from the goal of dealing with Israel, 
However, there has been no inherent or logical contradiction 
between the goal of restoring Arab rights in Palestine and the 
goal of advancing Third World objectives in general. 
The blame that OPEC has placed a burden of adjustment on 
the World economy in general, which is simply unmanageable. As 
argued earlier, oil prices should be treated like other prices 
which are determined by the dynamics of demand and supply and by 
the costs of alternatives. In total terms, oil imports account 
for less than 4 percent of the GNP of the industrialised nations -
certainly a manageable sum which can be matched by the 
productivity and exports from these nations. The real cost is 
to the late comers in the game of economic development; the 
developing countries. They are faced with the prospect of 
developing their economies at increasing rising costs of energy 
and other inputs because the cheap era is over by now. In fact, 
this constitutes a powerful argument for early users of resources 
to condensate late comers through bilateral assistance policies, 
since the incremental cost of development has risen so high 
through the rapid depletion of certain non-renewable sources. 
The energy problem thus can be seen in its proper 
perspective only if it is viewed as one of the many structural 
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transformations that the world is going through and if it is 
placed within the frame work of the restructuring of national 
and international orders which have become increasingly urgent. 
All these concerns are^ demanding structural changes in the 
past patterns of development and international relations. The 
energy issue greatly sharpened the global perception of these 
other transitions by demonstrating the essential interdependence 
and vulnerability of all countries. It is within that broad 
perspective that the energy issue can be helpful as an engine 
of transition as long as it is linked with other related issues. 
Today while falling oil prices are picking up the world 
economy, they are shaking it at the same time. Developing 
countries from Mexxco to Indonesia, which had built their 
economies and their dreams on oil revenues, now watch in anguish 
as those hopes of prosperity evaporate. The repercussions could 
go well beyond economies as those countries express their 
resentment toward consuming countries, many of which are rich 
industrial lands. The crisis could inflame tensions in West 
Asia, in particular, v/here oil revenues have dropped from $ 237 
billion in 1989 to an estimated ^ 110 billion in 1985. 
In the context of the aforementioned discussion it is 
necessary to analyse OPEC's general situation at present from 
four pointjof view, each distinct, but closely linked, to the 
others. 
The first viewpoint in offered by the oil equation itself, 
in the following question: can the free world get along 
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without approximately 17-18 million barrels per day of OPEC 
oil? Qxiite simply, the answer is no; and this view holds true 
both in the short and the long term. This is to emphasi^ie the 
fact that the member countries of the Organization: 
1. supply the oil market with a volume equal to 
approximately one-third of the Free World's demand; 
2. maintain a shut - in production capacity of some 
10 - 12 m b/d, the only one available on such a 
large scale and the cheapest source of oil nowadays; 
and 
3. account for 75 percent of the proven oil reserves 
of the Free World - enough to maintain their present 
rate of production for another 75 years. 
These three reasons are very valuable cards on a long-
term basis, but have been badly played, due to urgent situation 
in the short term. 
The second viewpoint is from the strategist's tower: 
Can OPEC, under the present circumstances, simultaneously 
maintain its prices and protect its share of the world's 
Petroleum market? it cannot. What has been evident since 1981 
is a cascade effect thiit has driven the organization to, 
alternately, lower its production levels and cut its official 
prices. By doing the former, it has given up the market to 
non-OPEC suppliers; by doing the latter, the socio-economic 
crisis which afflicts many of its member countries, has worsened, 
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Mercenary analysis point to these events in order to applaud the 
triunph of socalled 'market forces' over the 'undesirable' OPEC, 
Whereas, perhaps the real cause lies in some of the actions of 
the organization. 
The third approach, obvious to any alert observer is: Can 
OPEC strengthen its position in the international energy system 
while its own members compete amongst themselves in the search 
for clients? The answer will always be no. 
This competition within the Organization is a pernicious 
element eroding the basis of unity and support which was evident 
in OPEC during its early years; it deflects the attention of 
members towards secondary elements which could be handled through 
other operative channels; and it encourages mistrust within OPEC 
itself. Even worse, it has sanctioned the emergence of two very 
destabilizing mechanisms; the spot market and the futures market. 
This conpetition has also permitted the emergence of a finer 
weaving by serious analysts, who detect within the the Organization 
the existence of separatist elements, capable of overcoming the 
existing unifying forces. They cite, among others: wealthy OPEC 
versus poor OPEC; short-term OPEC versus long-term OPEC; and 
vertically-integrated OPEC versus non-integrated OPEC, 
The fourth viewpoint focuses on this question: Where is 
the Organization's Achilles' heel? A situation of volatility in 
demand and prices - such as the one now prevailing in international 
oil markets - has helped feed persistent doubts by those OPEC 
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countries most in need of petro-dollars about their ability to 
obtain such harcd currency from export sales which are within 
the crude oil production quotes agreed upon by the Organization. 
These countries try to solve their doubts by 'irregular* 
marketing practices which, in the end erode OPEC's strength and 
even endanger its future. 
It is obvious that these four viewpoints are closely 
linked* the indispensability of OPEC oil for the Free World; the 
Organization's difficulties, under the present circumstances, in 
simultaneously maintaining prices and holding its share of the 
oil market; tl^ debilitating effects of inter-OPEC competition 
in the oil market; and the uncertain flow of petrodollars to the 
oil exporters most in need of hard currency, are the four pieces 
of a very difficult puzzles to put together. 
Although it is difficult to separate the different 
aspects of the energy crisis, focusing on the strategic horizons 
would present us with a more realistic outlook on the problem and 
pel haps enable us to resolve it to the satisfaction of all 
concerned. For in the final analysis, the croix of the problem is 
in the West Asia where the oil producers insist on their right 
to make use of their valuable wealth in their efforts to achieve 
their own economic development, and it is within this context 
that they export oil and Import modem ttchnology. Unlike the 
consumer countries, they refuse to separate the two issues. 
The oil producing rich countries of the region believe 
that the monopoly of the international oil con^anies limits 
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their freedom to explit their national wealth and therefore 
see the solution to the energy crisis as being dependent on 
establishing direct trade relations with the consumer countries, 
thus limiting the role of the international oil companies and 
the support given them by the super powers behind the smokescreen 
of 'guaranteeing' oil supply from the area. 
Thus the problem of oil and security in the oil rich 
Gulf region can be resolved by an international agreement under 
the following conditions* 
First: achieving a just and unanimously accepted 
settlement to all the problems in the area* most important among 
them being in the Palestine question. 
Secondt removing the foreign military bases from West 
Asian territories and neighbouring countries, as well as removing 
the naval fleets of the superpowers. These two steps would 
obviously lessen military competition and reduce the 
possibilities of the area being turned into an arena for 
international conflicts. 
Third: coordinating the export of oil with a workable 
economic development plan that would encompass the Gulf region 
as a whole. This is the only positive step that would guarantee 
the transformation of the producer countries' temporary affluence, 
which is precariously based on cash liquidity, into a permanent 
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and viable state of prosperity established on a sound and 
developtd economic base. Such a result can be achieved only 
if there is some kind of international agreement whereby the 
West Asian oil producers exchange their oil for mode'-n technology 
and begin to adopt it in their industries., 
Fourth* determing oil prices on the basis of a basket 
of international currencies, instead of just the dollar, so as 
not be at the mercy of the fluctuations in the exchange rate of 
that single currency, nor the inflation rampant in the United 
States and the industrialised countries. To secure the value 
price of oil, the price of a barrel of crude oil must be 
estimated in relation to the increase in the Industrialised 
countries' export prices; i.e. indexation. 
Adopting this method of pricing would ensure the oil 
producers stable returns, as well as enabling consumers to 
predict the future pricing of oilo 
Fifth: the need for the oil producers to establish a 
unified policy within the framework of OPEC, for only then can 
a strong international entity be created which would respond 
to those who claim that there is a 'void* in the area and would 
also remedy the ailments of weakness, dividedness and backwardness 
which afflict the area at present. Unity would also help create 
a coordinated economic format within the framework of a unified 
regional planning system. 
Given political stability in the Nest Asia, the guarantee 
of the oil supply to the West can be realised; threats of 
occupation of the oil wells can only intensify the dangers. 
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Whereas if OPEC is to maintain its long-term role as a 
moderating force in the international political and energy 
system, its Members must immediately adopt measures which, within 
a framework of operational flexibility and progressive change, 
point toward secure supplies and predictable prices. 
In this vein, it would seem the hour is here for the 
Organization to induce its MeirtDers to adopt strict cartel 
practices, so that it can offer the Free World's oil market 
a guaranteed and secure package of some 15-l6m b/d of crude 
oil, for two years, at a reference price of ^ 26-28/b. This 
offer would be made on a 'take it or leave it' basis, with the 
understanding that any failure on the part of the purchaser to 
comply \^ ith the agreed acquisition would result in the automatic 
concellation of any future OPEC supplies to that purchaser. 
This proposal takes into account the fact that oil demand, 
the driving force of the system, is presently stagnant, due to the 
most severe economic contraction to afflict the industrialized 
world in the last 40 years. It also takes into account the fact 
that oil prices have declined 30 percent in the last four years, 
with the consequent worsening of the socio-economic crisis 
afflicting the oil exporting countries - OPEC Members as well as 
non-OPEC countries. Without a doubt, this decline in oil prices 
clearly establishes that there a re other more important reasons 
besides the price of oil to explain the economic contraction in 
countries of the Free World, including those of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
The effects of a package proposal by OPEC - at the level, 
price and period already indicated - are the following! 
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1. it tends to slow down the growth of non-OPEC 
supplies since important oil importing nations, or 
large-scale refiners without their own oil sources, 
will not take the risk of losing OPEC supplies; 
2. it helps to generate increased cooperation and 
greater sense of mutual interdependence amongst 
member OPEC countries against outside power 
pressures; 
3. it helps to stabilize prices, since no other 
supplier will give in to the temptation of selling 
at lower prices; 
4. it helps the strategy by finding a just and 
acceptable solution to the Palestine problem, 
stablilizing the area whereby guaranteeing a 
smooth oil supplies to the industrialized world; 
5. it ends the uncertainty of Member Countries with 
respect to their ability to obtain petro-dollars 
from the sale of their production; and 
6o it neutralizes inter-OPEC competition for markets 
or clients. 
Even more important, this proposal establishes a stable 
basis from which to begin a progressive rise in prices, as oil 
demand increases step-by-step over the original level of 15-16m 
b/d, or as OPEC's offer is increased. In the medium-term, this 
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would bring about a reversal of the cascade effect, prevalent 
during the last few years, which has undermine the Organization, 
To carry out a package proposal by OPEC it would be 
necessary to organise, within or outside of the Oxrganization's 
Secretariat, whichever is more convenient, a co-ordinating unit 
for the marketing of OPEC oil. Such a unit should encourage 
direct participation by the international marketing departments 
of each OPEC national oil company. Another option for 
consideration would be a single agency for the international 
marketing of OPEC oil, such as the one mentioned at the recent 
meeting of OPEC's Ministers in Vienna, in July 1985. 
All the actions or measures recommended here are 
necessary. None is sufficient by itself. The derive from 
concurrent approaches and thus they complement each other. 
Taken as a whole, they open new paths to strengthen the 
Organization an^ to restore confidence in OPEC as a moderating 
force in the international energy system. 
With political determination on the part of the 
Organization's Member Countries, current trends can be reversed 
so that they do not become an inevitable destiny. This 
reversal is essential for OPEC to have a future for itself 
and for the world at large. 
APPENDICES 
CHAPTER - I 
APPENDIX - I 
ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIVE 
Article 1 
The Organization of the Petroleiun Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), hereinafter referred to as "the Organization"# created as 
a permanent intergovernmental organization in conformity with the 
Resolutions of the Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, 
held in Baghdad from September 10 to 14, 1960, shall carry out its 
functions in accordance with the provisions set forth hereunder. 
Article 2 
A. The principal aim of the Organization shall be the co 
ordination and unification of the petroleum policies of iiimber 
Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding 
their interests, individually and collectively, 
B. The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring 
the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a 
view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations, 
C. Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests 
of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady 
income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return 
on their capital to those investing in the Petroleum industry. 
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Article 3 
The Organization shall be guided by the principle of the 
sovereign equality of its Member Countries. Member Coiintries shall 
fulfil, in good faith» the obligations assumed by them in accordance 
with this Statute, 
Article 4 
Jf, as a result of the application of any decision of the 
Organization, sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by 
any interested con5>any or cotnpanies against one or more Member 
Countries, no other Member shall accept any o ^ o r of a beneficial 
treatment, whether in the form of an increase in oil exports or in 
an improvement in ptices, which may be made to it by such interested 
company or companies with the intention of discouraging the 
application of the decision of the Organization, 
Article 5 
The Organization shall have its headquarters at the place 
the Conference decides upon. 
Article 6 
English shall be the official language of the Organization, 
CHAPTER ~ II t MEMBERSHIP 
Article 7 
A, Pounder Members of the Organization are those countries 
which were represented at the First Conference, held in Baghdad, and 
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which signed the original agreement of the establishment of the 
Organisation. 
B. Full Members shall be the Founder Members as well as 
those countries whose application for membership has been accepted 
by the Conference, 
C. Any other country with a substantial net export of crude 
petroleum, whichhas fundamentally similar interests to those of 
Member ^-ountries# may become a Full Member of the Organization, if 
accepted by a majority of three-fourths of Pull Members including 
the concurrent vote of all Founder Members, 
D. A net petroleum-exporting country which does not qualify 
for membership under paragraph G above may nevertheless be admitted 
as an Associate Member by the Conference under such special 
conditions as may be prescribed by the Conference, if accepted by 
a majority of three-fourths, including the concurrent vote of all 
Founder Members, 
No country may be admitted to Associate Membership which 
does not fundamentally have interests and aims similar to those of 
Member Countries, 
E. Associate Members may be invited by the Conference to 
attend any meeting of a Conference, the Board of Governors or 
Consultative Meetings, and to participate in their deliberations 
without the right tu vote. They are, however, fully entitled to 
benefit from all general facilities of the Secretariat, including 
its publications and library, as any Full Member. 
OPEC ORGANIZATIONAL SET UP. 
Map No, 4 
Source: Based on OPEC at a Glance 
Piobllshed by OPEC Secretariat, Vienna, Austria, 1983, 
Article 11 
A. The Conference shall consist of delegations representing 
the Member Countries, A delegation may consist of one or more 
delegates, as well as advisers and observers. When a delegation 
consists of more than one person, the appointing country shall 
nominate one person as the Head of the Delegation, 
B. Each Member Country should be represented at all 
Conference^; however, a quorum of three-quarters of Member Countries 
shall be necessary for holding a Conference, 
C. Each Full Member c&untry shall have one vote. All 
decisions of the Conference* other than on procedural matters, shall 
require the unanimous agreement of all Pull Members, 
The Conference Resolutions shall become effective after 
thirty days from the conclusion of the Meeting or after such period 
as the Conference may decide unless, within the said period, the 
Secretariat receives notification from Member Countries to the 
contrary. 
In the case of a Pull Member being absent fzrom the Meeting 
of the Conference, the Resolutions of the Conference shall become 
effective unless the Secretariat receives a notification to the 
contrary from the said Member at least ten days before the date 
fixed for publication of the Resolutions, 
D. A non-Member country may be invited to attend a Conference 
as Observer, if the Conference so decides. 
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p. Whenever the words "Members" or "Meaiber Countries* 
occur In this Statute, they mean a Pull Member of the Organization 
unless the context demonstrates to the contrary. • 
Article 8 
A. No Member of the Organization may withdraw from 
membership without giving notice of its intention to do so to the 
Conference, Such notice shall take effect at the beginning of the 
next calendar year after the date of its receipt by the Conference,/ 
subject to the Member having at that time fulfilled all financial 
obligations arising out of its membership. 
B. In the event of any country having ceased to be a 
Member of the Organization, its readmlssion to membership shall 
be made in accordance with Article 7, paragraph C. 
CH'jr^ TER III I ORGANS* 
Article 9 
The Organization shall have three organsi 
i. The Conference; 
11. The Board of Governors; and 
ill. The Secretariat 
1. The Conference 
Article 10 
The Conference shall be the supireme authority of the 
Organization, 
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Airticle 15 
The Conference shall hold two ordinary meetings a year. 
However, an extraordinary meeting of the Conference may be 
convened at the the request of a Member Country by the Secretary 
General* after consultation with the President and approval by a 
simple majority of the Member Countries. In the absence of 
unanimity among Member Countries approving the convening of such 
a meeting, as to the date and venue of the meeting, they shall be 
fixed by the Secretary General in consultation with the Presidento 
Article 13 
The Conference shall normally be held at the headquarters 
of the Organization, but it may meet in any of the Member Countries, 
or elsewhere as may be advisable. 
Article 14 
A. The Conference shall elect a President and an Aitemate 
President at its first Preliminary Meeting. The Aitemate 
President shall exercise the responsibilities of the President 
during his absence or when he is unable to carry out his 
responsibil1tie s• 
B. The President shall hold office for the duritlon of 
the Meeting of the Conference, and shall retain the title until 
the next Meeting. 
C. The Secretary General shall be the Secretary of the 
Conference, 
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Airticle 15 
The Conference shall-' 
1. formulate the general policy of the Organization and 
determine the appropriate ways and means of its 
implementation; 
2. decide upon any application for membership of the 
Organization; 
3. confirm the appointment of Members of the Board of 
Governors; 
4. direct the Board of Governors to submit reports or 
make recommendations on any matters of interest 
to the Organization; 
5. consider, or decide upon, the reports and 
recommendations submitted by the Board of Governors 
on the affairs of the Organization. 
6. consider and decide upon the Budget of the 
Organization as submitted by the Board of Governors; 
7. consider and decide upon the statement of accounts 
and the Auditor's Report, as sxibmitted by the Board 
of GQvemors; 
8. call a consultative Meeting for such Member Countries, 
for such purposes and in such places as the Conference 
deems fit; 
9. approve any amendments to this Statute^ 
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10, appoint the Chairman of the Board of Governors 
and an Alternate Chairman; 
11, appoint the Secretary General; 
12, appoint the Deputy Secretary General; and 
l3o appoint the Auditor of the Organization for a 
duration of one year. 
Article 16 
All matters that are not expressly assigned to other 
organs of the Organization shall fall within the competence of 
the Conference, 
II. The Board of Governors 
Article 17 
A, The Board of Governors shall be composed of governors 
nominated by the Member Countries and confirmed by the 
Conference. 
B, Each Member of the Organization should be represented 
at all meetings of the Board of Governors; however, 
a quorum of two thirds shall be necessary for the 
holding of a meeting. 
C, When, for any reason, a Governor is prevented from 
attending a meeting of the Board of Governors, a 
substitute and hoc Governor shall be nominated by the 
corresponding Member Country, Such nomination shall 
not require confirmation by the Conference. At the 
meetings which he attends the ad hoc Governor shall 
have the same status as the other Governors, except 
as regards qualifications for chairmanship of the Board 
Qf Governors. 
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D. Each Governor shall have one vote. A simple majority 
vote of attending Governors shall be required for 
decisions of the Board of Governors. 
E. The term of office of each Governor shall be two 
years. 
Article 18 
A. The Board of Governors shall meet no less than twice 
each year, at suitable intervals to be determined by 
the Chairman of the Board, after consultation with the 
Secretary General. 
B. An exti^rdinary meeting of the Board of Governors 
may be convened at the request of the Chairman of 
the Board, the Secretary General or two-third of the 
Governors. 
Article 19 
The meetings of the Board of Governors shall normally be 
held at the headquarters of the Organization, but they may also 
be held in any of the Member Countries, or elsewhere as may be 
advisable. 
Article 20 
The Board of Governors shall: 
1. direct the management of the affairs of the 
Organisation and the implementation of the 
decisions of the Conference; 
2. consider and decide upon any reports submitted by 
the Secretary General; 
3. submit reports and make recommendations to the 
Conference on the affairs of the Organization; 
4. draw up the Budget of the Organization for each 
calendar year and submit it to the Conference for 
approval; 
5. nominate the Auditor of the Organization for a duration 
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of one year; 
6. consider the Statement of Accounts and the Auditor's 
Report and sufenit them to the Conference for approval; 
7. approve the appointment of Directors of Divisions an3 
Heads of Departments, upon nomination by the Member 
Countries, due consideration being given to the 
recommendations of the Secretary General; 
8. convene an extraordinary meeting of the Conference; 
9. nominate a Deputy Secretary General for appointment 
by the Conference; and 
lOo prepare the Agenda for the Conference, 
Article 21 
The Chairman of the Board of Governors and the Alternate 
Chairman, who shall assume all the responsibilities oi: the Chairman 
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whenever the Chairman is absent or unable to exercise his 
responsibilities, shall be appointed by the Conference from among 
the Governors for a period of one year# in accordance with the 
principle of alphabetical rotation. The date of membership in 
the Organization, however, shall take precedence over the 
principle of alphabetical rotation. 
Article 22 
The Chairman of the Board of Governors shall» 
1, preside over the meetings of tl^ Board of Governors; 
2, attend the headquarters of the Organization in 
preparation for each meeting of the Board of Governors; 
and 
3, represent the Board of Governors at Conferences and 
consultative meetings. 
Article 23 
Should a majority of two-thirds of Governors decide that 
the continuance of membership of any Governor is detrimental to 
the interests of the Organization, the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors shall immediately communicate this decision to the 
Member Coxintry affected, who in turn shall norminate a substitute 
for the said Governor before the next meeting of the Board of 
Governors, The nomination or such substitute as a Governor shall 
be subject to confirmation by the following Conference, 
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Airticle 15 
Should a Governor, for any reason, he precluded from 
continuing in the performance of his functions on the Board of 
Governors, the corresponding Member Country shall nominate a 
replacement. The nominated Governor shall assume his functions 
upon nomination subject to confirmation by the following Conference. 
III. The Secretariat 
Article 25 
The Secretariat shall carry out the executive funtions 
of the Organization in accordance v;ith the provisions of this 
Statute under the direction of the Board of Governors. 
Article 26 
The Secretariat of the Organization shall consist of the 
Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General and such staff as 
may be required, it shall function at the h« adquarters of the 
Oirganisation. 
Article 27 
A, The Secretary General shall be the legally authorized 
representative of the Organization. 
B. The Secretary General shall be the chief officer of 
the Secretariat, and in that capacity shall have the 
authority to direct the affairs of the Organization, 
in accordance with directions of the Board of Governors. 
Article 28 
A The Conference shall appoint the Secretary General for 
a period of three years, which term of office may be 
renewed once for the same period of time. This 
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appointment shall take place upon nomination by Member Countries 
and after a comparative study of the nominees' qualifications. 
The minimum personal requirements for the position of the 
Secretary General shall be as follows* 
a) 35 years of age, 
b) A degree from a recognized university in Law, Economics, 
Science, Engineering or Business Administration, 
c) 15 years experience, of which at least 10 years should 
have been spent in positions directly related to the 
oil Industry, and 5 years in highly responsible 
executive or managerial positions. Experience in 
Government-Company relations and in the international 
aspects of the oil industry is desirable. 
Should, in any case, a unanimous decision not be obtained, 
the Secretary General, in that case, siaJ.J. be appointed on 
rotation basis for a term of two years without prejudice to the 
required qualifications, 
B, The Secretary General shall be a national of one of 
the Member Countries of the Organization. 
C, The Secretary General shall reside at the headquarters 
of the Organization, 
D, The Secretary General shall be responsible to the Board 
of Governors for all activities of the Secretariat, The 
functions of the different departments shall be carried 
out on his behalf and under his authority and direction. 
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E, The Secretary General shall.attend all mefetings of 
the Board of Governors, 
Article 29 
The Secretary General shall: 
1. organize and administer the work of the Organization; 
2. ensure that the functions and duties as<=!igned to 
the different departments of the Secretariat are 
carried out; 
3. prepare reports for submission to each meeting of the 
Board of Governors concerning matters which call for 
consideration and decision, 
4. inform the Chairman and other Members of the Board 
of Governors of all activities of the Secretariat, of 
all studies undertaken and of the progress of the 
in^lementation of the Resolutions of the Conference; 
and^ 
5. ensure the due performance of the duties v/hich may be 
assigned to the Secretariat by the Conference or the 
Board of Governors. 
Article 30 
A. The Deputy Secretary General shall be selected by the 
Board of Governors from amongst the highly-qualified 
and experienced national candidates put forward by the 
Member Countries, for appointment by the Conference 
by a vote of two-thirds of Pull Members including the 
concurrent vote of at least three Founder Members, 
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B. The term of service of the Deputy Secretary General 
shall be for a period of three years. It may be 
extended for a period of one year or more, at the 
suggestion of the Board of Governors and the approval 
of the Conference, 
C. The Deputy Secretary General shall reside permanently 
at the headquarters of the Organization, 
D. The Deputy Secretary General shall be responsible to 
the Secretary General for the coordination of the 
research and administrative activities of the 
Secretariat, The functions of the different 
departments are exercised under the general 
supervision of the Deputy Secretary General. 
E. The Secretary General may delegate some of his 
authority to the Deputy Secretary General. 
F. The Deputy Secretary General shall act for the 
Secretary General, whenever the latter is absent 
from headquarters. 
Article 31 
A* The Directors of Divisions and Heads of Departments 
shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the 
approval of the Board of Governors. 
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B, Officers of the Secretariat, upon nomination by their 
respective Governments/ or by direct recruitment* shall 
be appointed by the Secretary General in accordance 
with the Staff Regulations. In making such 
appointments, the Secretary General shall give due 
consideration, as far as possible, to an equtable 
nationality distribution among Members, but such 
consideration shall not be allowed to impair the 
efficiency of the Secretariat, 
Article 32 
The staff of the Secretariat are international enployees 
with an exclusively international character. In the performance 
of their duties, they shall neither seek nor accept instructions 
from any government or from any other authority outside the 
Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might 
reflect on their position as international employees and they 
shall undertake to carry out their duties with the sole object 
of bearing the interests of the Organization in mind. 
Article 33 
1, The Secretary General shall be assisted in the 
discharge of his duties by the Deputy Secretary 
General, a Division of Research, a Personnel and 
ASministration Department, a Public Information 
Department, a News Agency, any division or department 
the Conference may see fit to create and his own Office. 
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2, The OPEC News Agency (OPECNA) shall be a special 
Unit responsible for collecting, producing and 
disseminating news of general interest regarding the 
Organization and the Member Countries and on energy 
and related matters. 
3, The Office of the Secretary General shall provide him 
with executive assistance, particularly in carrying out 
contacts with governments, organizations and delegations; 
* 
in matters of protocol; in the preparation for, and 
coordination of meeting; and other duties assigned by 
the Secretary General. 
4, NotwithstSinding the provisions of Article 34, and where 
the efficient functioning of the divisions and 
departments of the Secretariat so requires, the Board 
of Governors may, upon the recommendation of the 
Secretary General, authorize the Secretary General 
to transfer functions or minor units from one division 
or department to another. 
Article 34 
A. The Division of Research shall be responsible fori 
1» conducting a continuous programme of research fulfill-
ing the needs of the Organization, placing particular 
emphasis on energy and related matters; 
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2. monitoring, forecasting and analysiing developments 
in the energy and petrochemical industries; and the 
evaluation of hydrocarbons and products and their 
non-energy uses; 
3. analysing economic and financial issues of significant 
interest, in particular those related to international 
financial and monetary matters, and to the 
international petroleum industry; and 
4. maintaining and expanding data services to support 
the research activities of the Secretariat and those 
of Member Countries. 
B. The Personnel and Administration Department shall; 
1, be responsible for all organization methods, the 
provision of administrative services for all meetings, 
personnel matters, budgets, accounting and internal 
control; 
2, study and review general administrative policies and 
industrial relations methods used in the oil industry 
in Member and other countries, and advise Member 
Counntries of any possible inprovements; and 
3, keep abreast of the current administrative policies 
and/or policy changes occurring in the international 
petroleum industry which might affect the Organization 
or be of interest to it. 
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C, The Public information Depairtnent shall be 
responsible for: 
1. presenting OPEC objectives* decisions and actions in 
their true and most desireable perspective; 
2. carrying out a central public information programme 
and identifying suitable areas for the promotion of 
the Organization's aims; and 
3. the production and distribution of publications and 
other materials. 
Article 35 
A, The Secretary General shall commission consultants, as 
necessary* to advise on special matters or to 
conduct expert studies when such work cannot be 
undertaken by the Secretariat. 
B, The Secretary General may engage such specialists or 
experts, regardless of nationality, as the 
Organization needs, for a period to be approved by 
the Board of Governors, provided there is a 
provision for such appointment In the Budget, 
C, The Secretary General may at any tlnae convene 
working Parties to carry out any studies on specific 
subjects of Interest to the Member Countries, 
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CHAPTER IV I Consultative Meetings and Specialized Organs 
Article 36 
A Consultative Meeting shall be composed of Heads 
of Delegations of Member Countries or their 
representative. 
B. In case a Conference is not in session, a Consultative 
Meeting may be convened at any time at the request 
of the President of the Conference. 
C. The Agenda of each Consultative Meeting shall be 
prepared by the President of the Conference, unless 
it has been previously specified by the Conference 
itself. 
D. The Consultative Meeting may pass decisions or 
recommendations to be approved by the next Conference 
unless otherwise authorized by a previous Conference, 
Article 37 
A. The Conference may establish specialized organs, as 
cijrcumstances require, in order to assist in resolving 
certain problems of particular inportance. The 
specialized organs shall function in accordance with 
the Resolutions or Statutes prepared to that effect. 
B. The specialized organs shall operate within the general 
framework of the Secretariat of the Organization, both 
fujictionally and financially. 
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C. The specialized organs shall act at all times in 
accordance with the principles of the Organization, 
as set out in the Resolutions of the Conference, 
CHAPTER V : Financial Provisions 
Article 38 
A, The Budget of the Organization shall be drawn up for 
each calendar year. 
B, The Conference, in accepting any Associate Member to 
the Organization, shall ask it to pay a fixed annual 
subscription to -.be considered as its financial 
contribution to the Organization. 
C, Budget appropriations shall be apportioned on an equal 
basis among all Member Countries, after taking into 
consideration the annual subscriptions of the Associate 
Members. 
Article 39 
A. Each Member Country shall bear all expenses incurred 
in sending delegations or representatives to 
Conferences, Consultative Meetings and Working Parties. 
B, The Organization shall bear the travelling expenses and 
remuneration of the Governors who attend the meetings 
of the Board of Governors. 
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CHAPTER VI I Additional Provisions 
Article 40 
Amendments to this Status may be proposed by any 
Member Country, such proposed amendments shall be considered 
by the .Eoa-cdv of Governors which, if it so decides, shall 
recommend their adoption to the Conference to the Conference, 
Article 41 
All Resolutions contraiTf to the context of this Statute 
shall be abrogated. 
Article 42 
This Statute shall be applied from the 1st May 1965, 
Reproduced from Statute of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporing Countries, published by the Secretariat, 
Obere Donaustrasse, Vienna, July 1983, 
CHAPTER - II 
APPENDIX-T 
Document 
EEC Statement on Energy - The text of the statement on energy 
by the summit meeting of the European Economic community In 
Copenhagen on 15 December is as followst 
"The heads of state or government considered that the 
situation produced by the energy crisis is a threat to the World 
Economy as a whole, affecting not only developed but also developing 
countties. A prolonged scarcity of energy resources would have 
grave effects on production, employment and balances of payments 
within the community. The heads of state or government therefore 
agreed on the necessity for the community taking immediate and 
effective action along the following lines. 
The Council should adopt at its session of December 17-18, 
1973, the community instruments which will enable the commission 
to establish by January 15, 1974 comprehensive energy balance 
sheets covering all relevant aspects of the energy situation within 
the community. 
The commission should on this basis proceed to examine all 
present or foreseeable repercussions of the energy supply situation 
on production, employment, prices and balances of payments, as well 
as on the development of monetary reserves. 
The heads of state or government ask the commission to 
present by 31st January 1974, proposals on which the council will 
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be invited to to decide as quickly as possible and in principle 
before 28th Feb., 1974, to ensure the orderly functioning of the 
common market for energy. 
In this context the commission is asked to submit to the 
Council as quickly as possible for rapid decision proposals 
aimed at resolving in a concerted manner the problems raised by 
the developing energy crisis. For the same reason they asked the 
Council to adopt the provisions to ensure that all member states 
introduce on a concerted and equitable basis measures to limit 
energy consumptions With a view to securing the energy supplies 
of the community, the Council will adopt to comprehnsive community 
programme on alternative sources of energy. This programme will 
be designed to promote a diversification of supplies by developing 
existing resources, accelerating research in new sources of energy 
and creating new capacities of production, notably a European 
capacity for enrichment of uranium, seeking the concerted harmonious 
development of existing projects. 
The heads of state or government confirmed the inportance 
of entering into negotiations with oil producing countries on 
comprehensive arrangements comprising cooperation on a wide scale 
for the economic and industrial development of these countries, 
industrial investments, and stable energy supplies to the member 
countries at reasonable prices^ 
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They furthermore considered it useful to study with other 
oil consuming countries within the framework of the OECD ways of 
dealing with the cotmnon short and long term energy problems of 
consumer countries. 
The Council should establish at its session of 17-18 Dec,^ 
1973, an energy Committee of senior officials which is responsible 
for implementing the energy policy measures adopted by the 
Council," 
OPEC MEMBER COUNTRIES - 1975 
Map NO.5 
+ OPEC Far East- 4 Indonesia 
.+ OPEC Latin ."unerica - 2 ECUADOR; 13 VENEZUELA 
+ OPEC Africa - 1 ALGERIA; 3 GABuN; 9 NIGERIA; LIBYAN AJ + OPEC Middle East - IR 6 IRAQ; 7 KUWAIT; 10 QATAR; 11 SAUDI ARABIA; 12 UAE. 
Source; Based on Facts and Figures, published by: The Secretariat 
OPEC, Vienna, Austria, 1975. 
CHAPTER - III 
AN OPEC STRATEGY FOR COOPERATION AND THE 
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE 
APPENDIX - I 
SOLEMN DECLARATION OF OPEC SUMMIT CONFERENCE 
• 
The Kings and Presidents of the OPEC member countries 
convened in Algiers at the invitation of President of the 
Revolution Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria. 
1. They discussed the current world economic crisis. 
They exchanged views on the causes of this crisis, which has 
been in progress for many years, and studied the measures to be 
taken to safeguard the rights and legitimate interests of their 
peoples within the framework of international solidarity and 
co-operation. 
The Kings and Presidents affirm that international peace 
and progress depend on the mutual respect for the sovereignty 
of the member countries of the world community and on equality 
among them in accordance with the UN Charter. They also affirm 
that the basic statements embodied in this declaration are in 
line with the resolutions of the special sixth session of the 
UN General Assembly on the questions of raw materials and 
development. 
The Kings and Presidents reaffirm the in^ortance of an 
exchange of views among their countires to unite them in a bid 
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to safeguard the rights and legitimate interests of their 
peoples and they once more proclaim their countries right to 
develop their natural resources, to exploit them and fix their 
prices. The right is one of the rights of their sovereignty 
which brooks no argument. The Kings and Presidents reject any 
idea or attempt to infringe these basic rights - ideas and 
attempts which constitute a challenge to their countries' 
sovereignty. 
They stress anew that OPEC member states work for the 
higher interest and progress of the entire world fcommunity, 
through a firm and cohesive collective defence of the legitimate 
rights of its peoples. They are thus proireating the interests of 
the raw material producing developing countries in defence of 
their peoples' legitimate rights. They believe that the nations' 
joint responsibilities with regard to the international economic 
situation demand that more importance be attached to international 
co-operation. 
They declare that they are prepared to contribute to the 
development and stability of the world's economy, as has been 
stated in the declaration and the special action programme to 
establish a new international economic system, a document 
approved by the UN General Assembly at its sixth special session. 
Economic Differences 
2, The Kings and Presidents observe that the current 
international economic crisis is due basically to the great 
differences in the economic and social progress of the various 
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peoples: that these differences, of which the backwardness of 
the developing countries is one feature, is basically the result 
of foreign exploitation which perpetuates these differences. It 
has become more acute with the passing of time in the absence 
of adequate international co-operation for development. This 
situation has led to the accelerated exhaustion of the developing 
countries' natural resources, and this in itself hinders to 
effective transfer of capital and technology and greatly 
disturbs the balance of economic relations. 
They point out that this disturbance which besets the 
current international economic situation has been aggravatcjd 
through a wide-spread inflation. The latter has reduced 
economic growth in general and has contributed to the instability 
of the world monetary system in the absence of adequate contrt>ls. 
They reaffirm that the reasons for this disturbance must 
be sought in the chronic and deep-seated defects which have been 
accximulating for years, such as the advanced countries' general 
tendency to over-consunption and waste of limited resources and 
to the inapporpriate, short-sighted economic policies pursued by 
the industrialised world. 
The Kings and Presidents reject all allegations which 
attribute the responsibility for the present instability in the 
world's economy to the price of oil. The fact is that oil, which 
has made a considerable contribution to the progress and 
prosperity of the industrialised countries in the last quarter of 
this <rentury* is not only the cheapest energy source, but the 
cost of inported oil accounts for only a minute portion of the 
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advanced countries' GNP. The latest adjustment in the price 
of oil has contributed only sUghtly to their high average 
inflation, which is basically due to other causes, whose roots 
are within the economies of the advanced countries. 
This inflation, whichisconsistently being exported to the 
developing countries, has resulted in obstructing their efforts 
in the sphere of development. 
Propaganda Campaign 
3. The Kings and Presidents also condemn the threats 
that have been made, the propaganda campaign and other measures 
taken, culminating in the accusation levelled at the OPEC 
member countries that they wish to undermine the economy of the 
developed countries. These campaigns and measures, which may 
lead to a confrontation, have precluded a clear understanding 
of the existing problems, and have created an atmosphere of 
tension hardly conducive to consultations or cooperation in the 
international sphere. They denounce any attempts by the 
consuming countries to form cartels with a view to a confrontation-
they condemn any plan of strategy aimed at economic of military 
acts of aggression by these or other cartels against any member 
countries of OPEC, 
In view of these threats, the Kings and Presidents once 
more emphasise the solidarity which unites their ranks in defence 
of their peoples' legitimate rights. They declare their readiness 
within the framework of that solidarity, to take immediate and 
effective measures to oppose these threats by adopting a united 
policy whenever this is called for, particularly in the event 
of aggression, 
4, While the Kings and Presidents are careful to respond 
to the legitimate aspirations of their peoples for Exist between 
the national development and progress* they are fully aware of 
the close links that development of their respective countries 
and the economic prosperity of the world as a whole. The 
cooperation between nations has made the Kings and Presidents 
more aware of the difficulties which other peoples have had to 
face and which may affect world stability. In view of this* 
they once more emphasis their support for dialogue, cooperation 
and joint action for finding solutions to the major problems 
facing the world's economy, 
Pronpted by this spirit, the OPEC member countries, 
thanks to the increasing financial resources which have been 
accruing to them for a relatively short period, have constributed 
- both through bilateral and multilateral arrangements - to the 
efforts made for development and for stabilising the balance of 
payments of other developing countries as well as the industrially 
advanced states. The financial aid given by these countries to 
other developing countries during 1974 was, in proportion to 
their GNP many times the volume of the annual average of the 
assistance given by the industrially advanced countries to the 
developing countries in the last development decade. 
In addition to this, the OPEC member countries have 
offered credit facilities to the developed countries to help them 
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meet their balance of payment deficit. Furthermore, the 
/measures taken by the OPEC member countries to speed up their 
economic development and encourage trade among themselves have 
contributed to the expansion of international trade and to 
establishing an equilibrium in the balance of payments of the 
developed countries. 
Oil Vital for Develonment 
5. The Kings and Presidents agree in principle to the 
holding of an international conference between the developing 
and the advanced countries. They believe that the aim of such 
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a conference should be to make concrete progress towards 
alleviating the existing major difficulties in the world's 
economy. That conference should therefore pay .equal attention 
to the problems facing the advanced and the developing countries. 
Consequently, the agenda of that conference should under no 
circumstances be confined to a study of the problem of energy* 
it should clearly cover the questions of the raw materials of 
the developing countries; reform of the international monetary 
system and cooperation for development, with a view to achieving 
world stability. Furthermore, the conference could take place 
on a limited scale so that it can worK efficiently, provided 
that all countries concerned with the problems xinder discussion 
ar« suitably and genuinely represented. 
6. The Kings and Presidents enphasise that the 
exploitation of the oil resources of their respective countries -
which are liable to run out - should be so conducted as to serve 
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primarily and above all the interests of their peoples in the 
best possible manner, proceeding from the fact that oil, which 
represents the major source of income, is a factor vital for 
the development of their countries. 
While they realise the crucial role which oil supplies 
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play in the world's economy, they believe that to conserve the 
resources of oil is a basic requirement for the prosperity of 
the generation to come. Consequently, they urge the pursuit of 
policies aimed at the optimum utilisation of this essential 
resource, which is both finite and non-renewable, 
7, The Kings and Presidents point out that the 
artificially low prices of oil have in the past led to continuous 
exploitation of this limited and exhaustible resource. To per-
severe with that police would lead to disaster, both as regards 
the conservation of this resource and for the world's economy. 
They are of the opinion that the interests of the OPEC member 
countries, as well as those of the r«st of the world, require 
that the price of oil, being the basic source of national 
income of the member countries, should be determined by taking 
into consideration the followingj 
(a) The need to conserve oil, the fact that it is a 
finite resource and its increasing rarity In the future; 
<b) The value of oil, having regard to its utilisation for 
other than energy purposes, 
(c) The facts with regard to alternative energy sources, 
from the point of view of their availability, use and 
cost. 
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The price of oil should, moreover, be stabilised by 
linking it with certain objective criteria, including the 
price of industrial products, the rate of inflation, and the 
conditions of transfer of commodities and technology for the 
development of the OPEC member countries. 
8. The Kings and Presic'ients declare that tteir countries 
are ready to continue to offer positive facilities for the 
solution of the major problems affecting the world's economy, 
and to encourage the consistent cooperation, which is the key 
to the establishment of a new international economic system. 
They propose, with a view to advancing this international 
co-operation, that a number of measures should be taken vis-a-vis 
the other developing and the industrialised countries. In this 
context, they would like to en^jhasise that the measures proposed 
in this declaration constitute a comprehensive programme whose 
provisions must be implemented in full if the goals of justice 
and efficiency are to be achieved. 
Aid to Developing Countries 
9, Once again the Kings and Presidents stress the natural 
solidarity which unites their countries with the other developing 
countries in their struggle to overcome their backwardness. They 
express their deep appreciation of the strong support given by all 
the developing countries to the member countries of OPEC at the 
developing countries' conference on raw materials held in Dakar 
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from 3rd to 8th February 1975. They realise that the developing 
countries suffer worst from the world economic crisis, 
consequently they stress anew their determination to inplement 
measures to strengthen their cooperation with these countries. 
They are also prepared to participate within the limit of their 
resources, in implementing the special international programme 
drawn up by the UN and to give additional special allocations, 
loans and grants to the developing countries. In this connection 
they have agreed to co-ordinate their special programme for 
financial cooperation to aid the worst-hit developing countries 
in the best possible manner, especially to help them overcome 
their balance-of-payments difficulties. They have also agreed 
to co-ordinate these financial measures with long-term loans for 
the development of the economies of these countries. 
To help improve the use of the agricultural potentials 
of the developing countries, the Kings and Presidents have 
decided to encourage the production of fertilisers and to 
provide the latter at favourable terms to the countries which 
have been badly affected by the economic crisis. They stress 
their readiness to cooperate with the other raw material exporting 
developing countries in their efforts to obtain a fair price for 
their exports, 
10, As a contribution to alleviating the difficulties 
affecUng the economies of the advanced countries, the Kings 
and Presidents declare that the OPEC member countries will 
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continue to make special efforts in respect of the needs of 
the advanced countries. 
AS for oil supplies, they reiterate their countries' 
readiness to guarantee sufficient supplies to meet the vital 
needs of the eccncmies of the advanced countries/ provided that 
the consumer countries do not erect artificial barriers to 
distort the natural functioning of the laws of supply and demand. 
In furtherance of this aim (of guaranteeing supplies), the OPEC 
member countries will establish close co-operation and 
co-ordination among themselves so as to preserve a balance 
between oil production and the needs of the world's market. 
As to oil prices, the Kings and Presidents point out 
that despite the apparent huge increase in these prices, the 
high rate of inflation and the deterioration of the value of 
currency have wiped out a large paxrt of the real value of the 
prices following their adjustment. The current price falls 
noticeably below that which would have resulted from the 
development of alternative sources of energy, 
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However, they are ready to discuss conditions for the 
stabilisation of oil prices - a matter which will help the 
consumer countries introduce the necessary changes in their 
economies. 
The Kings and Heads of State, motivated by a spirit of 
dialogue and cooperation, stress that the OPEC member states are 
prepared to negotiate with the advanced countries which have 
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suffered most, bilaterally or through international organisation, 
with a view to the provision of financial facilities that would 
enable the economies of these countries to develop while 
guaranteeing the value of the deposits of the OPEC members states 
as well as their cooperation. 
UN Programme of Action 
11. The Kings and Presidents, while maintaining that any 
genuine international co-operation must benefit all the 
developing and advanced countries alike, declare that in return 
for the efforts, guarantees and commitments that the OPEC member 
states are willing to undertake, the advanced countries must 
contribute to the progress and development of the developing 
countries by taking specific steps. Particularly with a view 
to achieving economic and monetary stability and giving 
appropriate attention to the interests of the developing 
countries. 
In this connection, they underline the need for the full 
implementation of the programme of action approved by the UN 
General Assembly at its sixth special session. Accordingly, they 
stress the following prerequisites! 
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(a) The advanced countries should support the measures 
adopted by the developing countries with the aim of 
stabilising the prices of their exports of raw 
materials and other essential commodities at fair and 
satisfactory levels. 
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(b) the advanced countries should honour their international 
commitments arising out of the second UN development 
decade as a minimum contribution which could be 
increased, in particular by the most advanced states, 
for the benefit of the developing states which have 
suffered most, 
(c) To draw up and implement an effective food programme 
under which the advanced states, particularly the 
major food-producing and exporting states, will give 
grants and aid to the most needy developing states in 
relation to their foodstuff and agricultural require-
ments, 
(d) To speed up operations to effect the development of 
developing states, particularly by using modem 
technology efficiently and quickly and by eliminating 
obstacles in the way of the application and development 
of technology in the service of the economy of our 
countries. 
In view of the fact that in several instances obstacles to 
development arise from the inadequate and unsuitable transmission 
Of technology, the Kings and Presidents attach the greatest 
inportance to the transmission of technology, which they regard 
as a big test of the degree of commitment on the part of the 
advanced countries to the principle of international cooperation 
in the interest of development. 
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The transmission of technology should not be based on a 
division of labour whereby the developing states would produce 
commodities of inferior technological standard. All efficient 
transmission of technology should help tl^ developing countries 
to overcome the technological backwardness characterising their 
economies by means of manufacturing products of high technological 
standard themseleves, particularly in relation to the development 
and processing of their natural resources. 
As regards exhaustible natural resources, such as the 
oil of the OPEC member states, it is vital that the rate of the 
transmission of technology should keep pace as far as possible 
with the mean rate of exploitation, which is now being stepped 
up in the interest of the economy and progress of the advanced 
countries. 
A large proportion of the planned or new petrochemical 
complexes, oil refineries and fertiliser factories should be 
built in the territory of the OPEC member states in co-operation 
with the industrial states for the purpose of exporting to the 
advanced coxintries and guaranteeing that these products will 
reach the markets of these countries. 
There should be sufficient protection against reduction 
in the value of the external reserves of the OPEC member states 
as well SB guarantees of the security of their investments in the 
advanced countries. 
Furthermore, the Kings and Presidents consider it essential 
for the advanced countries to open their markets not only to oil 
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and other primary products, but also to goods manufactured by 
the developing countries and to regard the discriminatory 
methods adopted against the developing countries, including the 
members of OPEC, as being in conflict with the spirit of 
co-operation and partnership. 
Monetary Reform 
12. The Kings and President note the current disruption 
of the international monetary system and the absence of normc and 
documents needed to protect trade exchanges and the value of the 
financial assets of the developing countries. They stress in 
particular the constant need for the adoption of measures to 
safeguard the legitimate interests of the developing countries. 
They also stress that the mobilisation of the financial 
resources of the OPEC member countries and the advanced 
countries and the technical capabilities of these countries for 
aiding the developing countries will greatly help in solving the 
international economic crisis. They stress the need for 
fundamental and urgent measures to remedy the international 
monetary system, with a veiw to stregthening the mechanisms for 
expanding trade, developing production resources and ensuring a 
balanced growth of the world economy. 
They note that the steps taken so far to rfdress the 
international monetary system have failed because these initiatives 
did not aim at removing the injustice inherent in the structure 
of that system. 
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The power of taking decisions which afiect the value 
of currency reserves and of the Special Drawing Rights, the 
price of gold and the role of gold in the international 
monetary system must not continue to rest with one side and 
must not be negotiated by the advanced countries alone. It is 
essential that the advanced countries contribute to a genuine 
reform of the world monetary and international financial systems 
and that they ensure fair representation for all developing 
countries and safeguard their interests. 
The reform of the currency and financial systems should 
allow for an ample increase in the share of the developing 
countries in the making of decisions, and in controlling and 
participating in the spirit of community of interest in world 
development and on an equal footing. The Kings and Presidents 
have therefore decided to set up machinery for consultation and 
co-oraiticiilon their coxmtries within th© framework of their 
solidarity in order to promote a true reform of the international 
currency and financial systems, 
OPEC Coordination 
13o The Kings and Presidents attach the utmost inportance 
to the strengthening of OPEC, especially in coordinating the 
activies of the national oil companies within the framework of 
the Organisation and the Organization's role in the world's 
economy. They consider that there are specific tasks of the 
utmost importance to be implemented. These require co-ordinated 
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planning among their countries and the co-ordination of their 
policies in the sphere of oil production, conservation, pricing 
and marketing - as well as in all financial matters of common 
interest. Coordinated planning and economic cooperation among 
the member countries would aid the world's development and 
stability. 
14. The Kings and Presidents wish to voice their deep 
anxiety about the current world economic crisis, which is a 
threat to stability and peace. At the same time they realise 
that the crisis has generated an awareness of problems, the 
solution of which will contribute to the security and prosperity 
of all mankind. 
Aware of the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world 
and anxious to promote the settlement of the major problems 
affecting their life, the Kings and Presidents declare that they 
have agreed that their states shall inclement measures designed 
to usher in a new chapter in International cooperation. 
The advanced countries, which possess most of the 
instruments of progress, prosperity, and peace, as well as most 
of the instiniments of destruction, should respond to the 
initiatives of the developing countries with similar initiatives, 
seizing the historic opportunity made available as a result of 
this critical situation to open a new chapter in the relations 
among peoples. This would alleviate the distress resulting from 
the disturbance in the relation of those who possess the elements 
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of power and the accompanying atmosphere of instability resulting 
from the prevailing chaos in the world economies. It would open 
the door to confidence and peace and promote an atmosphere of 
true international cooperation which would be most advantageous 
to the developing countries and to which these countries would 
contribute with their gigantic resources, 
/ 
Whereas man's genius has provided people with scientific 
and technological progress and great means of overcoming the 
hazards of nature and effecting significant changes for the 
better, the future of mankind ultimately depends exclusively on 
mankind's ability to mobilise its creative power and work for the 
good of all and in the Interest of all human beings. 
The Kings and Presidents of the OPEC member states 
express their deep faith in the ability of all peoples to set 
up a new economic system based on justice and fraternity to 
enable the world of tomorrow, to assure progress for everyone or) 
an equal footing in a spirit of co-operation, stability and 
peace. They therefore address this warm appeal to the governments 
of the world's other states and officially pledge to provide the 
full support of their peoples towards achieving this objective. 
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APPENDIX •• I 
NOTES:-
The Straits of Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz 
are two international straits where one or more of the Middle 
Eastern States are coastal States, The two straits, each in turn, 
and the practice of the Middle Eastern States concerned in 
relation to them, will therefore be examined here. 
it 
The Straits of Bab..El-Mandeb, In a study of straits which 
constitute routes for international maritime traffic. Commander 
R.H, Kennedy describes the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb in a 
statement which is necessary to quote at some length: 
1. These Straits join the high seas of the Gulf of Aden to those 
of the Red Sea and form part of the international route from 
the Mediterranean to the Far East, The name is strictly applied 
to the waters lying between Ras Bab el-Mandeb and Ras Si Ane about 
1472 miles south-westward and comprising the large Strait between 
that island and Arabia, Large Strait is about 9V4 miles wide and 
Small Strait about 1^ /2 miles in breadth. For the purpose of this 
study, however, the water area in the vicinity less than 26 miles 
wide will be considered. This extends from Mokha in the north to 
a position about 20 miles eastward of Ras Bab el Mandeb, a 
distance of approximately 50 miles. 
2, The following iJtates border these Straits: 
On the south-west, Ethiopia and French Somaliland (since 
1968 known as Territoire Francais des Afars et des Issas - French 
Territory of Afars and Issas; now the independent Republic of 
Djibouti). On the north-east, Yemen (Arab Republic) and Aden 
Protectorate (nov; the independent People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen). 
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3, (a) The length of tht: Straits may be considered as 50 miles, 
(b) The general width of the Straits is 19V2 miles but this 
width is restricted over a distance of about seven miles 
both by the peninsula of which Ras Bab el Mandeb forms the 
southern end on the northern side, and by Perim Island, 
which divides the main Strait into two - Large Strait and 
Small Strait. 
(c)Small Strait between Perim Island and Ras Bab el Mandeb 
is about three miles long and varies in width from about 
three miles to one-and-a-half miles, 
(d)Large Strait between Perim Islan and the African coast is 
about 10 miles long with a general width of about 10V2 
miles. The narrowest part is 9V4 miles wide between the 
southern end of Perim Island and Jezirate Seba, a group 
of six islands extending about six miles from the African 
coast and south-south-westward of Perim Island, 
4, The whole Strait, with the exception of Small Strait, 
throughout its length of about 50 miles, is deep water varying 
from about 100 fathoms or more in the middle to approximately 
three to six fathoms close off the coastal teefs. There are 
no navigational changes throughout its length. Small Strait 
has depths varying from 12 to 15V2 fathoms and is free from 
changes in the fairway. Tidal streams are, however, strong 
and irregular, and, as many casualities have occurred there, 
the use of Large Strait is recommended. 
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5. In addition to Perim Island and Jezirat Seba, described above 
the only island in the area is Tumerra, the outer edge of 
which lies about a mile from the African coast and about 14 
miles west-noith-westward of Perim Island. 
There a'-e no ports within the area. 
6. Navigation is possible on both sides of median line drawn 
through the main Strait and through Large and Small Straits, 
The narrower part of the Straits of Bab el-M.mdeb lies 
wholly v/ithin the territorial seas of Democratic Yemen and the 
x^epublic of Djibouti. Each claims a twelve-mile territorial 
sea. However, since the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb join the high 
seas of the Gulf of Aden to those of the Rtd Sea and are actually 
used for international navigation by foreign vessels, according 
to customary law the right of innocent passage through these 
Straits cannot be suspended. This is in accordance with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu 
Channel case, 1949, which is reaffirmed in Article 6 (4) of the 
1958 Territorial 3ea Convention referred to above. It may be 
further observed that at the Third Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, Democratic Yemen has already expressed its opposition to, 
while France, which formerly controlled the Territory of Afars and 
Issas (now Djibouti), has spoken in favour of, the principle of 
•transit passage' through straits linking part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone, such as the Straits of Bab el-
Manadeb. Besides, the French Law 71-1060 of 24 December 1971, 
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which extended the territorial sea of Prance and its overseas 
territories to twelve nautical miles, provides in Article 3 that 
when the distance between the French baselines and those of an 
opposite foreign State no longer allows the existence of a zone of 
high seas adeq\iate for navigation, if need be and after agreement 
has been reached with the States concerned, a navigation zone in 
which the principle of freedom of the high seas, and not the more 
restricted right of innocent passage, is to be applied may be 
reserved. 
When the Yemen Arab Reptiblic extended its territorial seas 
to twelve miles in 1967, fears were expressed in the House of Lords 
that the government of Yemen might interfere with the islands of 
Kamaran and Perim, discussed below, and with ships passing through 
the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb. The then Under-Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Beswick, told the House that* ... Her 
Majesty's Government WJLH take any action necessary to prevent 
interference by the Yemen authorities with islands of Kamaran and 
Perim*. He also said* 
the fact is that the extension of any territorial waters cannot 
affect the status of islands which belong to or are dependencies of 
another country and which are within the additional areas of sea 
now claimed. So far as access to the Red Sea is concerned, this is 
guranteed by international Convention, and we shall seek to ensure 
that that Convention is observedJ 
Until 1971 there had been no interference with ships passing 
through the straits. The first incident, however, took place on 
11 June of that year, when a Liberian-flag tanker, the Coral Sea, 
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chartered by Israel/ was fired on from an unmarked launch. Bazooka 
shells ripped three holes in the ship but failed to ignite the 
30,000 tons of crude oil. 
During the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973, reports 
were published that the govemirie-nt of Democratic Yemen had announced 
u blockade of the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb against ships sailing 
under thi. Israeli flag, operated by Isr.-ieli companies, or bound for 
Israel, an:^. declartd the straits a 'war' zone. It has been reported 
also that during the Arab summit meeting at Rabat in October 1974 
Egypt concluded an agreement with Democratic Yemen for the lease 
of the strategic island of Perim as a naval base to enable her to 
blockage the Israeli port of Eilat, This, however, was denied by 
the government of Democratic Yemen, which in an announcement also 
stated that 'the so-called lease of the island (of Perim), was 
not a subject for debate by anyone at the Seventh Arab Summit 
Conference in Rabat, 
The Strait of Hormuz - The Strait of Horniuz joins the high sees 
2 * 
of the Arabian Gulf to those of the Gulf of Oman, which opens to 
the Arabian Gea and the Indian Ocean, Since the <-nd of World War II, 
with the development of the extensive petroleum resources which are 
found in the Arabian Gulf area, th£ importance of the strait as an 
international waterway has notably increased. In 1973 it was shown 
that an average of one oil tahker every fourteen minutes passed 
through it, and that about 17 million barrels of oil-roughly a 
2*. The Arabs have called the Persian Gulf as Arabian Gulf 
although in general terms it is still a disputed Question, 
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third of the non-communist world's consumption-left the Arabian 
Gulf through this narrow strait daily. Geographically, the 
Strait of Hoirrauzi 
lies between Iran on the north and north-west and Oman on the 
south. Its northern shores are formed by the eastern part of 
Quishm island together with its off-lying islands of Jezirat 
Henjam, Its southern shores are formed by the western and northern 
sides of Musandam Peninsula, the most northerly part of the 
mainland of Oman, and its offlying islets. 
Prom the Gulf of Oman the approach to the Strait is in a 
northerly direction and is about 30 miles wide. The Strait Itself 
runs in a general south-westerly direction; it is constricted to a 
breadth of 20 3/4 miles at the northern and between Jezirat Larak 
and Great Quihni Island the general width ia about 28 miles. 
The twelve-mile territorial seas of Iran and Oaan overlap 
in the narrower part of the Strait of Hormuz, leaving no high seas 
area within this part. However, since the strait is used for 
international navigation between the high seas of the Gulf of Oman 
and those of the Arabian Gulf, innocent passage of foreign ships 
through the strait cannot be suspended. This is by virtue of the 
customary rule laid down in the Corfu Channel case, 1949, and 
restated in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and referred to 
above. The Strait of Hormuz would also quality for the application 
of the rule concerning 'transit passage' through straits, which 
as mentioned above, is being considered at the Third Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. At that conference, however, Oman and Iran 
stressed that any proposed rules concerning passage through 
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intc mational straits should boser* on th concept of 
innocent passage and not on thr- right of 'transit pa.^ -.age'. 
It may be further observed that the 1972 Ornani dccree 
conci rnlnq territoricil nea .j] : o r.pcak'i of the prind^jje of 
innocent pas.-^ age of r.hips and planes of other Stater; through 
internaLional sLraitSo 
CHAPTER - VI 
APPENDIX - I 
NOTES;-
Marine Pollution Control 
Since tht-y bordc^ j thf M< di t orran* an Sra, thf Red and 
the Arabian Gulf/ which may be decribed as some of the busiest 
international trade routes and most vulnerable to oil pollution, 
the Middle Eascern States have a general as well as direct 
interest in the control of marine pollution. In the Arabian Gulf 
the transport of oil is by far the largest item- of maritime 
traffic. It was estimated that in December 1972 a daily total 
of 19V2 million barrels (2,9 million tons) of crude oil were 
produced from oil wells in the surrounding countries and in the 
St a bed of the Arabian Gulf/ and that about 90 per cent of this 
enormous quantity (in the foirm of either crude oil or refined 
products) retjuired the services of tv;enty-five to thirty large 
tankers daily, th( average cargo of each exceeding 100,000 tons. 
It has also been indicated that about one-tenth of the total 
pjoductlon of crudo oil in tht; Arabltin Gulf comes f rom a larrie 
number of sea wells. Hence the risk of oil pollution/ whether 
from sea bed activities or shipping is too great, particularly in 
view of the shallowness of the waters of the Arabian Gulf. In the 
event of a major accident in the narrow Strait of Hormus or any 
part of the Arabian Gulf, all shipping could corns to a halt for a 
considerible time and would cost the oil-exportina littoral States 
millions of dollars a day. Serious harm, also, could be done to 
the rich marine life of the waters of the Gulf. 
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The Red Sea* linking Europe with Asia and Africa* is also 
exposed to oil pollution from oil tankers and other traffic which 
ply through it. 
Despite this, few steps have so far been taken by the 
Middle Eastern States, at the national, regional or international 
level, to establish legal requirements for the control of marine 
pollutiono 
A« International Level - Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Democratic Yemen are parties to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil, 12 May 1954, as amended 13 April 1962. The other 
Middle Eastern ^tates have so far not ratified this convention, 
and it appears that none has yet taken action on other multilateral 
anti-pollution measures, including the 1972 London convention on 
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dxanping of Wastes and other 
Matter, and the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973» The latter designates the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and the 'Gulf area* ~ that is, 
the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman - among the 'Special areas' 
that required additional precautions for the protection of the 
marine environment. 
B. Regional Level - Pirst,^  as regard the Arabian Gulf, at a 
conference held in Kxiwait on 15-24 April 1978 the States 
participating - Bahrain, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - adopted and signed the 
iii 
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation in the Protection 
of the Marine Environment from Pollution and a Protocol concerning 
Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution- by Oil and other 
Hairraful Substances in Cases of Emergency, 
Reference may also be made to tht agreement concluded 
on 11 July 1972 to deal with oil spillages resulting from offshore 
operations in the Gulf, Undet this agireeccient, thirteen oil 
companies in the region have established the Gulf Area Oil 
Companies Mutual Aid Organisation for the purpose of providing a 
joint capability to clear up oil spills larger than could be dealt 
with by a single party. Membership of the organisation is open 
to all oil companies working in the Arabian Gulf area. Each 
participant is required to submit oil^spill contingency plans and 
to keep on hand specified quantities of equipment and supplies to 
be made available to other participants in emergencies. 
During a conference held in January 1976 in Jedda# Saudi 
Arabia, at the invitation of the Arab League Educ«itional# Cultural 
and Scientific Organisation (ALECSO), to study the issue of 
scientific reseai:x:h on, and the preservation of, the marine 
environment of the Red-Sea basin and the Gulf of Aden# the 
participants-Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, the Republic of Somalia, 
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Democratic Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic-
decl«Lred that the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden were part of their 
national responsibility. Accordingly, the Jedda Declaration added, 
these States intended to shoulder their responsibility as regards 
conservation of environmental conditions from the dangers of 
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pollution and environmental degradation. It also declared that 
the States would co-operate in setting up a network for monitoring 
the meteorology of the environment of the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden; in adopting a convention for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment of these waters? and in 
establishing a regional programme for scientific research as well 
as a special fund to finance such a programme, 
C. National Level - In Oman the 1974 'Marine Pollution Control 
Law* establishes a 'Pollutionrfree zone* enconpassing the twelve-
mile territorial sea of the sultanate and those waters extending 
for thirty-eight nautical miles beyond the territorial sea. Where 
the coast of another State is opposite or adjacent to the coast of 
Oman, the limits of the 'Pollution-free Zone' will not extend 
beyond such limits as may have been agreed to with such other 
States or, if there is no such agreement, the median line shall 
be the boundary line, Oman has already concluded an agreement 
with the opposite State, Iran, delimiting the boundary of the 
continental shelf areas between the two States, 
Under the Omani law the term 'pollutant' is defined to 
include oil or oily mixture; any substance of a dangerous or 
noxious nature such as sewage, refuse, waste or garbage which, if 
added to any waters, would degrade those waters to an extent that 
is detrimental to their use by man or by any animal, fish or plant 
that is useful to mam any water which contains a substance such as 
the aforementioned: and any substance which may be designated by 
the Minister concerned to be a pollutant. The Omani law makes it 
illegal for any person to discharge a 'pollutant' into the 
•Pollution-free zone* from a vessel, a place on land, or an oil 
transmission apparatus. It is also illegal for any vessel to 
discharge a 'pollutant* into the 'Pollution-free zone'; and for 
any vessel registered in the sultanate to discharge a 'pollutant' 
into any waters beyond the 'Pllution-free zone' of Oman, 
Other provisions of the Omani law deal with such matters as 
relate to violations of the law, record-keeping, reporting and 
insurance requirements, enforcement, and civil liability for 
costs and damages. 
No other Middle Eastern State is known to have yet claimed 
a pollution control zone or passed any legislation concerning 
marine pollution contirol, but reference may be made to some legal 
instruments which made general reference to the problem of marine 
pollution. Thus Article 2 of the Iraqi Law No. 229 ..of 1970 
concerning 'Preservation of Oil wealth and Natural Hydrocarbons 
provides that all oil operations in the region of the Iraqi 
Republic including its territorial sea and continental shelf must 
be carried out 'in accordance with scientific and efficient 
methods, and in conformity with the safe practice of oil industry'. 
Article 3 states that the operator must take necessary measures to 
prevent, inter alia, pollution of the air, and surface and 
sub-surf ace water. 
It is understood that a draft law for the control of marine 
pollution .is still pendlhg before the Xc-anian Parliament, but the 
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Iranian Petroleum Act of 6 August 1974, which is applicable va th 
respect to petroleum operations in inland and coastal waters and 
the continental shelf, specifically provides thatj 
The National Iranian Oil Comply shall* during operations 
related to each agreement, be mindful and pay full attention to 
the conservation of the Natural Resources (especially Natural Gas ) 
and also prevention of pollution of the environment (air, water 
and land). The Party to the Agreement shall also be bound to 
observe in its operations all regulations announced and/or 
communicated to it by the Government or National Iranian Oil 
Company, for the said purpose. 
In April 1971 Iran and Russia took the first step towards 
reducing pollution in the Caspian Sea by signing a protocol which 
may lead eventually to a treaty on the prevention of pollution of 
the Caspian Sea, Iranian Officials claimed that the Caspian Sea 
hod been turned into a vast sev>?er by oil leakages and industrial 
waste. They believed that about 300,000 to 400,000 tons of oil 
steped into the Caspian each year from offshore wells. 
In Kuwait, Article II(2) of Law No.12 of 26 February 1964 
""Regarding Prevention of Pollution of Navigable Waters by Oil, 
which inplements the international Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, to which Kuwait is a party 
provides that the Minister of ^'inance and Industry may issue 
regulations to change the 'prohibited zones* described in Annex I 
of the law in accordance with any amendment of the provisions of 
the latter convention or any other convention ratified by the 
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state of Kuwait. It is also worth noting that in the offshore 
concession agreements with the government of Kuwait general 
reference was made to the problem of pollution. The agreements 
refer to the company proceeding'diligently with the drilling, but 
the provisions which dealt with pollution are marked by their 
brevity; 'the Company shall conduct its operations in a wor)ananlike 
manner and by scientific methods and shall take all reasonable 
measures ... to prevent the pollution of the sea (Kuwait, 
Ministry of Finance and oil. General Oil Affairs, The Oil of 
Kuwait - Pacts and Figures 3rd edn. August 1970, P.46). 
APPENDIX - II 
NOTES -
Exclusive fishing zones: exclusive economic zones: Both the 1958 
and 1960 Conferences on the Law of tht- Sea failed to produce any 
agreement on the question of exclusive fishex-ies jurisdiction, 
but, the prospects in the- further Law of the Sea Conference seem 
good for general agreement on a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
in which the coastal State v/ould have sovereign rights with 
regard to the living and non-living resources, and jurisdiction 
with regard to other activities, including scientific research 
and the preservation of marine environment. 
However, at December 1975, of the 129 coastal States 
seventy-six have claimed exclusive fishing zones of twelve nautical 
miles' limit, whereas thirty-six have claimed exclusive fishing 
zones in excess of the twelve-mile limit. As to the Middle 
Eastern States in particular, in their respective domestic 
continental shelf and territorial sea legislation many of them, 
including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
various members of the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, have 
expressly reserved their rights with respect to fishing in waters 
beyond the limits of the territorial sea. Up to the present, 
however, and with the exception of Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and Democratic Yemen, the Middle Eastern States appear 
to have made no effort to police or control fishing in waters 
beyond the' limits of their territorial seas. 
In 1972 and 1973 respectively Oman and Iran, which border 
on both tlie Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, followed the 
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precedent of other States which believed that fishing limits could 
be unilaterally decided upon, and each proclaimed an exclusive 
fishing zone of fifty nautical miles (in 1977 Oman extended its 
exclusive fishing zone to two hundred nautical miles) measured 
from the baselines of the territorial sea* but in the Arabian 
Gulf the limits of the Iranian exclusive fishing zone were said to 
be those of the waters superjacent to the Iranian continental 
shelf, which, it has been indicated, in general did not exceed 
fifty miles. According to the Iranian proclamation, where Iran 
had continental shelf demarcation agreements with other countires 
in the Gulf, the demarcation line would constitute the limits of 
the Iranian exclusive fishing zone, and where such agreements had 
not yet been concluded, unless otherwise agreed, the median line 
between the Iranian and opposite or adjacent shores would be 
considered the limit of the exclusive fishing zone of Iran, Iran 
has indicated that in the Gulf of Oman, as in the case of the 
exclusive fishery zones proclaimed by Pakistan and Oman, the 
criterion of fifty nautical miles had been adopted because there 
the continental shelf e nds abruptly a short distance from the 
coast. 
The Omani proclamation expressly provides that the sultanate 
exercises sovereign rights over its exclusive fishing zone for the 
purposes of exploring, developing and exploiting its living 
resources, 'including but not limited to fish'. 
The Iranian proclamation was made, according to its 
Preamble, in order to 'safeguard the fishing rights and interests 
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of Iran in the seas adjacent to its coast and the coast of its 
islands'. The Preamble added that the coastal communities of 
Iran have throughout history been engaged in fishing activities 
in the seas adjancent to the Iranian coast and that the natural 
resources of these seas are of 'vital importance to the economic 
and social progress of Iran', Introducing the proclamation to 
the Iranian Parliament, the Foreign Minister of Iran told the 
Majlis that 'overfishing by foreign trawlers was depleting the 
fish stock in Iranian territorial waters. 
In 1974 Saudi Arabia and Qatar issued declarations claiming 
e:i<clusive sovereign rights in zones contiguous to their territorial 
seas. The Qatar declaration reaffirms the rights of Qatar in its 
continental shelf as asserted in the proclamation of June 1949, 
and states that, in the zones contiguous to the territorial sea 
of its coast and the coasts of its islands, the State of Qatar 
alone has the exclusive sovereign rights with^respect to fishing 
and all related activities and the exploitation and conservation 
of the marine wealth and natural resources an^ ^ the rights with 
regard to the construction of installations and safety and 
control zones, and any type of research. The outer limits of 
those zones would be defined according to bilateral agreements 
already concluded with Qatar, but where no such agreements existed, 
and unless otherwise agreed, the limits would be defined by 
reference to the outer limits of the continental shelf of Qatar 
or to the median line bfetween the baselines of the territorial 
seas of Qatar and the opposite or adjacent State concerned. 
xi 
The Saudi declaration, which applies to the coasts of 
Saudi Arabia in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, asserts 
•exclusive fishing zones' in areas not specifically determined 
but stated to be 'contiguous to the coasts of the Kingdom and the 
coasts of its l5lsands, from the coastal sea (i.e. territorial sea) 
of the Kingdom towards the high seas'. Thus there is some 
obscurity about the outer limits of the Saudi exclusive fishing 
zone, but it appears that they correspond to the median line 
between the baselines of the territorial seas of the coasts of 
Saudi Arabia and the coasts of the opposite or adjacent States, 
for the Saudi declaration stipulates that, if the exclusive 
fishing zone of Saudi Arabia should overlap with those of another 
coastal State, the boundary shall be the median line between the 
baselines of the territorial seas of the States concerned. 
Besides, the proclamation, referred to above, made by Iran and 
Oman had adopted similar criteria. 
If the above-considered claims of Iran^ , Oman, Saudi 
Arabia 'ind Qatar - and more particularly the claim of Qatar-are 
understood in conjunction with the respective continental shelf 
claims, discussed below, of these States, it would appear that 
these States are actually asserting claims which fall into line 
with the exclusive economic zone concept referred to above. 
It may be observed also that if, as Iran already suggested, 
similar actions with regard to fishing were to be taken by the 
other coastal States of the Arabian Gulf, the living resources 
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of the whole Gulf would be covered by the exclusive jurisdictions 
of the coastal States. Suggestions have already been made for 
declaring the Gulf an 'inland aea' like the 'Bay of St Lawrence', 
in an agreement between the littoral States, to enable them to 
control pollution as well as fishing activities. As mentioned 
in the days when pearl fisheries were of prime importance to the 
inhabitants of the Gulf recommendations were also made for 
treating it as a'mare clausum'for the purposes of pearl diving 
It is worth noting, however, that Kuv/ait has already stated 
that it favours the view that every coastal states should have 
•special rights' in a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, but 
does not approve of the 'principle of closing the Gulf to the 
fishing vessels which belong to the States not bordering on it.' 
According to Kuwait, such action would be contrary to the 
principle of freedom to fish the high seas. Kuwait added the 
fear that other States might apply the same principle against the 
interests of Kuwaiti fishing vessels. However, Kuwait considers 
that it is possible for the States bordering on the Gulf to agree 
among themselves to regulate fishing activities in the Gulf for 
the pourpose of the conservation of its fish resources, in 
accordance with the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 
Finally, in 1977 Democratic Yemen claimed an exclusive 
economic zone the. breadth of which exteds two hundred nautical 
miles from the baseline of its territorial sea. 
APPENDIX - III 
NOTES:-
Speciflc Reoionjl I.-^  ^ ucst Legal Problems 
of offshore boundaries in Lhe Arabian Gulf 
(1) Iran-Sharj dh-Umm al-Uais^ain - The uuestion Of Abu Husa? 
Abu Musa is an island situated to»-/ards the Arabian side of 
the Gulf, near the exit of the Strait of Hormuz, It lie-s about 
thii.ty-five miles of the coast of the United Arab Emirates 
(Sh.rjdh), and approximately forty-three milts off the Ir.mian 
coast. It has a surface area of approximately chirty square miles 
with a population of some 800 persons. Abu Musa is characterised 
by deep watej s providing good anchorage, and extensive deposits of 
red iron oxide which are excracted and exported. The island has 
been the subject of a long-standing dispute between Iran and 
Sharjah, however in 1971 a 'Memoranaum of understanding* was announced 
between the two. Befoxe examining this memorandum, it would De 
enlightening to describe briefly the conflicting claims of Iran and 
F arjah, and the dispute which arose in 1970 between Sharjah and 
neighbouring Umm al-Qaiv/ain and their respective oil concessionaires 
over a drilling location situated v-/ithin nine miles of Abu Musa, 
A. Iran-Sharjah; Conflicting Claims - In the summer of 1964 Abu 
Wusa was reportedly occupied by Iran, 'when a Persian ship put a 
buoy near the island. While the report was subsequently denied 
by Iran, it is nevertheless a clear indication that this island >has 
been the subject of a long-standing dispute between Iran and Sharjah. 
jciv 
The Iranian claim to sovereignity over the island is 
understood to be based on three pointst (1) that Abu Musa 
formerly belongec+to Iran and was handed over to Sharjah after the 
British entry into the Arabian Gulf; (2) that the British 
government formerly acknowledged Iran's ownership; and (3) that 
the security of the Gulf and the protection of sea routes 
justify the Iranian government's assertion of sovereignty over 
the island. 
The Iranian claim became more insistent when the British 
government announced its intention of withdrawing from the Gulf, 
and after the eruption of the dispute, discussed below, between 
Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain over an oil promising area about nine 
miles out to sea from Abu Musa. Thus on or about 19 May 1970 
Iran informed Her Majesty's government that in her view the 
island of Abu Musa and its territorial waters to a distance of 
twelve miles were under the soveignty of Iran. This assertion 
was reaffirmed in two letters dated 27 May and 23 June 1970 
respectively* communicated from the National Iranian Oil Company 
to Sharjah's oil concessionaire, Buttes Gas & Oil Company, in 
the letter of June 1970 NIOC informed Buttes, inter alia, that 
^His Imperial Majesty's Government reserves the right to 
take any action whatsoever to maintain its sovereignty over the 
island of Abu Musa and its Territorial waters' 
For its part, Sharjah asserted that the tribes on the 
island were branches of Arab tribes inhabiting Sharjah and that 
Abu Musat 
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has since ancient times been recognised as an Arab island, and 
has never before been settled by an foreign power, having always 
been administered by its Arab rulers along the Omani coast ... The 
British Government affirmed this historical right of the Arabs 
and of Sharjah specifically on every occasion, and stated its 
official view through Sir William Luce, the Representative of 
the British Foreign Secretairy in the ^ulf area, with the words: 
'The British Government did not seize Abu Musa from the Iranians 
and hand it over to Sharjah at the time of its entry into the 
Gulf. The British Government has since its entry into the Gulf 
considered Abu Musa to be Arab, and according to old documents in 
possession of the British Government the island was Arab 
In addition Sharjah considered thatt 
(a) The security interests of a country cannot under any 
circumstances justify the occupation of another's territory, nor 
can the portection of sea routes be used as an excuse for claiming 
sovereignty over an island belonging to another state. 
(b) Abu Musa has no militai^f importance in the strategic 
sense, since it is well kno^m that Iran possesses the most modern 
aircraft and ijost powerful naval units and can therefore cover any 
area of the Arabian Gulf with its modem weapons without making 
use of Abu Musa. Moreover, Iran has seized the island of Sirri, 
only some twenty miles distant from Abu Musa, and - assuming its 
object is security and protection of sea routes - is capable of 
doing so from this island or other Iranian islands at the entranc
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of the Gulf, which forms a bottleneck foiown as the Straits of 
Ho rmuz • 
B. Sharjah -- UMM al-Qaiwaln; Disagreement - During November 
and December 1969 two offshore oil concessions were awarded to 
two American oil companie s in the adjoining Gulf States of Umm 
al-Qaiwain and Sharjah, These were the concession agreements of 
18 November 1969 between Umm al-Qaiwain and Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation, ejid that 29 December 1969 between Sharjah and Buttes 
Gas & Oil Company. Under the former agreement Occi<iental has the 
concession for 'the territorial and offshore waters of Umm al-
Qaiwain'. In the latter agreement the concession area was 
defined to include: 
All the territorial waters of the mainland of Sharjah 
within the jurisdiction of the Ruler, all islands within the 
jurisdiction of the Ruler and the territorial waters of the 
said islands and all the area of the sea bed and subsoil lying 
beneath the v/aters of the Arabian Gulf contiguous to the said 
territorial waters over which the ^uler e^cercises jurisdiction 
and control. 
These concessions were approved by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in conformity with the special treaty relations 
under which the British government at that time managed the 
international relations of the Trucial States, The maps issued 
by the Foreign Office at the time of the granting of the concessionc 
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showed a three-mile limit for Sharjah's territorial waters 
around the island of Abu Musa; they also showed that the 
concession of Occidental included the sea bed to the east of 
the island of Abu Musa beyond the said three miles. According 
to H.M, Government the areas of the two concessions were 
delimited on the basis of a sea boundary agrcfmtnt concluded 
betv/een Sharjah and Umm al-Uaiwain in 1964, 
However, as indicated earlier, in 1970 a dispute between 
Sharjah and Umm al-(i^aiwain and their respective oil concession-
aires erupted over an oil drilling location situated within nine 
miles off the island of Abu Musa and about thirty-two miles off 
the coast of Umm-al-Qaiwain, The dispute arose following the 
discovery by an operating company in early 1970 in thet location 
of favourable indications of an extensive oil and gas-bearing 
structure. Matters came to a head in 1970, when British naval 
units prevented Occidental from taking a drilling rig to the 
promising area. As a result of their action Occidental attempted 
to sue the British government for damages. Eventually the 
dispute was stopped by direct British intervention and a three-
month drilling stand-off in the disputed area was called, pending 
an investigation of the whole matter by a third party. Sir 
Gawain Bell was latfer appointed as mediator between the various 
factions, 
Umm al-Qaiwain claimed that the drilling location in 
question fell within the offshore concession area granted to its 
concessionaire. Occidental Petroleum, because it fell beyond the 
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three-mile limit originally claimed around Abu Musa. This view 
v/as based on an assertion by Umm al-Qaiwain that, according to 
the above-mentioned 1964 sea boundary agreement, Sharjah agreed 
that Umm al-Qaiwain should have soverign rights up to three 
miles off Abu Musa (thus leaving Abu Musa with three miles of 
territorial sea). This was contested by Sharjah, which agrued 
that the 1964 agreement was about 'sea boundaries' and not 'sea 
bed boundaries', as the English translation from the Arabic puts 
it; that the agreement related to the points of departure and 
the compass courses of the lines of certain lateral boundaries 
and that there was no evidence of any agreement touching frontal 
boundaries, nor of any agreement touching the breadth of which the 
territorial sea might be established. In addition Sharjah, which 
considt red the location to be within the oconcession area it had 
granted to Buttes Gas & Oil, asserted that the area never had been 
or could be within the jurisdiction and control of Umm al-Qaiwain 
because it fell within the twelve-mile territorial sea of Abu 
Musa as established by the first decree concerning the territorial 
sea of Sharjah and its dependencies which was made on 10 September 
1969, antedating the concession held by Occidental, (Occidental 
alleged that this decree was fraudulently backdated), Moreover, 
Sharjah said that '(ii) even apart from the effect of that Decree 
the area is within the 'contiguoi s zone' of jurisdiction and has 
, < 
been at all material times, and that (iii) even supposing neither 
the September Decree nor the contiguous zone were to have effcct 
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of excluding a claim by Umm al-Qaiwairi/ the area is still within 
Sharjah's sovereign rights on the continental shelf recognised 
by gentral international law! 
Sir Gawain Bell was unsuccessful in his mediation, but 
follov/ing intensive negotiations with Sir William Luce, Britain's 
special envoy in the Arabian Gulf# Sharjah and Iran agreed on a 
'Memorandum of Understanding', examined belwo, concerning future 
arrangements in respect of the island of Abu Musa and its twelve-
mile territorial sea, Umm al-^aiwain demanded the cancellation of 
the memorandum on the ground that the Sharjah authorities were not 
compettent to sign such an agreement. Following the discovery 
of oil in the disputed location by Buttes Gas and Oil in 1972, the 
government of Umm al-Oaiwain announced its intention of taking 
legal action against the company, though no such action is known 
to have been entered upon. 
The controversy between Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain was 
followed by litigation between their respective oil concessionaires 
before both United States and British courts. In the United States 
a private anti-trust suit brought by Occidtntal against Buttes 
Gas & Oil alleged that the latter had conspired with Sharjah, Umm 
al-Qaiwain, Great Britain and Iran to deprive Occidental of the 
oil-rich portion of its concession area from Unm al-Qaiwain. On 
17 April 1971 the district court in Califomia,dismissed the suit 
on the ground that the doctrine of 'acts of state' as applied in the 
United States precluded any enquiry into acts of foreign sovereigns 
even if allegedly included and procured by the defendants. The 
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dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals on 
23 June 1972, and on 24 October 1972 the Supreme Court denied a 
petition for a write of certiorari. A further action by-
Occidental was brought towards the end of 1974 in the VJestem 
Louisiana district court, in which the company claimed title to 
the crude oil produced by Buttes Gas & Oil from the disputed 
location. The court, however, entered judgement in favour of 
Buttes, stating that no rights of Occidental had been confiscated 
by any of the countries involved; that in law Occidental would 
be unable to prove that it had any concessionary rights at the 
time Buttes produced the oil; and that a decision on possible 
confiscation of rights would involve determining a boundary 
dispute between Iran, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain. 
Meanwhile in England on 15 October 1970 Buttes issued a 
writ of slander against Occidental and its chairrman, who in a 
press conference had accused Buttes of wrong-dealing. On 7 April 
1972 Occidental put in a defence and counter-claim. It affirmed 
that the accusation was true in substance and in fact, pleading 
fair comment on a matter of public interest. In a-idition, it 
counter-claimed against Buttes for conspiracy and made a claim 
for damages for libel in respect of a circular sent to Buttes 
shareholders. On 31.July 1974 Mr, Justice May struck out the 
conspiracy counter-claim on the grougds that allegations of 
conspiracy would involve investigation of matters which were 'acts 
of state' of the governments of Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Iran and 
the United Kingdom, and were not justiciable in the courts of 
England, But the Jud^e allowed the action to continue in regard 
to the slander and the counter-claim in respect of the libel. In 
the Court of Appeal, which considered the matter on 5 December 
1974, Lord Denning, M.R., allowed an interlocutory appeal by 
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occidental but dismissed a cross-appeal by Buttes. Lord Denning he 
held that there was no ground for striking out the counter-claim 
of conspiracy and no ground for saying that the counter-claim of 
libel should not proceed. He said that the courts of England had 
never extended the doctrine of 'acts of state* so as to prevent 
the defendants in such a case from pleading justification and 
proving the facts relied on, even though incidentally it would 
mean enquiring into acts done by a foreign power. But, Lord D 
Denning added, it was well settled that the English courts would 
not enquire into the validity or invalidity of the legislation 
Or decrees of a foreign.government which had been recognised by 
the government of the United Kingdom; he further noted that none 
of the claims in the action or counter-action sought to challenge 
the validity of any foreign legislation or decrees. All that was 
sought was compensation for the consequences of them. However, the 
case before the Court of ^Vpeal was only interlocutory and the 
trial of the action is in theory still pending, 
C. I ran-Sharj ah: Mfcmorandum of Understanding - As has bt en 
indicated, through intensive efforts by the British government 
Iran and Shar^gih agreed on a 'Memorandum of Understanding' 
concerning future arrangements in respect of the islnnd of Abu 
Musa and its territorial waters. (The unr^crstanding was first 
announced on 29 Novembf r 1971 by the then ruler of Sharjah. Just 
twenty-four hours after the ruler's announcement Iran's Prime 
Minister told the Iranian parliament that Iranian troops had landed 
on the Greater and Lesser Tumbs the day before and, taking up 
strategic positions on Abu Musa, had hoisted the Iranian flag there. 
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The unf^'erstanding does not determine the question of 
sovereignty over the island. For, under its terms/ 'Neither 
Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim to Abu Mi^ sa nor recognise 
the other's claim. Thus the settlement appears to be of a 
temporary nature. Against this background the parties have 
agreed upon certain arrangements concerning jurisdiction and 
other related matters. It has been agreed that Iranian troops 
will be stationed in areas the extent of which is shown on a 
map attached to the memorandum. Within the agreed areas 
occupied by Iranian troops Iran will have full jurisdiction and the 
Iranian flag will fly'. Sharjah's rights of jurisdiction are 
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described with some ambiguity: Sharjah will retain full 
jurisdiction over the remainder of the island. The SharjahSflag 
will fly over the Sharjah police post on the same basis as the 
Iranxon flag will fly over the Iranian military quarters'. 
Apparently Sharjah's garrison police post will be purely symbolic 
while the presence of Iranian troops will ensure for Iran control 
of the Strait of Hormuz. 
According to the memorandum both Iran and Sharjah 
recognised a twelve-mile limit of territorial waters around Abu 
Musa# and agreed that the exploitation of the petroleum resources 
of the Island and the sea bed and subsoil beneath its territorial 
sea would be carried out by Buttes Gas & Oil Company under the 
terms of its concession with the ruler of Sharjah. Revenues 
accruing from ail exploitation would be shared equally between 
Iran and Sharjah. It was also agreed that a 'financial assistance 
agreement will be signed between Iran and Sharjah'. In 
implementation of this provision an aid agreement was signed by 
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the two countries/ which provides for an annual payment by Iran 
of £1,500,000 for a period of nine years to the government of 
Sharjah to be used for public purposes. This payment will, 
however, cease when Sharjah's revenues from oil discovered in the 
area of Abu Musa reach a rate of £3,000,000 a year,^ Finally, 
under the memorandum, Iranian and Sharjah nationals would have 
equal fishing rights in the territorial sea of ^bu Musa, 
Although the validity of the arrangements regarding the 
island of ^bu Musa has been challenged by some Arab States on 
the groxmds that the then ruler of Sharjah concluded it under 
duress and that in any event he had had no authority to sign such 
an agreement, the new ruler stated on 2 February 1972 that 
Shajah intends to stand by its agreement with Iran. He added, 
however, that he would seek a new 'understanding with the Shah of 
Iran', As regards the United Arab Emirates, of which Sharjah is 
a member, it has been observed that the U,AoR, 'does not appear 
(to have) announced it position towards the Abu Musa Agreement, 
and it remains doubtful, therefore, whether the U.A,E. has 
legally succeeded to the obligations under the said agreement. 
(2) Iran-Ras al-Khaimahi the question of the Tumb islands 
As mentioned above, on 30 November 1971 Iran landed troops 
on the three saall, but strategically placed, islands of Abu Musa 
Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb, which lie in the exit from the Strait 
of Hormuz, the important seaway at the entrance of the Arabian 
Gulf. Greater Tumb (Tumb Kubra or Tanb-e-Bozorg), the easternmost^ 
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lies about fifteen miles from the approximately sixty-mile 
long Iranian island of Queshm, which is separated from the 
Iranian mainland by the narrow and intricate Clarence Xor 
Khuran) Strait, and about forty miles from the Arabian mainland. 
Lesser Tumb (Tumb Sughra or Nabiy Tumb), approximately eight 
miles west of its sister island, lies about twenty miles from 
Qeshm and forty-five miles from the Arabian side. The former 
island has about 150 Arab inhabitants, and the latter is 
virtually uninhabited. 
During the whole perio3 of British control the Tumb 
islands were considere part of the territory of Ras al-Khaimah, 
and the United Kingdom held the view that the islands belonged 
to Ras al-Khaimah. Nevertheless, since the two islands have 
long been claimed by Iran, Britain seems to believe that some 
arrangement about the future of the Tumbs should have been worked 
out between Iran and Ras al-Khaimah by the time of the British 
withdrawal from the ^ulf at the end of 1971, The British 
government, it is stated, made great efforts to this end, but 
it was not possible to achieve an agreed solution because the 
ruler of Ras al-Khaimah felt he could not reach an agreement 
with Iran. 
Iran claims the islands as Iranian territory: 
Vor more than a century, beginning in 1770, British maps 
marked the Tumb islands being Persian ....o these islands form 
part of a group of islands virtually constituting an archipelago, 
all of which has always been part of Iran, 
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However, it is clear that Iran had felt it necessary, because 
the- islands were of vital strategic importance, to control them 
after the British withdrawal. 
Though in the case of Abu Musa the landing of Iranian 
troops, as shown above, was in pursuance of the 'Memorandum of 
Understanding' between Sharjah and Iran, no such agreement 
existed in the case of the Tumbs, The occupation of these islands 
took place just one day before the United Kingdom ended its 
special treaty relations with Ras al-Khaimah and the territory 
became completely independent. Iran's action was strongly 
condemned by several Arab States, and on 9 December 1971 the 
Security Council of the United Nations began a consideration of 
a complaint by Algeria. Iraq, Libya and the People's Democratic 
Republic of yemen about 'dangerous situation in the Arabian Gulf 
area arising from the occupation by armed forces of Iran' of three 
islands in the Gulf on 30 November 1971o The representative of 
the United Arab Emirates felt that Iran's action was 'untenable' 
both historically and judicially* and thc-it it was contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations, He also said that: 
The British Government itself has on nuineious occasions 
stated its belief that these islands were Arab and that the 
Iranian claim to them was not based on any legitimate historical 
or legal basiso 
The British government was criticised by several Arab States 
on the grounds th>at at the time of the occupation Britain was still 
technically responsible for the islands' defence and in theory 
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should have come to Ras al~Khaimah's rescue. Thus the 
representative of Iraq* with regard to the two TurnbS/ stated that'. 
The Government of the United Kingdom always acknowledged 
and reaffirmed on various occasions that they were an integral 
part of Ras al-Khaimah, and that they were Arab i.slands. 
Accordingly, the United Kingdom has failed to honour its obligations 
tov/ards Ras al-Khaimah in not defending those two islands/ where 
protection was a British responsibility. 
The delegate of Kuwait said that his government had told 
Iran that: 
it could refer the case to the International Court of 
Justice or accept arbtration. But all our bids for a peaceful 
solution were turned down. Iran (he continued) cannot adjust 
itself/ apparently/ to the undisputed fact that these islands 
have always been Arab islands and that the continuation of free 
passage through the Strait of Homuz is not only essential to 
Iran's economic life but also equally essential and vital to 
Kuwait/ Iraq and the other littoral States of the Gulf. The Gulf 
is our sole economic lifeline. 
Notwithstanding the complaint of the Arab States/ the 
Iranian seizure of the Tumb islan'ds continued. From a legal point 
of view Iran's action was indefensible: it is certainly a manifest 
breach of the international law prohibitions enshrined in Article 
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. From ancient times 
the islands have always been rpcocfnised as Arab and as part of the 
territory of Ras al-Khaimah. 
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It is interesting to observe that before the Iranian 
landing on Abu Musa and the two Tumb islands the Shah of Iran 
argued that Iran should have the islands. 
for strategic reasons. It is true that they could be 
flattened by Iran's Phantoms if they were ever to fall into 
the wrong hands; but his aim is clearly to prevent such a 
confrontation/ with all its explosive potential from occurring 
in the first place. Iran, he argues, should be awarded 
sovereignty. At least (as Britain has informally suggested by 
way of compromise) Iran must get garrisoning rights. 
Clearly this argument is political and not legal. 
ISLANDS OF WARBAH AIJD BUBIYAN 
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APPENDIX - IV 
NOTES:-
bpecific Regional IssuessLeqal Problems of Offshore 
Boundaries in the Arabian Gulf. 
B. Outstanding Probems 
* 
(1) Iraq-Kuwait Dispute Over Warbah and Bubiyan - Warbah 
(or Warba) and Bubiyan are two barren and virtually uninhabited 
islands in the north-west corner of the Arabian Gulf. The two 
islands are very close to each other and to the mainland of 
Kuwait, and are within less than a mile from Iraq's ten-nautical-
mile stretch of coastline along the Arabian Gulf, They dominate 
the channel between Iraq's main port on the Gulf, Umm Qasr, and 
the Gulf itself, and thus command the narrow maritime lane through 
which Basrah-bound shipping has to pass. In 1905 Lorimer stated 
that: 
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Excluding the island of Bubiyan, which is claimed by the 
Shaikh of Kuwait but is at present (1905) occupied by the Turks, 
and the island of Warbah, the ownership of which naturally follov/s 
thcit of Bubiyan, wc may reckon the maritime possessions of Kuwait 
to consist of Failakah which, with its northern and southern 
outliers of Mashjan and Auhah, is situated at the mouth of Kuwait 
Bay, and the islets of Kubbar, Qaru and Umm al-Maradim,, 
In an agreomfnt signed between Kuwait and Iraq on 4 Octobcr 
1963 Iraq agreed to recognise the independence of the State of 
Kuv/ait and its complete sovereignty whithin the boundaries 
indicated in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 
21 July 193 2 and which was accepted by the ruler of Kuwait in a 
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letter dated 10 August 1932, The letter of the Iraqi Prime 
Minister indicates the land frontier between Kuwait and Iraq 
and further recognises that the islands of 'Warbah, Bubiyan, 
Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah. Auha, Kubar, Qaru, and Urnm al-
Maradim belong to Kuwait! 
Moreover, the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan and their 
territorial waters were included in the concession area granted 
by Kuwait to Kuwait Oil Co, Ltd. under an agreement dated 30 
December 1951. The two islands were also part of the concession 
area held by Kuwait Spanish Petrolevun Company under an agreement 
between the latter and Kuwait ratified on 6 May 1968. 
However, the present disagreement between Kuvrait and Iraq 
over Warbah and Bubiyan erupted on 20 March 1973 when Iraqi troops 
were reported to have occupied Kuwaitis Samitah police P9st in 
the frontier area, just south of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. 
According to Kuwait, the real cause of that incident was an 'Iraqi 
demand for Kuwait to relinquish its sovereignty over the two 
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan.' Kuwait later explained that, 
following the start of work on the development of the Iraqi North 
Romaila oilfield, Iraq approached Kuwait regarding its need for a 
suitable site for its proposed new deep-water oil terminal at the 
head of the ^ulf. Kuwait responded by pointing out that all the 
waters surrounding the Kuwaiti islands were shallow, whereas deep 
waters are to be found off Kuwait proper, and that Kuwait was 
prepared to facilitate the passage of Iraq pipelines across its 
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territory for eventual linking up with the proposed terminal, 
Iraq/ it was further added* responded by sut^itting to Kuwait a 
draft agreement on this project which was found unacceptable and 
was rejected by Kuwait. At the same time Kuwait issued two 
official statements which affirmed that Kuwait's borders with 
Iraq were internationally recognised frontiers and had been 
defined under an agreement concluded between the two countries 
in 1963. 
The Iraqi attitude was expressed by the Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, who stated that 'it is not that we want to take the 
islands from Kuwait, but rather that we are relinquishing our 
claim to Kuwait on account of them^ and that 'the two islands are 
of the utmost importance to us and our condition for demarcating 
the boundaries is that they should be Iraqi.' The Foreign 
Minister added, 'There is an exchange of letters or agreement 
between us and the Kuwaitis, but there is no legal document 
defining the boundaries, ,,,' 
With a view to discussing the entire boundary issue between 
the two countries, official talks between Kuwait and Iraq were 
held in April and August 1973 but ended inconclusively, reportedly 
because Iraq insisted on having the two islands of Bubiyan and 
Warbah leased to her, while Kuwait was adamant in its refusal to 
even consider such a request. At the same time Kuwait insisted 
on discussing only the 1932 and 1963 border pacts. 
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More recently, however, the Deputy Prime Minister 
of Kuwait said that Kuwait is willing to lease to Iraq 
the island of './arbah and a stretch of coastline to enable 
hf-i to pxpinri thr' port oi Umm Uaar, in rftum for a 
piece of Iraqi territoryo He added, Kuwait could not 
consider les-sing Bubiyan because it lies in 'the heart 
of Kuwait'. In addition, on 12 July 1975, the Nitional 
Assembly of Kuwait adopted a resoiution which, while 
expressing support for 'the positive steps v/hich the 
Government has taken at all levels, designed to reach 
full mutual understanding' with Iraq, stres;3C-d 'Kuwait's 
sovereignty over all its territory within the borders 
which have be- n approved in accordance v/ith international 
and bilateral agreement between Kuwait and its neighbours, 
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